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PART I: Legal and descriptive analysis 
1. Summary 
1.1. Aims and methodology 
The aim of Part I of this study is to identify and prioritize the effects of the changes stemming 
directly from the single market programme (SMP) on the conditions under which third-
country products (defined to include goods and internationally traded services) can gain access 
to the European market. This is achieved through a qualitative and targeted assessment, 
supported by quantifiable indicators where possible, of the changes in market access regime. 
This analysis identifies clearly the balance of probabilities concerning the way in which third-
country products have been affected. 
The study strikes a balance between a very narrow definition of SMP measures and the 
broader policy environment in which they have been implemented. To a degree, the SMP 
changes, narrowly defined, are neutral vis-à-vis third parties: their actual impact has been 
conditioned by the environment in which they have been implemented. 
The methodology used to assess and prioritize change is based upon an eclectic use of 
empirical observation and literature on perceptions of gain and loss (Chapter 3). This reflects 
the methodological and practical problems of measuring some effects in a wholly objective 
fashion and the differing stages of implementation. In cases where the SMP measures are not 
yet fully implemented, the analysis seeks to identify the type and scale of effect that will 
accrue once implementation is complete. 
1.2. Findings 
1.2.1. National barriers to trade 
In terms of the immediacy and directness of impact, the dismantling of national barriers to 
trade has had the most effect on conditions of access for those third-party suppliers that were 
adversely affected by them. Before the SMP there existed a bewildering array of formal and 
informal national-level trade restrictions, given practical effect through national control of 
internal frontiers and the use of Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome (Chapter 4). The number of 
these restrictions was well into five figures, most but by no means all on textiles and clothing. 
Although a precise measurement of their effect in practice is prevented by methodological and 
data problems, there are good reasons to suppose that they did restrict imports of some 
products from some suppliers. 
The SMP has swept away most of these formal restrictions, other than those relating to textiles 
and clothing and to China. Although some formal barriers may have been replaced by informal 
controls, it seems clear that the scale of sub-Community restrictions on market access has been 
much reduced by the SMP (Chapter 5). Change in market access as a result of the SMP is very 
much a product-market-specific affair. However, the countries that will have gained most from 
communitization are the East Asian and South Asian states that were the most frequent targets 
of national quantitative restrictions (QRs). 
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1.2.2. Technical barriers to trade 
Of more widespread and, in the longer term, greater importance for the conditions of access of 
third-country products are the SMP changes in relation to technical barriers to trade (Chapter 
6). Before the SMP, differing technical standards were one of the most serious impediments to 
the free movement of goods within the Community. 
The process of technical harmonization and standardization has largely improved market 
access for products from outside the Community: transparency and legal certainty have 
increased, and design and production costs have probably been reduced. Where mutual 
recognition applies, barriers between Member States are removed without being replaced by 
barriers at the Community level. Under new approach Directives, EC measures are relatively 
flexible and, therefore, tend not to affect trade very adversely. 
To the extent that the SMP might have made market access more difficult, it is most likely to 
have done so with regard to technical harmonization. These measures are detailed and 
inflexible and thus harder to comply with than new approach Directives. In addition, there is 
reason to believe that, at least in some cases, in the pursuit of legitimate public policy 
objectives EC harmonization may have raised the stringency of some Member States' 
regulations, thus potentially impeding access for EC and third-country products to their 
markets. 
The impact of such market access changes cannot be assessed precisely because it will vary 
according to the nature of the firms that are affected. Technical barriers are the most important 
barriers to intra-EC imports and, therefore, relatively more important than for extra-EC 
imports. Also EC firms may be better able to take advantage of opportunities to exploit 
economies of scale. Although access to some Member State markets for some products may 
have been made more difficult by the SMP, the strong balance of probabilities is that trade in 
products for which gains will be unambiguous is much larger than in products which may be 
subject to new restrictions. 
1.2.3. Barriers to establishment and the provision of services 
A range of SMP measures tend to reduce barriers to the provision of services and to rights of 
establishment (Chapter 7). These may affect third parties but, for the most part, they do so by 
making it easier for foreign firms to establish operations in the EC. Hence, they fall within the 
ambit of this study only to the extent that such establishment facilitates the access to the EC 
market of third-country products. Since intra-firm trade represents a significant part of the 
total, there are likely to be such spill-overs. The gains will accrue mainly to countries with 
firms able to consider establishing themselves in the EC market, such as the USA. 
1.2.4. Changes to the business environment 
To the extent that changes to company law, taxation, intellectual and industrial property rights, 
and the free movement of persons make it easier for foreign-owned firms to operate within the 
Community, and to the extent that this facilitates intra-firm trade utilizing extra-EC products, 
then the changes may be relevant to this study (Chapter 8). In most cases, the changes to the 
business environment do represent an improvement for third-country producers, even though 
progress in some areas has been slow. High profile contrary cases, such as the 'Television 
without Frontiers' Directive, are relatively limited in extent. 
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1.2.5. Public procurement 
Public procurement is one area in which trade even within the EC has been heavily restricted 
in the past, and the removal of barriers represents an important element of the SMP (Chapter 
9). Even though the SMP regulatory regime permits a degree of discrimination against third 
countries, it provides some restriction on the scope ofthat discrimination. As a result, the EC's 
public procurement regime should provide better access for foreign companies than did the 
pre-SMP national preference regimes. Extra-EC supplies, however, form a tiny proportion of 
total public procurement, and so any gains are likely to be relatively modest in absolute terms, 
at least in the short to medium term. 
1.2.6. The liberalization of regulated industries 
The liberalization of the telecommunications and energy markets is unlikely to have major 
effects on the conditions of access for third-country products in the short term, but might have 
substantial effects in the future. When complete it could provide opportunities for third-party 
suppliers to enter the telecommunications and energy markets. By and large, foreign firms will 
have to establish themselves in the EC in order to take advantage of these opportunities. Thus, 
these changes are not the focal point of our study. 
1.3. Conclusions 
On balance, the SMP has improved rather than worsened the conditions under which third-
country products may be placed on the European market. In several ways the SMP has made it 
easier for third-country firms to participate in the EC market. Examples include eliminating 
national quantitative restraints, harmonizing customs procedures, increasing transparency and 
legal certainty, and decreasing market fragmentation. 
But since these changes will have affected firms in different ways, it is not feasible to produce 
a single, firm judgement on gains and losses. Even where no discrimination exists between 
European and third-country firms in the formal SMP measures, there could have been a 
practical difference in the effect of these changes. 
In a few limited cases, including financial services and public procurement, the SMP explicitly 
provides for discrimination against non-EC firms. This largely reflects the absence of 
comparable market access conditions in the EC's main trading partners. In spite of these 
provisions, market access conditions for third-country firms are probably better, and almost 
certainly not worse, than before the SMP. 
Because of the diversity of SMP measures, and of the pre-SMP situation as it affected 
particular suppliers, the actual impact of change will vary widely, depending upon the precise 
characteristics and circumstances of the product and supplier in question. Hence, it is perfectly 
possible that the overall conclusion of third-party gain is compatible with the existence of 
some cases in which particular third parties have suffered a clear deterioration in access for 
some products. 
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2. Introduction 
2.1. Aim of the study 
The purpose of Part I of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the external 
consequences of the SMP. It is not the only element in the programme of studies launched by 
the European Commission1 on the SMP that deals with external consequences, and its scope is 
influenced strongly by its relationship with these other studies and the need not to duplicate 
work. In particular, its parameters have been established in relation to the quantitative 
evaluation of the SMP in a number of sectoral case studies (Part II of this report) and by the 
other studies in Subseries IV (Impact on trade and investment). 
The essential characteristic of this study is summed up in the study proposal issued by the 
European Commission: 
The purpose of this study is not to provide a quantitative analysis of changes in trade or investment 
flows occasioned by these adjustments in market access. Rather the objective is to identify and 
prioritize any changes and conditions under which third-country products can be placed on the 
markets of the EU Member States which stem directly from completion of the Internal Market. 
Among the key words in this quotation are that the study should be concerned with: 
(a) identification and prioritization; 
(b) products; 
(c) changes stemming directly from the SMP. 
The aim of the report is to establish a clear picture of the ways in which the various elements 
of the SMP could have had external impacts, how the direction of these and their scale might 
be judged, and what such judgements would imply for countries and sectors. Where (as will 
often be the case) there exists scope for reasonable differences of opinion to exist over the 
judgement that should be made, the report aims to make it possible to identify the 
consequences of such changes for the conclusions reached. 
2.2. Boundaries of the study 
2.2.1. The approach adopted 
These directional beacons are important because the SMP is an enormously complex exercise 
of a nature and in a context that make the identification, let alone prioritization, of external 
effects a matter of considerable judgement. A strong emphasis has been put, therefore, on a 
mode of analysis that identifies clearly: 
(a) the approach adopted; 
(b) the choices made and the reasons for them; 
(c) the assumptions underlying the analysis and any qualitative or quantitative prioritization. 
Known as the 'Commission of the European Communities' in legal matters, its usual title now is 'European 
Commission". 
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The report presents a qualitative and targeted assessment of the changes in the market access 
regime for third-country products (defined to include goods and internationally traded 
services). This has involved varying levels of detail in the description of what has happened, 
why, and to what effect. In each case, the level of analysis has been selected in the light of the 
potential scale of effect on market access and of the amount of detail required to understand 
what has happened or might happen. 
This approach has involved choices in defining the boundaries of the study. These have been 
made in a measured way taking account, on the one hand, of the need established in the terms 
of reference to disregard changes 'not strictly related to the completion of the Internal Market' 
and, on the other, the requirement to explain sufficiently the contextual changes that have 
given the SMP measures their flavour. Many of these detailed choices are described in the 
relevant chapters of the report. The fundamental choices affecting the overall boundaries of 
the study are described in this introductory chapter and the next. 
2.2.2. The complexity of the SMP 
The complexity of the SMP is well known, but can perhaps be illustrated by the fact that this 
report reflects only one study out of a total of 39. The bulk of the research programme is 
concerned with identifying the nature of the changes and their impact on sectors, regions and 
policies within the European Community (EC).2 
The nature of the SMP exercise also adds complications since it was oriented primarily 
towards conditions on the European market, with little direct relation to the rest of the world. 
It is highly likely, therefore, that most of the external effects will be indirect in the sense of 
being consequences of SMP activities rather than their principal, or even secondary, objective. 
The absence of strong, tangible and direct external effects is evident in many of the sectoral, 
thematic and regional studies undertaken in this programme. 
2.2.3. The context of the SMP 
The most important complicating factor is the fact that the SMP did not occur in isolation. On 
the contrary, it occurred at a period of very substantial and particularly rapid change in other 
areas. This is likely to have had analogous and complementary effects on third parties. To a 
significant degree the SMP changes, narrowly defined, are neutral vis-à-vis third parties. Their 
actual and potential impact has been conditioned by the environment in which they have been 
implemented. A different environment would (and possibly could still) produce very different 
effects. 
These contextual changes include not only such obvious parallel activities as the negotiation 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round, the creation of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), the enlargement of the EC, the collapse of Communism in 
Eastern Europe and the negotiation of the Europe Agreements. They also include the 
substantial changes in conventional attitudes in recent years towards the role of the public and 
The events analysed in this report straddle a period in which European nomenclature has changed. Although the terms 
'European Communities' or 'EC' remain valid when referring to legislation implementing the Treaty of Rome, the term 
'European Union' has obtained widespread use following ratification of the Treaty on European Union. To avoid 
confusion, this report uses the terms 'EC' and 'Community' throughout when referring collectively to the Member 
States. 
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private sectors in economic affairs which contributed to, and were affected by, the SMP 
process. 
Some examples may illustrate the situation. The change in access conditions for third-country 
products resulting from the phase-out of national restrictions was the result both of the 
replacement of national with Community-level trade instruments (an SMP effect) and the 
nature of those successor instruments (which in some cases were shaped by the GATT and 
regional trade negotiations). Similarly, the effect of provisions on the abolition of bilateral 
restrictions on air transport between Member States (an SMP measure) on third-party access 
will be strongly influenced by the (non-SMP) trend towards liberalization of air service 
provision in many Member States. 
An illustration of the potential scope of the changes associated with the SMP is to be found in 
the following quotation drawn from a well regarded text on the EC (Wallace and Young, 
1996:127): 
Several themes ... run through the story of the single market: 
the impact of new ideas, as views about the European 'Welfare State' altered and 
Keynesianism was forced to compete with neo-liberalism as an alternative and potentially 
predominant paradigm in economic policy; 
the mobilization of industrial opinion and pressure in novel ways as a transnational 
phenomenon and a stimulus to policy change; 
the critical conjunction of changes to EC decision-rules with alterations in the relationships 
between the business community and policy-makers and in business responses to global 
markets; 
evidence of policy 'entrepreneurship', especially by the Commission, backed by a new 
coalition of supporters of change and the recasting of the old argument about 'Community 
preference'; 
the impact of 'statecraft' by and 'collusion' between top policy-makers from key Member 
States; 
the pervasive impact of European law and rulings from the European Court of Justice ... on 
the ways in which policy options were defined; 
the external dynamic of third-country competition and technological innovation; and 
the external projection of EC policy.' 
2.3. Guiding principles 
Two conclusions drawn from this review of the nature of the SMP have formed guiding 
principles for the study: 
(a) In many cases, access conditions have been shaped not by the SMP changes in isolation, 
but by the context within which they have been implemented. A judgement is required at 
many points to determine what are, and what are not, justifiably described as effects of 
the SMP on conditions of access for third-country products to the EC market. 
(b) In this grey area of the study, one of the most important objectives is to identify clearly 
the balance of probabilities in terms of the implications of the SMP, not least so that 
appropriate adjustments to the conclusions can be made by those who would form a 
different judgement on the appropriate range of factors that have been taken into 
account. 
Another complicating aspect of the SMP that has added two more guiding principles concerns 
implementation. Despite its earlier association with '1992', the SMP is a process and not a 
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date, and its extent varies between sectors. Some aspects with potentially major implications 
for the conditions of access of third-country products to the EC market have not yet been 
adopted, others are not fully implemented in practice, and others are in operation but have not 
been in position for long enough for their effects (if any) to be measurable in publicly 
available statistics. 
Given the task of the study, it would be inappropriate to concentrate only on those measures 
for which adequate, quantifiable data are available. The study's aim is to set out the ways in 
which all changes that might affect the conditions of access of third-country products to the 
EC market would produce these effects if implemented fully. To the extent that the rigorous 
analysis of data within tightly drawn parameters is an important part of the process of 
assessing the external effects of the SMP, it is more appropriately performed by Part II as well 
as by the other studies in the group on the impact on trade and investment. 
Because the study must cover the effects of instruments at different stages of implementation, 
for which different levels of data are available, it is not feasible to adopt a single methodology. 
Rather, the broad methodological approach described in Chapter 3 is applied in different ways 
in relation to the characteristics of each element of the SMP. Hence, the third and fourth 
guiding principles for the report are that: 
(c) an eclectic approach is required that gives highest importance to describing the ways in 
which a measure might affect third-party access to the EC market when it is fully 
implemented and if this is done in a particular way; 
(d) the methods used to assess the direction and scale of any such effects will vary 
considerably between measures according to the nature of the case. 
2.4. The research team and sources 
The principal authors of Part I of this report are Christopher Stevens and Alasdair Young. 
They have been supported by a research team at the Institute of Development Studies 
comprising: Arianna Calza Bini, Ulrike Hotopp, Jane Kerman, Paul Marsden and Costanza de 
Toma. An independent academie Study Advisory Board has provided research guidance. The 
Board's members are: Professor Helen Wallace (chair), Professor Iain Begg, Dr Stephany 
Griffith-Jones, Dr Nigel Grimwade, Professor Alasdair Smith. Dr Peter Holmes has attended 
the meetings of the Board in his capacity as a consultant to the Commission on the overall 
programme of studies on the effects of the SMP. 
A wide range of published and unpublished data and analyses have been consulted in this 
study. Some of it, but by no means all, has been supplied by the Commission. A number of 
international organizations have kindly made available information and documents that are not 
in the public domain; for obvious reasons neither these nor the views expressed by the 
officials concerned are referenced. The study has attempted to move substantially beyond what 
is already available in the many reports, articles and books dealing with the SMP and has 
succeeded in this aim at least in terms of the detail and breadth of coverage as well as in the 
precision of some of the quantification made. Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn represent no 
more than the authors' interpretation of limited information. 
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2.5. Organization of Part I of the report 
Chapter 3 sets out the main methodological parameters of the study and identifies, inter alia, 
the principal groups of SMP activity that are considered important for analytical purposes. 
Each of these is then subjected to review and analysis in the remaining chapters of Part I. 
Because of their complexity, as well as their direct and substantial implications for the 
conditions of access of third-party products, national trade barriers are reviewed in two 
chapters. Chapter 4 assesses the pre-SMP situation and shows the range of national trade 
barriers that were in force, the countries that most frequently imposed them, the products that 
were covered, and the extra-EC states most directly affected. Chapter 5 assesses the 
implications of the SMP changes, and the contextual measures that have coloured their effect. 
Because the implementation of national trade barriers (and their removal) has been closely 
associated with national control over cross-border traffic, the SMP changes to customs 
veterinary and phytosanitary procedures are dealt with alongside the other elements of 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
The important changes affecting technical barriers to trade are dealt with in Chapter 6. This 
analyses the changes in terms of their potential implications for the access of third-country 
products, and supplies a broad basis for prioritizing favourable and potentially unfavourable 
changes. 
Many of the other SMP changes have limited implications for conditions of access of third-
country products when viewed in isolation although, when taken together and fully 
implemented, their effect may be more substantial. For this reason, they are grouped in the last 
three chapters of Part I. Chapter 7 deals with barriers to the provision of services, rights of 
establishment and free movement of capital. Chapter 8 clusters changes that can be described 
as the removal of barriers in the business environment. These include elements such as 
intellectual and industrial property, company law, taxation and the media. Chapter 9 deals with 
the SMP changes in relation to public procurement and Chapter 10 to barriers in regulated 
industries such as energy and telecommunications. 
Finally, Chapter 11 draws the threads of the analysis together and presents them in different 
ways in order to identify and prioritize the effects of the SMP on the conditions of access to 
the European market for third-country products. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. A typology 
3.1.1. The extent of the SMP 
Adopting systematically a wide-ranging approach to the SMP such as described by Wallace 
and Young (Section 2.2.3) is clearly beyond the terms of reference for this study. But it is 
often difficult to distinguish clearly between effects on third parties that result solely from the 
SMP narrowly defined and are not influenced, at least in part, by these broader aspects. The 
methodology adopted must accommodate such problems and provide guidance on how they 
are to be resolved. 
The problem of definition is made more difficult because direct external provisions are spread 
widely through many documents and because there is ground for reasonable disagreement 
even on the scope of a narrow definition of the SMP.3 The problem of scope is exemplified by 
the arrangements made since 1992 for the European banana market. These changes have often 
been described as a consequence of the SMP and, indeed, are listed in European Commission 
reports on the single market (see, for example, CEC, 1994a: 5 7-60). Yet, although the new 
common market organization for bananas might have been an indirect consequence of the 
SMP, it is not part of the legislation in the SMP, and its legal basis is a 1968 Regulation 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 827/68). Hence, it could be argued that it falls outside the 
terms of reference of this study since its relationship is too tenuous and it is not an effect that 
'stems directly from' the SMP. 
In order to produce a convincing analysis of the potential effects of the SMP on third parties it 
is necessary to step a little beyond the narrowest confines of the Directives and to consider 
modes of implementation and ancillary effects. An OECD Working Paper which provided an 
early 'post-1992' review of the SMP, for example, concluded that the 'single market initiative 
should have had a strong impact on trade flows' that would benefit third parties, but it 
continued that 'whether trade diversion occurs will partly depend on external trade policy 
changes' (Hoeller and Louppe, 1994:26, 33). Such changes will not all fall within the confines 
of the SMP, even broadly interpreted. But, once the path towards broader study boundaries is 
embarked upon, it is difficult to find clear, objective milestones that can be used to halt the 
slide into wide analysis of the kind indicated by Wallace and Young. 
3.1.2. Different modes of effect 
What may be learned from existing classification systems of the SMP measures to help deal 
with the particular needs of this study? Several different approaches have been adopted for 
classifying the various SMP measures into broad categories. The Commission in its progress 
reports has begun, for example, to distinguish between White Paper Directives and Single 
Market Legislation, as well as between elements within each group. 
The first problem is illustrated by a detailed review undertaken by the Commission of those elements of EC documents 
related to the SMP that contain explicit references to third parties (CEC, 1992a). It identifies some 172 EC documents 
(Council Regulations, Directives, opinions of the European Parliament and of the Economic and Social Committee, 
etc.) that contain references to the treatment of third parties. But the great majority of these references are in the form of 
one or two (usually brief) articles in documents, the bulk of which do not refer to third parties. 
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One categorization of the SMP measures employs the widely used fourfold classification of 
measures in the White Paper (CEC, 1985) concerned with: market access, competitive 
conditions, market functioning and sectoral policy, as defined in Pelkmans and Winters 
(1988:12). In all four categories, there are effects on goods and services (the primary focus of 
this study), persons and labour, and capital. Although the origins of the classification pre-date 
much of the SMP and, hence, the examples used are not always still apposite, it is helpful to 
use these examples to illustrate the main characteristics of the four categories of effect. 
(a) Market access measures for products, as identified by Pelkmans and Winters, include 
the abolition of intra-EC frontier controls, and the approximation of technical 
regulations. For services, they include mutual recognition and 'home-country control', 
the removal of licensing restrictions for banking and insurance, dismantling of quotas 
and freedom of cabotage for road haulage, access to inter-regional air travel markets. For 
capital, market access involves the abolition of exchange controls, the admission of 
securities listed in one Member State to another, and measures to facilitate industrial 
cooperation and migration of firms. In the case of persons and labour, the measures 
include the right of establishment for various highly educated workers. 
(b) Market measures in the White Paper on competitive conditions with respect to products 
are said to include, for example, liberalization of public procurement. For services, they 
include the introduction of competition policy in service industries such as air transport. 
(c) Market functioning measures include those on voluntary standards, trade marks and 
corporate law. In services they include the approximation of requirements in service 
industries, for consumer protection in relation to insurance, together with EC-wide 
permits for road haulage. In the case of capital they include harmonization of industrial 
and commercial property laws and the European company statute. In the case of persons 
and labour, the measures include various training provisions and mutual recognition of 
diplomas. 
(d) Sectoral policy measures include the approximation and mutual recognition in 
agriculture of veterinary and phytosanitary policies. Services examples are proposals for 
common air transport policy on access, capacity and prices, together with common rules 
on mass-risks insurance. 
Although this classification system is helpful for examining the overall effects of the SMP, it 
is not necessarily best suited to classifying external effects. One problem is that the elements 
affecting market access for third countries are spread across several categories which also 
contain elements with no direct impact on access conditions for products. 
3.1.3. An economic framework for analysing trade effects 
Evidently, none of the existing systems is ideal for the present study. The SMP was designed 
to remove internal barriers to trade and to reduce discrepancies in regulations within Europe; 
possible external effects were not a prominent feature of the measures adopted. This section 
and the next review some classification systems and major methodological considerations, as a 
prelude to a description, in Section 3.2, of the approach adopted for this study. 
Economic analyses that focus on the central core of the SMP, i.e. its promotion of intra-EC 
trade, tend to identify four welfare-enhancing effects. These are: an initial reduction of costs as 
a result of the dismantling of customs and administrative barriers to trade; lower costs due to 
economies of scale and learning; the efficiency-inducing effects of stronger competition; and 
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non-price effects such as enhanced innovation and organizational change (Hoeller and Louppe, 
1994:16). 
When the analysis extends to consider the external dimension, economists have introduced an 
additional set of factors which often emphasize the importance of policy changes as a 
determinant of the scale and direction of change (see, for example, Koekkoek et al., 1990). 
These include the effects of income growth on demand for extra-EC imports of products, 
enhanced European competitiveness, changes to trade policy and also, when examining effects 
outside the EC market, changes to the terms of trade. 
The SMP is anticipated to result in faster European economic growth than would occur 
otherwise. This could be expected, other things remaining equal, to result in increased 
European demand for products, both those produced within the EC and those that are. 
imported. This 'trade creation' effect forms an important element in exercises that undertake a 
formal quantification of the external impact of the SMP. But an equally important focus for 
attention, that is given relatively more weight in Part I (which complements Part II), is the 
validity of the 'other things remaining equal' assumption. 
Another anticipated consequence of the SMP is that European producers will become more 
competitive. This will enhance European welfare but could result in the replacement of 
products previously imported by the, now, more competitive European supplies. Although 
frequently, and confusingly, referred to as 'trade diversion' in the SMP context, such a change 
would result in a reduction of welfare only if it were accompanied by new market distortions, 
such as might be produced by trade-related policy. Again, this emphasizes the importance of 
checking the 'other things remaining equal' assumption. 
The critical element that may be overlooked is whether trade-related policies have changed. If 
they have, this could be in a direction that extends the welfare-enhancing effects of the SMP. 
This would be the case if, for example, national governments became unable to support ailing 
domestic industries from intra-EC competition and as a consequence lost the need to protect 
them also against extra-EC imports; European trade policy might become more liberal as a 
result of this realignment of political forces. This is certainly the case made in favour of the 
abolition of national trade barriers, as analysed in Chapters 4 and 5 (see, for example, WTO, 
1995: 57). But the opposite could have happened: through a combination of new policies, 
governments might have attempted, at a national or Community level, to offset for ailing firms 
the consequences of the increased SMP competition by raising new barriers to the access of 
extra-EC imports. Because such action need not have been in the form of transparent, 
conventional 'trade policies', any analysis that aims to establish a balance of probabilities 
must spread its net widely. 
The typology of barriers to market access developed by Emerson et al. (1988) identified: 
(a) tariffs; 
(b) quantitative restrictions; 
(c) cost-increasing barriers (border formalities, technical regulations, certification); 
(d) market-entry restrictions (public procurement, restrictions on establishment, provision of 
services and ownership); 
(e) market distorting subsidies and practices (subsidies, collusion, abuse of dominant 
position). 
14 External access to European markets 
Not all of these barriers have been affected by the SMP, which related only to categories (b) to 
(d). The differing ways in which the SMP's set of internally oriented measures could affect 
external trade relations was well summarized in the GATT Trade Policy Review of the EC in 
1993 (GATT, 1993:64). The internal market reforms, it argues, fell into two groups: 
(i) measures which have an immediate impact on access, such as the abolition or 'communitization' 
of residual national import quotas, or the treatment of external deliveries under the new EC 
procurement rules; and (ii) measures which, while not directed at imports, can nevertheless be 
expected generally to change access conditions for external suppliers as well for EC producers, 
such as the recognition or harmonization of technical regulations among the Member States or the 
abolition of internal border controls. 
In order to rank the effects of the different SMP changes on third countries' market access it is 
necessary to know the relative importance of each of these barriers in restricting market 
access. Unfortunately it is very difficult to quantify the effects of many of these barriers. This 
is particularly the case for non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Three principal difficulties are that there 
is no precise definition of NTBs, many NTBs are not transparent, and NTBs can vary greatly 
in their restrictiveness (see OECD, 1985). The problems are such that even in the context of 
the 'Cost of non-Europe' evaluation the quantification of the costs associated with technical 
barriers was possible in only a few cases, and could not be aggregated (Emerson et al, 1988). 
Given the variety of SMP effects and the well-known problems of measuring some of them, 
the most appropriate methodology for assessing the scale and direction of changes and an 
appropriate counterfactual will differ between broad categories of change. Some elements of 
the SMP fall clearly into one or other category, while others may straddle boundaries or their 
influence may be strongly affected by interplay with measures in the other category (as with 
the removal of internal border checks which undermined national QRs permitted under Article 
115). 
3.1.4. Differential effects on third parties 
There is the possibility of SMP measures having differential effects with respect to third 
parties in both absolute and relative terms. If, for example, access to the European market for 
products from third parties were to be subject to an absolute restriction, as some had feared 
with their evocation of a 'Fortress Europe', then there would have been a clear differential 
change as between foreign and domestic suppliers. 
Hence, an important distinction is between changes that apply equally to external and to non-
national EC suppliers and those that apply specifically to foreign suppliers. 
(a) An example to illustrate the first type of measure is that the removal of physical barriers 
to trade within the EC has similar effects for Netherlands-based companies exporting to 
Germany and for external imports cleared through Rotterdam for onward shipment to 
Germany. 
(b) By contrast, the requirement in the Excluded Sectors Directive (see Chapter 9) clearly 
establishes a differential treatment between EC and external suppliers in its rule that 
third-country offers that are less than 3% more advantageous on price (and no more 
advantageous on other grounds) must be rejected. 
But even in cases where there is apparently equal treatment of EC and foreign suppliers, there 
may still be differential effects in practice which the methodology adopted should seek to 
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identify. This is because market access is not just an absolute, but is also a relative affair. 
Identifying such relative differential access is much more difficult and contentious than simply 
looking for absolute changes. 
A relative deterioration could have occurred if, for example, the improvement resulting from 
the removal of the barriers to trade between one Member State and another were less marked 
for external suppliers than for European producers. This could happen if, say, the removal of 
internal borders and the accompanying strengthening of external borders increased the 
difference between the formalities faced by European and foreign suppliers. To continue with 
the illustrative example cited above, the combination of abolishing the customs posts between 
the Netherlands and Germany and strengthening customs control in the Rotterdam Europort 
could make market access absolutely easier for both Dutch and non-EC suppliers, but 
relatively more difficult for the latter as compared with the former. 
The scope for disagreement is widened when account is taken of a second type of differential 
impact. This is between one third party and another. Not all of the pre-SMP restrictions on 
imports had the effect only of protecting domestic industries in the Member State imposing the 
restriction. To the extent that the controls did not apply to all third-party suppliers, they will 
have tended to restrict competition between the most constrained suppliers and all non-
constrained (or less constrained) suppliers, including those outside the Community. Hence, the 
removal of the partial restrictions will have improved market access for those suppliers that 
formerly bore the brunt of the restrictions but, by the same token, increased competition for 
those suppliers (external as well as domestic) that had not previously been affected (or not to 
the same extent). 
3.2. The analytical framework adopted 
Almost all the changes of the SMP are likely to have some impact on third parties, if only 
through their effect on the rate of European growth. But since the demand effects of the SMP 
are the subject of other studies in the research programme, they are not the direct concern of 
this report. Only some aspects of the SMP will affect 'conditions of access of third countries' 
products'. 
3.2.1. Types of external effect 
Taking into account the different bases for classification and the range of potential effects on 
third parties, an analytical framework has been developed for this study. This is summarized in 
Table 3.1, which uses the broad classification system employed by the Commission in its 1994 
progress report (for rows) and in the columns classifies each of the sets of SMP change 
according to: 
(a) the nature of the pre-SMP barrier and its external effects; 
(b) the nature of the change; and 
(c) the potential external effects of these changes. 
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Table 3.1. Analytical typology of SMP change and third parties 
Pre-IMP barrier 
QRs in Member States 
Physical barriers between 
Member States (e.g. controls 
on borders) 
Technical barriers (e.g. 
regulations and standards) 
Barriers to provision of 
services, right of 
establishment and free 
movement of capital (e.g. 
financial services, transport) 
Barriers in the business 
environment (e.g. intellectual 
and industrial property, 
company law, taxation and 
me.Aia) 
Public procurement 
Barriers in regulated industries 
(e.g. energy and 
telecommunications) 
External effect 
Discrimination between 
internal and external 
Discrimination among 
third parties 
No differential effects vis-à-
vis domestic supplies 
No differential effects 
Discrimination among 
third parties (e.g. MRAs) 
No differential effect 
No differential effect 
No differential effect 
No differential effect 
Nature of change 
Removal of QRs 
Substitution of EC QRs 
Removal of QRs 
Substitution of EC QRs 
Removal of barriers 
Mutual recognition 
Harmonization 
Mutual recognition 
Harmonization 
Primarily liberalization 
Primarily approximation 
Some liberalization 
Primarily liberalization 
Potential external effect of change 
Better access for externals 
Complex change 
Better access for some; more 
competition for others 
Complex change 
Increased ease of supply 
Access to new markets, more 
competition in old 
Complex change 
Access to new markets, more 
competition in old 
Complex change 
Greater ease of establishment 
Simpler operating conditions 
Mix of opening plus continued 
discrimination 
Improved access 
The justification for some of the judgements made in the table is provided in the following 
chapters. 
In the case of the pre-SMP QRs in Member States, there were two type: of external effect: 
discrimination between internal and external suppliers, and discrimination among third parties 
between the relatively favoured and the relatively disfavoured. In both cases, the QRs have 
either been removed or replaced by EC QRs. 
In the former case, the nature of the change is related to the type of external effect of the pre-
SMP barrier. The removal of national QRs will result in better access for external suppliers, 
but this improvement will be stronger for those suppliers that bore the brunt of the former 
restrictions. Those states that were not so affected may even face increased competition as a 
result of the change. 
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In the latter, the nature of the change for third parties as a result of the SMP will depend very 
much on the nature and the implementation of the new restrictions as compared with the old. 
This will differ case by case. 
In the case of physical barriers between Member States, it is not clear that there is any major 
direct differential effect on third parties compared with domestic suppliers other than nationals 
of a particular Member State market. The removal of these barriers as part of the SMP will 
increase demand in the EC, and this is likely to affect external as well as domestic suppliers. 
The main aim of this study is to identify any special aspects of the removal that might have a 
direct bearing on the access conditions for third countries' products. Since these are likely to 
be small in relation to the overall effect on demand for imports resulting from market 
enlargement, quantification is more appropriately captured by formal dynamic models of the 
impact of the SMP. 
In the case of technical barriers to trade between Member States (such as differing regulations 
and standards), the SMP change can be summarized as a mixture of mutual recognition of 
national measures and approximation of national measures (although this has taken different 
forms). It is not always straightforward to distinguish between 'direct SMP effects' and the 
consequences of changes in the policy environment within which the SMP occurred. As 
explained above, the consequences of the changing regulatory environment are, in most cases, 
beyond the terms of reference of this study. 
The old regime had effects on third parties that were equivalent to those of the QRs in 
Member States. To an extent the restrictions discriminated between domestic and foreign 
(including other EC) suppliers, and in some cases may have also discriminated among foreign 
parties (such as in the case of bilateral agreements on the mutual recognition of certifications 
between individual Member States and certain third countries). The harmonization of Member 
State measures simplifies access to the EC market as a whole by reducing the number of 
regulations with which importers must comply, but might, depending on the specifics of the 
harmonized measure, make access more difficult, even to traditional markets, by raising the 
standard that must be attained. As in the case of Member State QRs, there are differential 
improvements between third parties depending on the extent to which they were more or less 
favoured by the old regime. 
A rather similar picture applies with regard to the other SMP measures. Most pre-SMP 
measures governing the provision of services, rights of establishment, the business 
environment or tendering in public procurement largely discriminated against non-national EC 
firms and non-EC firms alike, although firms from some foreign countries might have 
received preferential treatment. In most cases the changes have been a mixture of 
harmonization and liberalization, in which non-EC suppliers have benefited to a certain 
degree. Where establishment is required to reap the gains of the removal of barriers, it is EC 
firms that would benefit, together with those third-country firms able to establish a presence in 
the EC. Consequently, it is more likely that gains will accrue to firms from the United States 
of America (USA) than to those from, for example, Bangladesh. Similarly, where reciprocity 
is required it is more likely to be firms from countries that are of reciprocal interest to the EC 
that will gain. 
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3.2.2. Relative external impacts of SMP measures 
An assessment of how the different SMP changes have affected market access conditions for 
third countries' products requires the relative importance of each of these barriers in restricting 
market access to be established. Unfortunately, as is explained in Section 3.1.3, it is very 
difficult to quantify the effects of many of these barriers, particularly NTBs. Work currently 
being undertaken under the auspices of the OECD bears out these methodological and data 
problems. It tends to support the approach to dealing with them that is adopted in Chapter 5. 
Although a definitive assessment of the relative importance of market access restrictions is not 
possible, it is feasible to identify in general terms the sectors in which SMP changes are likely 
to have the most significant impact on third countries' products. The same SMP change will 
have a more significant impact on market access in a sector in which tariffs or other trade 
barriers are low than in a sector in which they are high. Likewise SMP changes will have less 
impact in sectors where competition is restricted than in ones where it is open. As tariff levels 
decline as a result of the Uruguay Round, remaining NTBs will become relatively more 
significant as restrictions on market access. 
EC producers will experience relatively larger cost reductions as a result of the SMP than 
third-country producers because of the persistence of some trade barriers, such as tariffs and 
customs formalities. Consequently, it is possible that although barriers to market access 
decline for third-country producers, they may lose market share to EC producers that have 
experienced greater cost reductions (Koekkoek et al., 1990:115; Hoeller and Louppe, 1994: 
19). 
3.2.3. Subjective views 
The emphasis given to SMP measures in this study is broadly in line with views expressed by 
some observers of the SMP process. Given the problems of identifying unambiguous 
quantitative conclusions on some aspects of the SMP, the qualitative assessments of third 
parties could form an important input. They are used at appropriate places in the following 
chapters. 
In order to obtain as wide a range of such views as feasible, several sources were consulted.4 
Three of these are sufficiently detailed and general enough to be synthesized in this section (in 
addition to the issue-specific references elsewhere in the report). They are: US government 
reports on the SMP (USITC, 1993; 1996), a survey of European trade associations 
commissioned as part of the overall programme of studies (DRI, 1995), and a business opinion 
survey (Eurostat, 1997). 
The USA had initially feared the formation of a 'Fortress Europe' as the 1992 programme led 
to increasing competition among the 12 Member States, causing EC industry to seek more 
protection against imports from third countries (USITC, 1993:xix). Later USITC reports 
These included the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states, which are among the third parties most likely to 
find the market access of their producers affected by the SMP. But the EFTA Secretariat's analyses consulted did not 
address the issues in such a way as to be a direct input into this study (for example EFTA, 1992; Gardener and Teppett, 
1992). They attempted to predict rather than evaluate the effects and to include modifications of EFTA's relations with 
the EC in the analysis. Moreover, since the EFTA states were engaged in bilateral free trade agreements for 
manufactures prior to the SMP most of the external trade measures did not apply to them. Hence, their analyses are of 
limited validity for other third parties. 
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indicate that these fears have been largely dissipated. However, certain issues like standards, 
broadcasting, public procurement and intellectual property remain a source of concern and will 
continue to be monitored by the US government and the private sector (USITC, 1993:72-5, 
79-90). 
Table 3.2 tabulates the areas of interest identified in the syntheses of US and trade association 
reports. A brief indication of the reason for the area being the focus of attention is provided in 
the two columns labelled 'Hopes' and 'Fears'. The table is not intended as a definitive list, but 
simply a very broad-brush review of expectations. It must be understood, as well, that it does 
not offer any commentary on the validity or otherwise of either the hopes or the fears that are 
recorded. 
Table 3.2. SMP effects: subjective priorities 
Area 
1. By third parties-USA 
Standardization 
Testing 
Intellectual property 
Public procurement 
Financial services 
Free movement of goods 
Residual QRs 
Taxation 
2. EC trade associations 
Residual QRs 
Regulations 
Free movement of capital 
Hopes 
Uniformity will facilitate exports 
Support for trade-related 
intellectual property rights 
Potential US exports 
Potential US exports 
Will facilitate US exports 
Will facilitate US exports 
Fears 
May inhibit exports 
Fear of exclusion (Utilities Directive) 
May inhibit exports (e.g. US-Japanese cars) 
Removal will increase import competition 
Non-removal will reduce SMP boost for 
EC firms 
Extravagant social and environmental 
controls will increase costs 
Will attract hostile FDI 
3.3. Methodological options for analysis 
3.3.1. The research tasks and data availability 
Different methodological options are required for this variety of measures. Most are 
constrained because of the wide range of potential effects and the limited availability of 
evidence (qualitative or quantitative) on their impact. The aim has been to use explicit 
empirically supported criteria for prioritizing SMP effects on market access wherever these are 
available. However, in many cases they are not available, either because of technical problems 
with the data that limit their use (at least within the time scale of this study) or because of the 
nature of the SMP changes. The methodological options are illustrated in Table 3.3. 
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In the case of both the removal of the Member State QRs and the harmonization of regulations 
and standards, the most appropriate methodology would be to compare data on trade patterns 
before and after the change, either in a formal analysis or in a less structured fashion as 
necessary. For example, when evaluating pre-SMP restrictions to judge the potential impact of 
the SMP-induced abolition of national QRs (Chapter 4) it would have been very helpful to be 
able to compare, for the products concerned, the pattern of EU trade in, say, 1985 and 1995. 
But this is not possible for reasons of structure and availability of trade data. The problem of 
structure derives from changes in the nomenclature used to classify products.5 The problem of 
availability arises because the latest year for which full annual EC trade data are in the public 
domain (1994) is too early to capture many post-SMP effects. Unfortunately, EC measures 
formally communitizing all remaining national QRs were only adopted in March 1994, and 
although a number of technical harmonization measures have been in effect for some time, 
some have only come into force recently and significant work remains to be done in 
developing the European standards to give effect to some of the new approach Directives 
(CEC, 1996a:30). Therefore in both cases the change has been too recent for any effects to be 
observable in published trade statistics. 
In the case of the removal of Member State QRs, therefore, what has been adopted is an 
eclectic identification of the main pre-SMP distortions and of the changes that have been 
introduced. This uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, with attention 
focused on a sufficiently small sub-set of the whole to allow them to be collated, absorbed and 
assessed within the time constraints of this study. This provides a level of quantification that 
goes significantly beyond any previous work in this area known to the authors, but even so the 
empirical analysis does not resolve beyond reasonable doubt many of the more important 
questions that arise concerning the SMP. When combined with qualitative data and broader 
considerations it is possible to obtain a view that establishes a reasonable 'balance of 
probabilities'. 
The QRs were mainly established at the most disaggregated item level. The Nimexe system ofproduct nomenclature (in 
use in 1985) and the Combined Nomenclature (CN. used since 1988) are not fully compatible at the most disaggregated 
level. Even within the period since 1988, when the CN has been operative, there have been many changes in the 8-digit 
details between years that bedevil attempts to make systematic comparisons at the required level of disaggregation over 
time. 
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Table 3.3. Methodological options for prioritizing SMP change 
SMP change 
Removal of Member 
State QRs 
Harmonization of 
regulations and 
standards 
Removal of barriers 
to the provision of 
services and right of 
establishment 
The business 
environment 
Public procurement 
Regulated industries 
Research task 
Identify suppliers and 
scale of change 
Identify items covered 
by QR and regime 
details 
Identify indicators of 
scale 
Describe changes 
Describe changes 
Identify effects on 
suppliers and 
indicators for scale of 
change 
Describe changes 
with potential effects 
for market access 
Describe changes 
Identify indicators for 
scale of change 
Describe changes 
with potential effects 
for market access 
Methodology 
Analysis of trade flows 
before and after 
Eclectic and incomplete 
identification of pre-
SMP distortions 
Analysis of trade flows 
before and after 
Qualitative 
identification of issues 
and, where possible, 
quantitative indicators 
of broad scale 
Broad-brush, qualitative 
identification of type of 
effect and of states 
more or less likely to 
take advantage 
Broad-brush, qualitative 
identification of type of 
effect and of states 
more or less likely to 
take advantage 
Use existing study 
on SMP and public 
procurement 
Broad-brush, qualitative 
identification of type of 
effect and of states 
more or less likely to 
take advantage 
Data required 
Import time series 
before and after 
Data on direction 
and value of 
imports into QR-
imposing Member 
State 
Import time series 
before and after 
Literature on 
perceptions of gain 
or loss; relevant 
trade statistics 
Literature on 
perceptions of gain 
or loss 
Literature on 
perceptions of gain 
or loss 
Procurement study 
Literature on 
perceptions of gain 
or loss 
Data availability 
Not available 
(change too 
recent) 
Available 
Not available 
(change too 
recent) 
Moderate 
availability 
Moderate 
availability 
Moderate 
availability 
Available 
Moderate 
availability 
In the case of harmonization of regulations and standards, the methodology focuses more 
heavily on qualitative than quantitative measures. This involves an assessment of the EC's 
different approaches to removing technical barriers to trade, to identify the areas in which third 
countries are most likely to be directly adversely affected. This broad assessment is 
supplemented by the perceptions of EC and external suppliers. 
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In the case of the removal of barriers to the provision of services and improvement to the 
business environment, a much more broad-brush, qualitative analysis is all that is feasible. Our 
first step is to analyse the market opening potential of the SMP, paying particular attention to 
measures that have at least the potential to discriminate against firms from third countries. The 
literature on third parties' perceptions of gain and loss is used to round out this assessment. 
This is also an important source of information on procurement, but is supplemented by 
another study in this Programme which focused on the SMP changes to procurement practice. 
3.3.2. Evidence of change in practice 
Part of the problem of weighing the relative importance of the various SMP measures 
concerns the extent to which they have altered the practical conditions within which 
businesses operate. This is a separate issue from that concerning the degree of implementation, 
although the two are linked. A flavour of the problem may be obtained from a survey of 
business associations undertaken as part of the overall programme of studies. 
The 431-page report entitled 'Survey of the Trade Associations' Perception of the Effects of 
the Single Market' is the result of 200 face-to-face interviews with European trade 
associations conducted between February and June 1995 (DRI, 1995). 
The overall message of the report is that whilst the single market programme may have had an 
overall positive effect on the economy, and therefore indirectly on business in general, few of 
the measures contained in the White Paper were perceived to have directly impacted on the 
different business sectors represented by the trade associations. The list of perceived obstacles 
to the establishment of the SMP is summarized in Appendix A to Part I. 
There is no explicit evaluation in the report of the external impact of the single market 
programme. Neither the interview guide nor the respondents (European trade associations) 
particularly lent themselves to such an analysis. However, several questions and issues tackled 
in the report were of indirect relevance to the external impact of the single European market. 
The responses need to be interpreted in the knowledge of the respondents' role. They are, 
essentially, comments from European lobbying groups, with their own interests. 
One external impact of the SMP, according to the business survey, has been the increase in 
external interest in Europe as an entity and investment opportunity. This has been manifested 
by an increase in merger and acquisition activity as well as joint ventures and alliances. The 
single market programme is perceived by Europe's trade associations as a successful exercise 
in attracting external investment. 
There is a concern that high production and infrastructure costs in Europe together with 
environmental and social policies may encourage both EC and non-EC companies to relocate, 
often to Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean Rim. This perceived high burden of costs is held 
to have allowed non-EC companies to compete successfully on price. In order to exploit this 
strategy, non-EC companies have created alliances, or established European 'shop windows' 
by merging with or taking over EC companies. 
A similar set of conclusions is to be drawn from another Business Opinion Survey undertaken 
as part of the overall programme of studies (Eurostat, 1997). The results were first published 
in an internal EC document in April 1996. No indication was made in the report as to when 
the actual fieldwork took place. The study was conducted using self-completion closed 
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questionnaires that were sent to EUR-12 businesses by mail. The sample size was 20,000 and 
the response rate was 65%, yielding 13,000 completed questionnaires. 
Among the questions were three of some relevance to this study. They were: 
Question 2.4 (i) 
Answer 
Question 2.4 (ii) 
Answer 
Question 2.4 (iii) 
Answer 
Change in the number of non-EC competitors 
Increased, but less than increase from EC competitors. 
Change in competition based on price from non-EC companies 
Increased, but less than increase from EC and domestic competitors. 
Change in level of competition on quality from non-EC firms 
Increased, but less than increase from EC and domestic companies. 
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4. National trade barriers: identification 
A whole host of import restrictions maintained at a national level have been swept aside and 
either replaced by Community-wide restrictions or abolished altogether. The removal of these 
national barriers to trade, which were maintained on at least some products by all Member 
States prior to the SMP, is an extremely important aspect of the SMP for this study. This is 
because it has had clear effects on the conditions of access of third-country products and 
because it is a direct effect of the SMP. This view is shared by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which has argued that 'quantitative restrictions are possibly the area where the single 
market has most directly improved access conditions across a wide variety of "sensitive" 
product categories' (WTO, 1995:57). 
A first step in evaluating the impact of the SMP in this area is to establish the extent and effect 
of the national barriers to trade. Although their existence was well known and their extent has 
been commented upon by many analysts, there does not exist in the secondary literature a 
definitive list and estimates of their extent have varied widely. An OECD Working Paper, for 
example, stated that there were 6,417 country-specific restrictions at the start of 1993, but the 
exercise undertaken in the present study and reported in this chapter found the total to be one-
third greater (Hoeller and Louppe, 1994:34) The identification of the pre-SMP national QRs 
presented in this chapter is believed to go well beyond anything previously available from 
secondary sources in the public domain and, as far as is known, from restricted sources. 
The pre-SMP national barriers fell into one of three main groups: 
(a) residual QRs that were in force before the countries entered the Community or before 
the agreement of the common commercial policy and which were allowed to continue 
after joining; 
(b) national quotas on textiles and clothing established as part of the Community's overall 
trade policy in this area; and 
(c) a disparate collection of barriers of varying opaqueness introduced to affect trade flows 
into particular Member States. 
The first two of these are treated together in the next sub-section because their extent is 
reasonably well documented in official Community publications. The third group is treated as 
a separate sub-section because accurate documentation is sparse. 
Which countries imposed restrictions on which products from which suppliers? Have these 
restrictions been abolished, or replaced by Community-wide measures? And, in the case of the 
latter, how do these differ from the national restrictions that they have replaced? Neither the 
status quo ante nor the status quo are clear-cut with respect to these questions. 
4.1. Residual quantitative restrictions 
An analysis of the 'last-before-1992' Council Regulations in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities has established the nature of the status quo ante immediately before 
the SMP as it related to national trade barriers in the form of authorized residual QRs. 
The same methodology was employed for assessing the pre-SMP extent of national QRs for 
products from both state and from non-state trading countries, although due to differences in 
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the data available and to changes in EC policy following the collapse of Communism some of 
the analyses were not conducted for the state trading countries. Because of these differences in 
implementation of the common methodology, the procedures for these two types of trading 
partner are set out in separate sub-sections. 
4.1.1. Non-state trading countries 
Official listings of QRs 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 288/82 built upon earlier Regulations and, as subsequently 
amended, established common rules for imports up to the SMP from non-state trading 
countries. It provided a framework for EC monitoring of the QRs that were maintained by the 
member governments. Over the following decade the number of national QRs was periodically 
changed in the light of economic and commercial circumstances. Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 196/91 represented the last major amendment before the completion of the single market, 
replacing entirely previous lists of exceptions. It was further amended twice, but only in 
relation to the QRs imposed by Spain, France and Italy. 
In 1991, some 7,269 national QRs were authorized in respect of products imported from non-
state trading countries (Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 196/91 of 21 January 1991, 2978/91 
of 7 October 1991 and 2875/92 of 21 September 1992). In most cases, each QR referred to a 
specific (8-digit) item of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) that was restricted in whole or in 
part in relation to imports from a specified source. Two-thirds of the QRs were with respect to 
textiles and clothing. 
This total includes QRs covered by the derogations granted to Spain and Portugal upon their 
accession. Since their elimination was not a single market effect, it is appropriate to disregard 
them. This brings the total down to 6,421 (three-quarters for textiles and clothing). The vast 
majority of these restrictions were total, in the sense that they covered the whole of a CN item. 
The products and countries involved 
The 10 Harmonized System (HS) chapters with the most restrictions were (in descending 
order of the number of items within the chapter subject to QRs): 
(a) 52 (cotton); 
(b) 62 (articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted); 
(c) 55 (man-made staple fibres); 
(d) 61 (articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted); 
(e) 85 (electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof); 
(f) 54 (man-made filaments); 
(g) 63 (other made up textile articles); 
(h) 87 (vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories 
thereof); 
(i) 60 (knitted or crocheted fabrics); 
(j) 51 (wool, fine or coarse animal hair). 
Only two chapters were subject to QRs by all of the Member States. They were Chapter 9 
(coffee, tea, maté and spices) and Chapter 21 (miscellaneous edible preparations, including 
processed coffee). Both were, presumably, in support of the International Coffee Agreement 
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quotas. But in most other chapters there was a broad spread of quota-imposing states: more 
than half of the then Member States maintained national QRs in all chapters except 60 (four 
imposing states) and 87 (three imposing states). 
Even after the expiration of its derogations, Spain maintained the most national QRs overall, 
followed by the UK (mostly on textile and clothing imports from Laos and Cambodia), Italy, 
Greece, France and Portugal. Excluding textiles and clothing, Spain imposed the most QRs, 
followed by Portugal, Italy, France and the UK. The Benelux customs union had the fewest 
QRs, followed closely by Denmark. 
Japan was far and away the country most specifically targeted by national QRs. QRs directed 
only at Japan accounted for more than 60% of non-general national QRs. After Japan came 
Laos and Cambodia (all UK QRs), Taiwan, Zone II countries,6 and non-members of the 
International Coffee Agreement. 
Adding to and interpreting the lists 
The list of products provided in these Regulations is extensive, but there are reasons to 
suppose that it is not complete. It would appear that there were errors and omissions in the 
published text of Council Regulation (EEC) No 196/91. In some cases, these dealt with 
residual QRs that had, in the view of the national government concerned, been omitted 
erroneously from the list, and in others it dealt with changes to CN codes that had not been 
fully reflected in the Regulation. In at least one case, and probably in others, these errors and 
omissions were notified to the Commission and taken into account in the implementation of 
import policy. However, they appear not to have been put into the public domain as a formal 
combined list. 
The analysis in this report is based on a complete record of one Member State's (the UK's) 
national residual QRs, but does not take account of any similar errors and omissions in 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 196/91 identified by other Member States. 
A more substantial limitation of the information derived from Council Regulation (EEC) No 
196/91 and its subsequent amendments for the purposes of this study is that, although it lists 
the products on which Member States had QRs, it does not provide any detailed information 
on the nature of the restrictions. There is every reason to suppose that there may have been 
substantial differences in some cases, but it is not possible to discern from the Regulations 
which products are most likely to have been affected. 
There is no way of determining, for example, whether a Member State actually enforced any 
of these QRs. There may well have been reasons to keep redundant authorizations 'on the 
books' so that they would be available should demands arise for import limitation. But, if this 
occurred, it is not easy to discern. One observer writing in 1989, for example, recorded that 
'the United Kingdom government claims to have revoked all [non-textile and clothing] QRs 
Zone II refers to QRs imposed by France, and includes: Libya. Republic of South Africa, Namibia, Mexico, Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti. Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Peru, Brazil Chile. Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina. Iraq, Iran. Saudi Arabia. North Yemen, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India. Bangladesh. Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal. Bhutan. Burma, Thailand, Indonesia. Philippines, South 
Korea. Japan. Taiwan. Australia, Australian Oceania. New Zealand. New Zealand Oceania. 
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other than on footwear, leather gloves, ceramics, hats, television sets and matches imported 
from various Eastern European countries and China and. as a curiosum, ceramics from Viet-
nam' (Davenport, 1990:190). Yet, the 1991 Regulation lists the UK as imposing on non-state 
trading countries QRs in no fewer than 10 chapters outside the textile and clothing sectors. 
Were these enforced? 
Even where national QRs are known to have been enforced, neither their nature nor their 
coverage is clear from the lists in the Council Regulations. The nature of this problem may be 
illustrated in relation to controls on the import of bananas (CN 08030010). This is a product 
for which actions taken in relation to (but not necessarily as part of) the SMP are known to 
have had consequences for third parties, and in which the national regimes in operation prior 
to 1992 were complex. No hint of this complexity is provided by Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 196/91. The Regulation implies that Spain, France, Greece and Portugal all imposed 
complete restrictions, that the UK imposed a complete restriction with regard to the dollar area 
except for Liberia, and that Italy did so with regard to Mediterranean states, EFTA and Zone 
A3.7 Yet the facts belie this implication. The UK imported bananas from dollar zone countries 
(but under licence), while the apparent complete restriction of France did not prevent that 
country importing bananas from Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Colombia, Egypt, Chile and other 
Latin American countries in 1992. 
4.1.2. State trading countries 
Official listings of QRs 
As with the non-state trading countries, the move towards a common approach with regard to 
QRs on products from state trading countries began in the early 1980s and over the ensuing 
decade the number of national QRs was gradually changed. The 'last-before-1992' regulations 
dealing with the issue were Council Regulation (EEC) No 3420/83, as amended, together with 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3419/83 which treated Romania separately. 
In addition to changes in economic conditions, the liberalization of QRs on state trading 
countries had a great deal to do with the internal politics of the countries in question. For 
example, for years Romania received more favourable treatment than the other state trading 
countries and following the collapse of Communism a spate of new agreements with countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe radically changed the trading regimes between those countries 
and the EC. Council Regulation (EEC) No 3049/91 of 29 July 1991 was the last substantive 
amendment prior to the '1992' target date and set out a definitive list of national QRs 
exempted from the common approach. 
Afghanistan. United Arab Emirates, Andorra. Angola and Cabinda, Saudi Arabia. Argentina. Australia (and territories 
under Australian administration). Azores. Bahrain. Bangladesh, Bermuda. Bhutan. Burma. Bolivia. Brazil. Busingen 
(German territory of). Cambodia, Canada. Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla. Chile. Colombia. South Korea. Costa 
Rica. Cuba. Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador. Philippines. Gibraltar. Greenland. Guatemala. Haiti. Honduras. 
Hong Kong. India. Indonesia, Iraq. Iran. Kuwait. Laos. Libya. Macao. Malaysia, Maldives. Mexico, Mozambique. 
Nauru. Nepal, Nicaragua New Zealand (and territories under New Zealand administration), Oman. Pakistan, Panama. 
Paraguay. Peru. Qatar. Singapore. Sri Lanka. United States of America (and territories under United States 
administration). South Africa. Taiwan. Thailand. Uruguay, Venezuela. North Yemen. South Yemen (People's 
Republic). 
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In 1991 there were 4,800 authorized national QRs in respect of products other than textiles 
and clothing imported from state trading countries (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3049/91 of 
29 July 1991). In addition, there were a large number of restrictions on textile and clothing 
products which have not been totalled for technical reasons.8 When the Spanish and 
Portuguese transitional QRs are taken into account, this figure falls to 4,138. The principal 
target of these national QRs was China. According to Commission sources, over 4,000 quotas 
were in respect of China. 
The products and countries involved 
Even excluding textiles and clothing, under the status quo ante more products from state 
trading countries faced Member State QRs than did products from non-state trading countries. 
Of those products, the following faced the most restrictions (in descending order of the 
number of items within the chapter subject to QRs): 
(a) 85 (electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof); 
(b) 72 (iron and steel); 
(c) 73 (articles of iron and steel); 
(d) 63 (footwear, gaiters and the like, parts of such articles); 
(e) 87 (vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories 
thereof); 
(f) 48 (paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard); 
(g) 29 (organic chemicals); 
(h) 84 (nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof); 
(i) 70 (glass and glassware); 
(j) 39 (plastics and articles thereof). 
In no chapter did all Member States impose QRs, and in only four did over half of the Member 
States maintain national QRs - Chapters 85, 73, 64 and 70. 
The fact that these figures do not include QRs on textiles and clothing needs to be borne in 
mind when assessing their incidence among Member States. Spain maintained by far the most 
national QRs, accounting for 40% of the total. Only Italy came close to imposing as many 
national QRs. Together they accounted for 66% of national QRs. Ireland imposed the fewest 
QRs, followed by Germany and France. 
4.2. Other national barriers 
The lists in the Official Journal did not cover all the measures that tended to restrict imports in 
relation to particular EC Member States. As stated in GATT 1991 (p. 97): 
The absence of quotas in an individual Member State does not necessarily mean that access is 
unlimited. For example, imports of passenger cars from Japan (subject to quotas in Italy) are under 
administrative import barriers in France and ¡ndustry-to-industry restraint arrangements in the 
8 'the data do not include information on textiles and clothing for two reasons: 
(a) They are provided in terms of MFA codes, and so arc not directly comparable with the other data for state trading 
countries or with those for the non-state trading countries: 
(b) The Regulation supplements the bilateral agreements with many state trading countries. Since there has not yet been 
time to analyse all of these agreements, the information derived from Council Regulation (EEC) No 3049/91 alone 
would not be representative. 
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United Kingdom. Japan moderates its exports of colour TV sets to the EC as a whole and, 
specifically, to Germany; other Member States (France and Italy) have implemented quotas. 
By their nature, these less transparent restrictions are difficult to catalogue and, if they depend 
upon industry-to-industry collaboration, the effective change brought about following the SMP 
may also be very difficult to discern. As the GATT argued, in a subsequent Trade Policy 
Review. 
The individual measures may differ widely with regard to trade coverage, restrictiveness and 
potential implications on third countries. Retrospective Community surveillance, as an example, 
may be considered a merely statistical exercise without any impact on trade flows. However, as a 
possible precursor to trade restraints, it may also serve as a warning signal to the suppliers 
concerned. In other cases, it may be used to monitor compliance with price or quantitative 
undertakings given (GATT, 1993:71). 
This ambiguity is underlined in a 1990 study by Winters. This concluded that: 
... more often than not the imposition of import surveillance, which ostensibly entails only 
collecting detailed trade information, curtails imports ... [Sjince surveillance barely affects the 
actual costs of trading, its effects must stem from its influence on exporters' perceptions of their 
environment (Winters, 1990). 
Moreover, some voluntary export restraints (VERs) may not even be known to the Member 
State governments. One observer has claimed, for example, that in the late 1980s Taiwan 
continued to restrict its footwear exports to UK by agreement with the British Footwear 
Manufacturers' Association, even though the government believed the VER to have expired in 
1986 (Davenport, 1990:191). 
Given the uncertainty in this area, it is important to limit unnecessary controversy by focusing 
attention on those trade restrictions for which there is some quasi-official acceptance. For this 
reason, a list has been compiled of known voluntary restraints, surveillance and similar 
measures affecting imports identified by the GATT in the early 1990s which were enforced at 
a sub-Community level (Table 4.1). No other more detailed and equally authoritative source is 
available, at least in the public domain. Since the table combines information relating to more 
than one time period, not all of the restrictions will necessarily have been in force at the same 
time. The purpose of the table is to illustrate the range of measures in place, the products 
affected, and the external suppliers that were constrained. 
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Table 4.1. Other national trade barriers' 
Product 
Frozen squid 
Slippers and sandals 
Footwear 
Machine tools 
Colour TVs 
TV tubes 
Video recorders 
Passenger cars 
Automobiles 
Metal flatware 
Umbrellas 
Pottery and 
chinaware 
Clothing 
Travel goods 
Imposing state 
Italy 
France 
Ireland 
UK 
France 
Germany 
UK 
France 
France 
UK 
Belgium 
Benelux 
France 
UK 
UK 
Belgium, Germany, 
France, Italy, 
Netherlands, UK 
Target state 
Rep. of Korea 
China 
Rep. of Korea 
Czech Rep.. Slovakia. 
Romania, Poland 
Japan 
Japan 
Singapore 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
Rep. of Korea 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand 
Japan 
Japan 
Rep. of Korea 
Type of measure 
Reference prices 
Autolimitation 
Industry-to-industry arrangement 
Industry-to-industry arrangement 
Restraint arrangement 
Export moderation 
Export restraints 
Industry-to-industry arrangement 
Industry-to-industry arrangement 
Industry-to-industry arrangement 
Price fixing subject to administrative 
authorization 
Industry-to-industry arrangement 
Industry-to-industry arrangement 
Export restraints 
Export approval 
Export recommendation 
1 Explanatory notes in original tables excluded. 
Source: GATT. 1991:Table IV.5; GATT. 1993:Table IV.2. 
The products covered range from frozen squid to passenger cars, via, among others, consumer 
electronics, machine tools and spoons. Eight Member States are identified as having imposed 
restrictions. The restrictions themselves are of a kind that is not easy to monitor (such as 
industry-to-industry arrangements). 
4.3. Use of Article 115 
4.3.1. Scope and application of Article 115 
The practical application of national QRs is closely associated with the use of Article 115 of 
the Treaty of Rome which may be used if the import of a product is restricted at a level lower 
than that of the EC, usually the Member State level. The Article provided a safety valve for 
national governments facing internal economic difficulties to seek protection by preventing 
goods, the import of which was restricted at Community level, from crossing their borders via 
other Member States. The scope and application of Article 115 has changed, but the situation 
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over the time period covered by this report is best reflected in terms of the Commission's 
Decision 87/433/EEC in 1987. This stated that: 
... at the present stage of establishment of the Common Market the measures under Article 115 of 
the Treaty should be authorized only where deflections of trade lead to economic difficulties or 
jeopardize the effectiveness of commercial policy measures taken by Member States pursuant to the 
Community's international obligations (OJ L 238/26, 21.8.1987). 
Under the pre-SMP procedures for the implementation of Article 115, a procedure was 
established through which requests for protection were channelled upwards from the affected 
industries via national governments to the Commission (Velia, 1996:86). The first stage of the 
procedure was for the industry, mostly through national associations, to provide their national 
authorities with the necessary information. Supported cases were then passed on to the 
Commission for examination. The Commission based its judgement on indicators of change in 
the levels of employment, production and use of capacity, bankruptcy rates, total and direct 
imports, price and profit levels, and turnover plus consumption in the current and two 
preceding years. Under this procedure, discretion on whether or not to put forward an 
application lay with the Member State, while responsibility for taking a final authorization 
either to restrict licences or to grant intra-Community surveillance rested with the 
Commission. 
Without the opportunity afforded by Article 115 to restrict imports from other Member States 
of goods originating outside the Community, the enforcement of national QRs would have 
been much more difficult or, depending upon the nature of the product and market, 
impossible. The Article has not been removed as a result of the SMP, but it appears to be no 
longer enforceable given the disappearance of internal border controls. Under the rewording of 
the Article in the Treaty on European Union, national measures require ex ante approval. 
Hence, Article 115 is not a separate feature of the SMP with implications for the access of 
third-country products, but it forms part of the context within which changes have been made 
to conditions of access. 
4.3.2. National customs control 
The application of Article 115 was facilitated by the physical barriers to trade at national 
frontiers. Until 1988, each Member State retained its own form of customs declaration 
required for all cross-border trade. In 1988, a single document, the Single Administrative 
Document (SAD), was developed to bring some consistency to the paperwork and data 
collected. This remained in force for all trade until the end of 1992. 
Until the SAD was introduced Member States used many different individual forms for the 
purposes of customs export and import declarations and Community transit (CT). The total 
number of different 'boxes' on customs forms before the SAD was over 150. This was 
reduced to 54 in the SAD, and a good degree of consistency in the individual Member States' 
requirements for data was achieved.9 
This section draws on the study on Customs and fiscal formalities at frontiers undertaken as part of the broader 
programme of research on the SMP, in The Single Market Review. Subseries III. Vol. 3. Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the EC and London: Kogan Page/Earthscan publishers. 1997. 
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Until 1 January 1992, customs warehousing was governed by a fairly generally worded 
Directive and implemented in quite different ways in different Member States. New basic and 
implementing Regulations were applied from this date and brought a much more standard 
approach to this important procedure. 
An important feature to note is that controls for customs warehousing have also progressed. In 
the 1980s there was an emphasis on physical control over the security of the premises and 
checking of the goods themselves. This has tended to change to a control based on records, 
especially computerized records. 
In the past, customs usually required a bond or guarantee to cover the duty and taxes 
suspended in warehouse (hence the old expression 'bonded warehouse'). Customs today often 
will not require such a bond for the warehousing procedure. 
Before 1993 CT documents were used to cover free circulation goods which moved through 
another country en route from the Member State of export to that of destination. They also 
covered goods moving directly from one Member State to another, but the goods were to be 
customs-cleared inland and not at the frontier. 
4.4. The scale and incidence of national QRs 
Bearing in mind the methodological pitfalls and the greyness of the situation before and after 
the SMP, it is not the task of Part I of this study to attempt a formal modelling of the effects of 
removing national QRs. As explained in Section 3.3, data are not available to make a 
systematic comparison of a 'before and after' kind, and as indicated in Section 4.1 the codified 
information on formal national QRs (let alone informal ones) is insufficiently detailed to 
permit wide-ranging, empirically supported conclusions to be drawn without substantial 
qualification. In this difficult situation the study has undertaken a range of quantitative 
exercises designed to contribute to a set of indicators of the probable scale and incidence of 
the pre-SMP restrictions. Because each of these exercises looks at only a part of the overall 
picture, the process of undertaking them could continue for a very long time without 
exhausting all useful approaches. The time constraint has been the principal limiting factor in 
the extent of the exercises reported in this chapter. Nonetheless, the data presented in this 
section do represent the fruits of a significant level of research and a considerably more 
detailed and wide-ranging quantification of national QRs than, as far as is known, is available 
elsewhere. 
4.4.1. Ranking HS chapters by quota ratios 
In Section 4.1 the CN chapters most affected by residual QRs were identified, but any analysis 
conducted at a chapter level of restrictions that are, in most cases, established in relation to 
particular items, cannot be very rigorous. One simple refinement is to adjust for the number of 
items in any chapter. A chapter with a large number of items may have a higher number of 
national QRs than one with only a few items, but what does this imply? It is not possible to 
establish without closer scrutiny whether a chapter in which 50 out of 100 items are subject to 
quotas is more or less substantially affected than a chapter in which nine out of ten items are 
covered. But at least an attempt should be made to distinguish between these different cases. 
All 54 chapters in which national quotas on imports from non-state trading countries were 
recorded in the Regulation have been analysed to indicate the proportion of the number of 
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8-digit items that were subject to quotas. A similar exercise has been undertaken for all 61 
chapters in which imports from state trading countries were subject to national restrictions in 
the Council Regulation. This exercise, when combined with others (see below), directs 
attention towards those product groups that appear to have faced more, and those that have 
faced fewer, restrictions. 
Summary information on all those chapters in which more than 20% of the items were subject 
to national quotas is provided in Table 4.2 (for non-state traders) and Table 4.3 (for state 
traders). These supply information on the number of quotas imposed, the number of EC 
Member States imposing them, and a column headed 'ratio'. The ratio is produced by dividing 
the number of quotas by the number of countries imposing them, and expressing the result as a 
percentage of the total number of 8-digit items within that chapter. The chapters are then 
presented in declining order of ratio. 
Table 4.2. Top HS chapters subjected to national QRs on imports from non-state 
trading countries (all HS chapters with quota/item ratio > 20%) 
HS 
chapter 
65 
60 
61 
62 
52 
55 
87 
66 
54 
50 
64 
58 
63 
51 
31 
95 
89 
57 
27 
53 
Description 
Headgear and parts thereof 
Knitted or crocheted fabrics 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted 
Cotton, including yams and woven fabrics thereof 
Manmade staple fibres, including yams and woven fabrics thereof 
Vehicles, and parts and accessories thereof 
Umbrellas, walking sticks, whips, etc., and parts thereof 
Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof 
Silk 
Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles 
Special woven fabrics; tuned textile fabrics; lace; etc. 
Other made-up textile articles; worn clothing; etc. 
Wool, fine and coarse animal hair; yam and fabrics of horsehair 
Fertilizers 
Toys, games and sports equipment; parts and accessories thereof 
Ships, boats and floating structures 
Carpets and other textile floor coverings 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation 
Other vegetable textile fibres 
No of 
quotas 
15 
183 
751 
924 
985 
780 
274 
4 
347 
33 
141 
164 
279 
170 
42 
47 
11 
35 
47 
21 
No of 
countries 
1 
4 
6 
7 
8 
8 
3 
1 
7 
3 
4 
7 
8 
7 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
2 
Ratio 
(%) 
83 
83 
74 
69 
69 
58 
51 
50 
47 
44 
43 
41 
40 
35 
35 
31 
28 
25 
25 
21 
Sources: Eurostat. 1995; Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 196/91 and 197/91 of 21 January 1991 
Hence, for example, in Table 4.2 it is indicated that 15 quotas were imposed by one Member 
State on Chapter 65 which, because it contained only 18 items, represents a ratio of 83%. In 
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the case of Chapter 60 there were 183 quotas, but they were imposed by four Member States. 
The ratio will vary depending on whether the four imposed QRs on different items (i.e. 183 
items were affected) or all targeted the same items. Given the objective of providing a 
focusing device rather than a precise ranking (an infeasible objective given the uncertainty 
over implementation), an arbitrary assumption was made. This was that each imposing state 
targeted the same items, i.e. in this example there were 45 or 46 quotas per Member State, 
which is equivalent to some 83% of the total number of items in the chapter. 
Table 4.3. Top HS chapters subjected to national QRs on imports from state trading 
countries (all HS chapters with quota/item ratio > 20%) 
HS 
chapter 
65 
18 
64 
66 
87 
36 
31 
93 
45 
48 
39 
79 
78 
27 
38 
42 
72 
89 
41 
29 
73 
32 
Description 
Headgear and parts thereof 
Cocoa and cocoa preparations 
Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles 
Umbrellas, walking sticks, whips, etc., and parts thereof 
Vehicles, and parts and accessories thereof 
Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; etc. 
Fertilizers 
Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof 
Cork and articles of cork 
Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, paper or paperboard 
Plastics and articles thereof 
Zinc and articles thereof 
Lead and articles thereof 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation 
Miscellaneous chemical products 
Articles of leather 
Iron and steel 
Ships, boats and floating structures 
Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather 
Organic chemicals 
Articles of iron or steel 
Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and derivatives; etc. 
No of 
quotas 
15 
40 
357 
8 
324 
17 
80 
27 
3 
191 
144 
13 
4 
78 
75 
2 
437 
27 
12 
187 
388 
27 
No of 
countries 
1 
2 
8 
2 
4 
4 
5 
2 
1 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
1 
2 
7 
2 
Ratio 
(%) 
83 
77 
54 
50 
45 
43 
40 
39 
38 
33 
32 
29 
29 
27 
26 
25 
23 
23 
21 
21 
21 
20 
Sources: Eurostat, 1995; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3049/91 of 29 July 1991. 
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A number of salient features appear from Table 4.2: 
(a) Only a relatively small number of chapters were affected by a broad range of national 
quotas. Out of the 54 chapters considered, only 20 have a quota/item ratio of more than 
20%. Clearly, a ratio below this threshold does not necessarily mean that the quotas were 
not important in one sense or another; a quota on just one item could have a very strong 
effect if that item were either of considerable importance to a particular country or group 
of countries, or covered the most important traded good within a chapter. Nonetheless, 
the finding, when combined with other focus criteria, provides a basis for identifying the 
sectors in which national QRs were most wide-ranging. 
(b) There exists a fairly strong polarization between those chapters in which most Member 
States imposed quotas and those in which very few did so. Because the Benelux is 
treated as one unit, the maximum number of countries imposing quotas is 10. Of the 20 
chapters in Table 4.2, eight were subject to quotas by six or more Member States, while 
10 were targeted by three states or fewer. 
(c) This polarization is closely associated with the type of product. Thirteen were textiles or 
clothing of some kind, and this group included all the chapters in which six or more 
Member States imposed quotas. In five of the remaining seven cases, the number of 
imposing states was three or fewer. 
The salient features of Table 4.3 are similar to those of Table 4.2, although this is partly 
because textile items were excluded from the analysis: 
(a) Once again, only a relatively small number of chapters were affected by a broad range of 
national quotas. Out of the 61 chapters considered, only 22 have a quota/item ratio of 
more than 20%. 
(b) With textiles absent, most chapters faced restrictions in only a few national markets (as 
was the case for non-textile items in Table 4.2). Of the 22 chapters in Table 4.3, only 
two were subject to quotas by six or more Member States, while 15 were targeted by 
three states or fewer. 
4.4.2. Ranking HS chapters by value of trade 
Evidently, the quota/item ratio is only one of several approaches to prioritizing the national 
QRs in order to identify those with the most wide-ranging potential impact on third parties. 
The value of trade in the products subject to national QRs is also a very relevant consideration 
(but not an unambiguous one, which is why it must be assessed alongside other measures). 
Data have been collected on the value of EC imports in 1992 of HS chapters subject to 
national QRs on imports from non-state trading countries, and on the value of imports of the 
items within these chapters covered by national QRs.10 In order to cover the possibility that the 
value of extra-EC imports of items subject to national QRs was restricted because of them, 
data were collected on both extra-EC and intra-EC imports. 
This information has been processed in two ways, and the most important features are 
presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The first approach lists the chapters in declining order of 
10 It was agreed between the authors and the Commission to focus attention on non-state trading countries. 
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value of imports (intra + extra) of items within the chapter subject to national QRs. Table 4.4 
indicates, in declining order of intra + extra import value, all of those chapters: 
(a) in which the value of imports (intra + extra) of the items subject to national QRs 
exceeded ECU 500 million in 1992; and 
(b) which were not included in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.4. HS chapters subject to national QRs, by value of imports (chapters not 
included in Table 4.2) 
(million ECU) 
HS 
chapter 
85 
84 
90 
04 
40 
22 
12 
72 
08 
82 
09 
42 
07 
91 
15 
20 
59 
56 
69 
16 
94 
71 
11 
Description 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof 
Optical, photographic, medical etc. instruments and parts 
Dairy produce: birds' eggs; natural honey; edible animal products n.e.s. 
Rubber and articles thereof 
Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; misc. grains, seeds and fruit 
Iron and steel 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons 
Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal 
Coffee, tea, maté and spices 
Articles of leather 
Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 
Clocks and watches and parts thereof 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products 
Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other parts of plants 
Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics 
Wadding, felt and non-wovens; special yams; ropes, etc. 
Ceramic products 
Edible preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans, molluscs, etc. 
Furniture; stuffed furnishings; lamps n.e.s.; prefab buildings 
Precious/semi-precious stones; precious metals; imitation jewellery; coin 
Products of the milling industry 
Total EUR-12 imports of QR 
items, 1992, from: 
intra-+ 
extra-EC 
65,991 
14,396 
10,698 
8,258 
6,568 
4,670 
4,444 
4.192 
3,475 
3,467 
2,698 
2,572 
2,568 
2,474 
2,220 
2,181 
2,048 
2,042 
2,020 
1,830 
1,674 
690 
552 
extra-EC 
31,280 
5,685 
5,487 
495 
1,657 
620 
3,291 
1,724 
2,291 
1.493 
2,209 
1,710 
491 
2,251 
971 
752 
518 
504 
736 
513 
458 
491 
18 
Sources: Eurostat, 1995; Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 196/91 and 197/91 of 21 January 1991. 
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The second approach presents the data in proportionate rather than absolute value terms. The 
chapters are listed in relation to the proportion of the value of imports of the items subject to 
national QRs in total imports of the whole chapter within which they fall. Again, it is intra- + 
extra-EC imports that are used for this ranking exercise. Table 4.5 identifies from this list 
those chapters: 
(a) in which the proportion of imports of the items subject to national QRs exceeds one-
third of the total value of imports in the chapter; and 
(b) which were not included in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.5. HS chapters subject to national QRs, in declining order of proportionate 
value of quota-restricted items (chapters not included in Table 4.2) 
HS 
chapter 
59 
56 
12 
09 
91 
85 
04 
93 
82 
42 
22 
40 
15 
11 
16 
69 
36 
Description 
Impregnated, coated, covered or 
laminated textile fabrics 
Wadding, felt and non-wovens; special 
yams; ropes, etc. 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; misc. 
grains, seeds and fruit 
Coffee, tea, maté and spices 
Clocks and watches and parts thereof 
Electrical machinery and equipment 
and parts thereof 
Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural 
honey; edible animal products n.e.s. 
Arms and ammunition; parts and 
accessories thereof 
Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and 
forks, of base metal 
Articles of leather 
Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
Rubber and articles thereof 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils and 
their cleavage products 
Products of the milling industry 
Edible preparations of meat, fish, 
crustaceans, molluscs etc. 
Ceramic products 
Explosives; pyrotechnic products; 
matches, etc. 
Total EUR-12 imports, 1992, 
from: 
intra+extra-EC 
(million ECU) 
2.077 
2,115 
5,788 
3,521 
3,415 
96,862 
12,528 
520 
5,734 
4,772 
9,646 
13,608 
4,851 
1,285 
4,733 
5,616 
365 
extra-EC 
(million ECU) 
521 
532 
3,871 
2,821 
2,784 
44,302 
772 
194 
2,441 
3,278 
962 
4,168 
1,781 
55 
1,946 
1,233 
173 
Proportion of value of QR 
imports to total: 
intra+extra-EC 
(%) 
99 
97 
77 
77 
72 
68 
66 
62 
60 
54 
48 
48 
46 
43 
39 
36 
35 
extra-EC 
(%) 
99 
95 
85 
78 
81 
71 
64 
57 
61 
52 
64 
40 
55 
33 
26 
60 
44 
Sources: Eurostat, 1995; Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 196/91 and 197/91 of 21 January 1991. 
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Combining the data in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicates the additional chapters, not already 
covered in Table 4.2, that combine both relatively high import value (implying that they are of 
wide potential interest to third parties) and were characterized by a relatively high proportion 
of the value of the chapter in items subject to national QRs (implying that external suppliers 
may have been strongly affected). The chapters concerned, and the number of QR-imposing 
states for each, are listed in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. 
HS chapter 
85 
04 
40 
22 
12 
82 
09 
42 
91 
15 
59 
56 
69 
16 
11 
Most important HS chapters, ranked by value 
Description 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 
Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible animal products n.e.s. 
Rubber and articles thereof 
Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; misc. grains, seeds and fruit 
Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal 
Coffee, tea, maté and spices 
Articles of leather 
Clocks and watches and parts thereof 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products 
Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics 
Wadding, felt and non-wovens; special yarns; ropes, etc. 
Ceramic products 
Edible preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans, molluscs, etc. 
Products of the milling industry 
No of countries 
6 
2 
4 
3 
2 
1 
10 
1 
3 
2 
7 
5 
6 
2 
3 
Sources: Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
One-third of the 15 additional 'most affected' chapters added to the list in Table 4.6 are 
agricultural products. Five cover products that fall under the common agricultural policy 
(CAP), while a sixth (coffee) reflects the EC's adherence to the International Coffee 
Agreement. Of the remainder, two are textiles, and beverages, leather goods, cutlery, ceramics, 
electrical machinery and watches make up the picture. 
The polarization between widely and narrowly imposed QRs is more marked than was the 
case for the top 20 chapters selected in relation to the quota/item ratio (Table 4.2), especially if 
coffee is disregarded. Nine of the chapters in Table 4.6 were subject to national QRs in three 
or fewer states. Apart from the case of coffee, only three chapters were subject to QRs in six 
or more states. In the case of quota/item ranking, half of the top 20 chapters were subject to 
QRs in three or fewer states; with the value ranking in Table 4.6, the proportion is almost two-
thirds. Similarly, just under one-third of the chapters in Table 4.2 were subject to national QRs 
in six or more Member States; in Table 4.6 the share is just over one-fifth. 
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4.5. The countries affected 
This sorting process provides some guidance on: 
(a) the Member States that made the most use of national QRs (identified in Sections 4.1 
and 4.2 above and also in Section 5.3 below); 
(b) the products most subjected to national QRs and, hence, most likely to experience a 
change in market access as a result of the SMP (identified in Section 4.4); 
(c) the third parties most frequently targeted by national QRs and, hence, most likely to be 
affected directly by the SMP (identified in Section 5.3 below). 
However, these exercises do not indicate in any precise way either the impact of the national 
QRs on the direct imports even of the imposing states (leaving aside the methodological 
debate on trade deflection summarized in Section 5.2 below), or the extent to which they may 
have altered the geographical pattern of trade (by disfavouring, for example, targeted states 
relative to other third parties). 
A full quantification of such effects is well beyond the scope of this study (not least because of 
the manifold problems of complexity and lack of data noted above), but a number of 
illustrative exercises have been completed to facilitate the prioritization process. These are 
designed to identify whether or not the existence of national QRs was associated with a 
complete absence of imports into the imposing state, and whether the geographical pattern of 
imports from the QR-imposing state was different from that of the EC as a whole. 
4.5.1. Cases of zero imports 
Data have been collected on an item-by-item basis to show the level of imports into QR-
imposing states and into the Community as a whole. These cover the HS chapters listed in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.6.n 
There are a significant number of occasions on which the existence of a national QR is 
associated with a complete absence of imports into the imposing Member State. In over one-
third of the cases covered in Table 4.7, the imposing state recorded zero imports in 1992 for 
25% or more of the items on which it imposed national QRs. In one-quarter of 1,068 national 
QRs covered by the table, the imposing state recorded zero imports. 
Whilst there exists reasonable room for doubt over whether a given positive level of imports 
has been influenced by a national QR (with the counterfactual having to take account of 
consumption patterns, etc.), there must be some strong suspicion that the absence of imports is 
a QR effect. If market and consumption characteristics were such that imports were not 
demanded (or were prohibited by other measures) there would be no need, after all, for the 
national QR. 
1 ' For technical reasons, Chapter 85 is excluded. 
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Table 4.7. Authorized national QRs: An indicator of the frequency of discrimination 
against external suppliers 
04 
09 
11 
12 
15 
16 
22 
27 
31 
40 
42 
HS chapter 
Dairy produce, eggs. etc. 
Coffee 
Products of the milling industry 
Oilseeds 
Animal fats and oils 
Edible meat and fish preparations 
Beverages, spirits, vinegar 
Mineral fuels 
Fertilizers 
Rubber 
Articles of leather 
QR-imposing state 
Spain 
France 
Benelux 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
UK 
Spain 
Germany 
UK 
Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Spain 
France 
Spain 
France 
Portugal 
Denmark 
France 
Spain 
Benelux 
Spain 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Greece 
Ireland 
Spain 
UK 
No of items: 
with QR 
66 
1 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
43 
2 
1 
22 
1 
1 
48 
4 
1 
20 
5 
41 
19 
18 
3 
33 
13 
14 
14 
14 
15 
15 
5 
2 
24 
4 
with zero imports: 
No 
41 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
37 
0 
0 
8 
0 
0 
32 
3 
1 
9 
1 
16 
2 
13 
3 
6 
5 
6 
8 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
% 
66 
100 
0 
25 
0 
25 
0 
0 
25 
0 
0 
0 
88 
0 
0 
36 
0 
0 
67 
75 
100 
45 
20 
39 
11 
72 
100 
18 
39 
43 
57 
43 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table 4.7. (continued) 
HS chapter 
56 Wadding, felt and non-wovens 
59 Impregnated, coated, etc. textiles 
66 Umbrellas 
69 Ceramic products 
82 Base metal tools, cutlery, etc. 
87 Vehicles 
89 Ships, boats, etc. 
91 Clocks and watches 
95 Toys and games 
QR-imposing state 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Spain 
Greece 
UK 
Spain 
Greece 
France 
Portugal 
Germany 
Italy 
Spain 
UK 
Spain 
Portugal 
Denmark 
France 
Greece 
Spain 
Spain 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Spain 
Greece 
No of items: 
with QR 
11 
9 
9 
3 
1 
12 
6 
5 
4 
4 
1 
I 
3 
11 
9 
6 
5 
2 
2 
70 
138 
102 
66 
12 
11 
16 
8 
1 
28 
23 
with zero imports: 
No 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
20 
14 
23 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
17 
50 
80 
0 
50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17 
0 
0 
0 
0 
15 
14 
35 
42 
27 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
Sources: Eurostat, 1995; Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 196/91 and 197/91 of 21 January 1991. 
The exercise has added a further illustration of the ambiguous effect of national QRs and the 
fact that their role must be considered alongside data on national consumption and production 
patterns, as well as on the extent to which the QRs were actually enforced. In a significant 
number of cases the actual imports into the QR-imposing state were not less than might have 
been expected (based on that state's 'normal' share of EC imports and of total extra-EC 
imports of the item in question). On the contrary, they were more - sometimes considerably 
more. This suggests that on some products the QR-imposing state is one of the major markets 
in the EC. Whether this is because QRs may have been designed primarily to restrain but not 
necessarily to stifle imports that would otherwise have been even larger, or whether it reflects 
their non-enforcement, or whether it simply reflects different consumption patterns within the 
EC, is impossible to judge in the context of this study. 
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4.5.2. Differential effects on third parties 
The national QRs did not simply restrict extra-EC imports into the Community. In the case of 
QRs affecting only some supplying countries, they may also have distorted the geographical 
composition of imports. Countries facing restrictions were disadvantaged but, by the same 
token, external suppliers not covered by the restrictions were relatively favoured. 
Two sets of data were collected in relation to the products listed in Table 4.2, in the 
expectation that they might provide a broad indication of the extent to which such differential 
treatment may have occurred. The first concerns the main source of extra-EC imports into the 
QR-imposing state and into the EUR-12 as a whole. The second concerns the share of the 
most important supplying state in the extra-EC imports of the QR-imposing state and in the 
EUR-12. This information is summarized in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8. Authorized national QRs: an indicator of the frequency of discrimination 
between external suppliers 
Chapter 
27 Mineral fuels 
31 Fertilizers 
66 Umbrellas 
87 Vehicles 
89 Ships, etc. 
95 Toys and games 
QR-imposing state 
France 
Spain 
Benelux 
Spain 
Greece 
Spain 
Spain 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Spain 
Greece 
No of items facing QR in which: 
Main supplier is different from 
main EUR-12 supplier 
No 
17 
5 
7 
5 
6 
3 
65 
62 
20 
5 
3 
22 
21 
% 
70 
63 
88 
83 
75 
100 
55 
71 
47 
71 
38 
79 
96 
Share of QR-imposing state is 
higher than of EUR-12' 
No 
21 
7 
7 
3 
5 
3 
88 
71 
37 
6 
5 
18 
18 
% 
78 
88 
88 
50 
63 
100 
75 
83 
86 
86 
63 
64 
82 
1 Items in which the main extra-EC supplying state to the QR-imposing state has a share of the QR-imposing state's extra-
EC imports that is one-quarter or more greater than its share of EUR-12 extra-EC imports. 
Sources: Eurostat, 1995; Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 196/91 and 197/91 of 21 January 1991. 
In the great majority of cases, the most important source of extra-EC imports into the QR-
imposing state is different from the most important supplier of that item to the EUR-12. 
Column 4 of Table 4.8 shows, for each QR-imposing state in relation to each chapter, the 
proportion of items subject to QRs in which the main source of imports into the QR-imposing 
state and the EUR-12 was different. In all but two of the 13 instances reported in the table, the 
proportion of items in which there was a difference of supplier is greater than one-half, and in 
nine it is greater than two-thirds. 
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The two right-hand columns report the comparison between the import share of the main 
supplier to the QR-imposing state and that country's share of EUR-12 imports. In most cases, 
the main supplier to the QR-imposing state has a higher share ofthat country's imports than it 
does of EUR-12 extra-EC imports. 
It may be the case that these results indicate the existence of an inter-third-party bias which 
results not only in a reduction in the total value of imports into the QR-imposing state but also 
in a shift in the source of supply. However, it was agreed between the authors and the 
Commission that further work on the differential impact of national QRs as between one third-
party supplier and another was not a high priority for the limited resources available for this 
study. 
4.6. Summary of findings 
Unlike most of the other chapters in this report, the present one has attempted only to identify 
the pre-SMP situation. This is because the situation is sufficiently complex to require detailed 
exposition. 
There were an extremely large number of national QRs in existence on paper, plus an 
indeterminate number of unauthorized restrictions that tended to distort particular national 
product markets. It is far from clear how many of these restrictions were actually imposed, and 
those that were in force are likely to have been applied in differing ways so that their effect on 
market access will not have been identical. 
Despite these caveats, the overall effect of the restrictions will have been to limit market 
access for some products from some third parties to some extent. A very wide range of 
products may have been affected in this way. Textiles and clothing were clearly the most 
targeted products, but a wide range of other items were covered too (over 1,000 in the case of 
non-state trading countries, and over 4,000 in the case of state traders). 
The Member States most frequently imposing national QRs on imports from non-state trading 
countries were Spain, the UK, Italy, Greece, France and Portugal. The fewest QRs were 
imposed by the Benelux and Denmark. In the case of imports from state trading countries, 
Spain and Italy imposed overwhelmingly the largest number of national QRs, with Ireland 
imposing the fewest. At least nine Member States imposed unofficial restrictions on imports. 
The countries most frequently targeted by these national QRs were state traders, Japan and 
other East Asian states. Unofficial national trade barriers were directed almost exclusively at 
the East Asian countries. 
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5. National trade barriers: the effects of their removal 
5.1. Changes to the status quo ante as a result of the SMP 
5.1.1. The new regulations 
An important aspect of the SMP is that: 
... Member States may no longer enforce national trade restrictions against third countries, control 
regional supply targets that may be pursued by exporters, or operate technical barriers as substitutes 
for border measures (WTO, 1995:14). 
Although provision is made for national derogations from harmonized policies on the grounds 
of'major needs', such exemptions are supposed to be exceptional in character. 
In 1994 the import regime described in Chapter 4 was replaced by a regime compatible with 
the single market. Two Council Regulations of 7 March 1994 (No 518/94 for non-state trading 
and No 519/94 for state trading) repealed, respectively, Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 
288/82 and 3420/83, thereby eliminating all national QRs and surveillance measures on 
products (apart from textiles under Section XI of the CN) from both groups of countries. From 
15 March 1994 all surveillance measures and decisions regarding the imposition of quotas 
have been at the EC level. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 517/94 of 7 March 1994 replaced Council Regulations (EEC) 
Nos 288/82, 3420/83, 1765/82 and 1766/82 as far as their application to clothing and textile 
products from countries without a bilateral agreement is concerned. (Countries covered by a 
bilateral agreement under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) are covered by Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3030/93, see Table 5.2.) 
Residual national QRs on products from non-state trading countries were suspended pending 
the entry into force of the Agreement on textiles and clothing resulting from the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations at which point they were due to be abolished, although it is 
understood that this has not yet happened. Although no new formal equivalents have since 
been imposed for non-state trading countries and, as explained below, use of safeguard actions 
to achieve similar objectives has been very limited, there are some curbs in place that have 
similar effects. These include, for example, the 1991 Elements of Consensus Agreement with 
Japan on cars. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 March 1994 generally prohibits individual Member 
States from applying national QRs or surveillance measures on products from the countries 
formerly governed by Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 3420/83, 1765/82 and 1766/82, 
excluding many of the countries of Eastern Europe.12 It placed 'justified' existing national 
quotas on an EC footing. In effect this meant that it replaced national QRs with a limited 
12 fhe countries currently covered are Albania. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Moldavia, Mongolia. North Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam. 
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number of EC restrictions on imports from China.13 It also established restrictions on outward 
processing traffic (OPT) and detailed surveillance measures. 
From the beginning of 1993, the Commission has rejected all but one application of Article 
115. This exception was its use for six months in relation to imports of bananas from certain 
Latin American countries. 
The net effect is that sub-EC level restrictions with respect to non-state trading countries have 
been largely removed, except for clothing and textiles, but that the situation is not so clear-cut 
with respect to states that are, or were formerly, state trading. The collapse of Communism 
meant that many states were changing category before the SMP was completed. In important 
respects the change in the EC's trade policy stance, especially towards the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, has been influenced by factors other than the SMP. This is not to say that 
the SMP was without any influence on the evolution of EC policy towards Eastern Europe, 
only that it was one factor among others, was not necessarily the most important, and any 
unique effects are not sufficiently identifiable to satisfy the tight requirements of the terms of 
reference for this study. Moreover, the state trading country that was most heavily targeted 
before the SMP, China, is still subject to restrictions and, hence, is in a different position to 
the non-state trading countries with respect to the effects of the SMP. 
The broad picture on QRs is illustrated in Table 5.1. This indicates the situation pre- and post-
SMP for textile and non-textile products from state trading and non-state trading states. It 
makes the point specifically that the removal of non-textile QRs from formerly state trading 
states not covered by Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 should not be considered an effect 
of the SMP. Rather, it is a consequence of action taken by the Community following the 
collapse of Communism. 
Table 5.1. 
Products 
Textiles 
Non-textiles 
Changes on national QRs 
Countries 
Non-state trading 
State trading 
Non-state trading 
Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet 
Union and China 
Pre-SMP 
National 
QRs 
National 
QRs 
National 
QRs 
National 
QRs 
National 
QRs 
Post-SMP 
Community QRs 
Community QRs 
Abolition of QRs or Community 
QRs 
No SMP effect 
Abolition of QRs or replacement 
with Community QRs 
Regulation 
(EEC) No 958/93 
(EC) No 517/94 
(EEC) No 958/93 
(EC) No 517/94 
(EC) No 518/94 
Trade and Cooperation 
Agreements 
Association Agreements 
(EC) No 519/94 
13 The following are the 2-digit HS chapter numbers followed, in brackets, by the number of products at the 8-digit level 
affected: 42 (1): 64 (9): 69 (2); 70 (1); 85 (2); 95 (3): quotas under Chapter 85 were eliminated in 1996. 
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5.1.2. Changes to customs procedures 
An important stimulus to these changes has been the parallel movement in cross-border 
customs formalities, which has made national restrictions much more difficult to enforce. The 
SMP has been associated with changes designed to improve the efficiency and simplicity of 
customs procedures relating to all cross-border trade, intra-Community and third-country 
alike. 
Such procedures were increasingly being developed at Community level before the SMP, but 
the objective of creating a barri er-free Europe added impetus to the effort.14 There have, of 
course, been many other changes to customs procedures during the period covered by this 
study, but they are in the main not a direct consequence of the SMP but of other factors. As the 
study on Customs and fiscal formalities at frontiers notes, for example, many of the 
procedures which customs will administer for third-country trade are governed by the 
provisions of the Uruguay Round, while procedures on the ground are covered by the 
Commission's 'Customs 2000' vision and programme, which is also outside the review. 
One change that is most directly attributable to the SMP is that external imports and internal 
cross-border traffic are now treated differently. The SAD (see Section 4.3.2) was discontinued 
from 1 January 1993 for intra-Community cross-border trade, and was replaced by the EC 
VAT and Intrastat reporting systems. The SAD is now used only for third-country trade. 
On 1 January 1994 a Community Customs Code came into force, with Member States 
progressively introducing simplified customs procedures for approved traders and forwarders, 
together with computerization. These two changes, simplification and computerization, can 
lead to immense improvements in the efficiency of customs procedures, but it is reported that 
much remains to be done in terms of implementation and establishing commonality between 
the computerized applications adopted by different Member States. 
To the extent that the new procedures apply to intra- and extra-EC trade alike, any 
improvement would have the potential to improve the conditions of access of third-country 
products into the European market. And, to the extent that the improvements have not yet been 
realized, there is no strong evidence that, apart from the difference in use of the SAD, it is 
because of rules or procedures that are differentially onerous for third parties; it is just that the 
changes have not yet been fully implemented and, hence, the gains not obtained. 
An example provided in the report on Customs and fiscal formalities at frontiers refers to 
footwear. Certain types of footwear specially designed for a sporting activity, or involving 
special technology, are covered by special import regulations that do not apply to other forms 
of footwear. However, the interpretation in the Member States differs on the definition of the 
given rules. One result is that companies importing these goods choose the most favourable 
Member State for import clearance in order to avoid problems and additional administrative 
work. 
14 This section draws on the study on Customs and fiscal formalities at frontiers undertaken as part of the broader 
programme of research on the SMP in The Single Market Review. Subseries III, Vol. 3, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EC and London: Kogan Page\Earthscan, 1997. 
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Alongside the simplification and harmonization of customs procedures has been a 
harmonization of veterinary and health checks. These have had a similar effect in opening the 
European market (to external and non-national EC suppliers alike) and reducing the practical 
scope for implementing sub-Community import restrictions. 
The changes in this area have overlapped with those analysed in Chapter 6. There has been 
activity to ensure adequate veterinary and phytosanitary standards in extra-EC imports. This 
has included fact-finding field visits to third countries and the granting of 'a large number of 
derogation decisions' (CEC, 1994b:70). For the most part, these were adaptations of previous 
derogations 'made necessary by the requirements of the new legislation and the concept of the 
internal market' (CEC, 1994b:70). 
5.1.3. The implications for national restrictions 
Does this mean that there can no longer be sub-Community restrictions on access to third-
country products? The answer is no. In all three Regulations, the decision to impose QRs may 
be taken only at the EC level, but the possibility is raised that QRs will apply only to certain 
parts of the EC. The proviso is made that this will occur only if deemed necessary and most 
appropriate, and on an exceptional and temporary basis. 
Clearly, without the enforcement mechanism of Article 115 or intra-EC border controls, the 
application of this provision will vary according to the characteristics of the product and its 
market, so that not all third-country products can be restricted successfully at a sub-
Community level. As is clear from the review of non-authorized national QRs, it is possible to 
segment the European market for some products (depending upon the characteristics of 
suppliers, consumers and the goods in question) by a range of other, often informal, means. 
There have been no formal safeguard actions to replace the pre-SMP restrictions. And, in any 
case, change in the use of safeguards by the EC is now more properly considered as a Uruguay 
Round and WTO effect than as a direct consequence of the SMP. Council Regulation (EC) No 
518/94 was superseded by Regulation (EC) No 3285/94 to reflect the EC's WTO obligations. 
Since 1988, the Commission has adopted only two safeguard measures (a third, on footwear 
from China in 1992, was proposed by the Commission but not accepted by the Council). The 
two were: 
(a) in 1992, in relation to certain steel products from the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
imported into Germany, Italy and France; 
(b) in 1993, in relation to unwrought aluminium imported from the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) into the Community as a whole. 
But there may have been less formal, and visible, controls. In the period since the SMP, 
negotiations with third countries have occurred and there is some evidence that the 
'cooperation' of third countries has been requested in order to keep their exports at a certain 
level and to avoid concentration in specific markets (Velia, 1996:85). A recent WTO Trade 
Policy Review on Japan lists various cases of export monitoring or restraints vis-à-vis the EC 
in addition to the 1991 'consensus' on cars. Some of these have sub-Community application. 
The products covered were: video tape recorders, forklift trucks (until December 1994), ball-
bearings (until July 1993), cotton fabrics (export approval for one item since December 1994), 
pottery and chinaware (exports to the UK), and clothing (exports to the UK until December 
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1994) (WTO, 1995:67). WTO Trade Policy Reviews have also indicated that several 
Mediterranean countries have for years moderated their exports of 'sensitive' textiles and 
clothing in order to avoid EC safeguard actions under their bilateral agreements. 
In addition to sub-Community and informal controls, national QRs have been replaced in 
some cases by formal Community-level restrictions. These are almost exclusively in relation 
to textiles and clothing or, in the case of non-textile products, those originating in China. 
An overview of the provisions regarding textiles is presented in Table 5.2. Protocols exist on 
textile and clothing products under the EC's association agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia; these provide for full liberalization by 
1 January 1998. During 1993 the EC substituted bilateral quotas for previously unilateral 
restrictions on imports from Mongolia, Vietnam, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan, and the textile agreements with the Baltic states and other FSU states have 
surveillance provisions (WTO, 1995:58). 
Table 5.2. Suppliers of textiles and clothing products with bilateral agreements or 
arrangements with the EC, 1 January 1995 
I. ¡VIFA Agreements 
ASEAN 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
South Asia 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh 
Far East 
Hong Kong 
Republic of Korea 
Macau 
China 
Latin America 
Argentina 
Peru 
Brazil 
Uruguay 
Colombia 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
(no 
(no 
(no 
(no 
(no 
restrictions) 
restrictions) 
restrictions) 
restrictions) 
restrictions) 
Source: European Commission, cited i 
II. MFA-type Agreements 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
Russian Federation 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Ukraine 
Mongolia 
Vietnam 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Slovenia 
in WTO. 1995:Table 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
(no restrictions) 
V.2. 
III. Preferential Arrangements 
(Mediterranean countries) 
Egypt 
Turkey 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Malta 
IV. Preferential Arrangements 
(Europe Agreement countries) 
Czech Republic 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
V. Autonomous Arrangements 
Chinese Taipei 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Croatia 
Form. Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia 
People's Democratic Rep. of Korea 
In the case of non-textile products, Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 (7 March 1994) 
introduced Community-wide quotas on imports from China of: working gloves, six types of 
footwear, tableware of porcelain or ceramics, glassware, car radios, and three types of toys. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 538/95 (6 March 1995) enlarged and amended the quotas and, 
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according to Commission estimates, non-restricted items account for more than 65% of EC 
imports of footwear from China (WTO, 1995:58). 
5.2. Methodology for assessing the impact of change 
Despite the caveats identified above, the assumed counterfactual must be that, in the absence 
of the SMP, national restrictions would have remained in force. Hence, the effect of the SMP 
on market access for non-state trading third countries is to be identified by comparing the 
status quo ante with the status quo.15 
Assessing the effect of the SMP changes on third-country access to the EC market is 
complicated by: 
(a) the complexity and opacity of the status quo ante; 
(b) uncertainty concerning the status quo (given the continuation of some Community-wide 
quotas and some less formal means of restriction); 
(c) and methodological uncertainty concerning the impact of both pre- and post-SMP 
measures. 
The first two of these have been described in Chapter 4 and Sections 3.3 and 5.1. The 
methodological uncertainty derives from theoretical and empirical arguments over the impact 
of national quotas on trade and prices (see, for example, Hamilton, 1991; Faini et al, 1992). 
There are at least three relevant strands of argument. 
Since national QRs restricted the entry into a Member State market only of goods produced 
outside the Community, it is possible that the intended protective effect on producers in the 
quota-imposing state were partly offset. If prices in the notionally restricted market were 
raised by the reduction of supply, they may have attracted increased intra-EC imports. In such 
a case, the extra-EC product may have been deflected into the national market of the exporting 
Member State. To the extent that this occurred, the anticipated restriction on third-party access 
to the EC market will have been dissipated. Hence, the SMP changes will have had less effect 
than would have been expected. 
In addition, there is debate over the practical effect of switching from country sub-quotas to 
EC-wide quotas. The effect of identically sized quotas could be different for two (not mutually 
exclusive) reasons: 
(a) in one case, a Community-wide quota could be less restrictive than a set of national 
quotas with the same total volume. This is because the national system might result in a 
situation in which exports to one country reach constraining levels even though demand 
is unsatisfied, while quotas in other countries are underutilized because of inadequate 
demand; 
(b) in the other case, Community-wide quotas may be more rigorously administered than 
were some national quotas. If true, this would tend to affect third parties in the opposite 
direction. 
15 As explained above, this counterfactual does not necessarily hold with respect to the formerly state trading countries 
with which the EC has agreed trade and cooperation and association agreements. 
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If the underutilization of quotas in some sub-markets reflects differential price levels between 
the sub-markets, and if the relatively high prices in the sub-markets with fully utilized quotas 
include a certain element of economic rent, then the gains to suppliers from a globalization of 
quotas may be less than might have been expected. This is because globalization of sub-quotas 
would tend to level out prices across the sub-markets, resulting in an increase in supply to the 
market in which, previously, the quota was underutilized, but a loss of revenue on exports to 
the markets with fully utilized quotas. Hence, the gains to suppliers from increased sales at 
higher prices to some markets will be offset to a degree by lower prices on their sales to other 
markets. 
5.3. Article 115 as a barometer 
The use of Article 115 provides a helpful barometer to the extent to which the national QRs 
that existed on paper were actually enforced. As noted in Chapter 4, one of the problems of 
quantifying the effect of the SMP in terms of access to Member State markets is that there are 
no comprehensive and reliable data on the extent to which Member States made use of their 
authorizations to restrict imports, let alone of the use made of the more informal, unauthorized 
policies that had a restrictive effect. One broad indicator, however, of the use made of national 
QRs is provided by the applications made to the Commission by Member States to implement 
the provisions of Article 115. 
Monitoring of the rate of applications for, and approvals of, Article 115 action can provide one 
indicator of: 
(a) the scale of national QRs; 
(b) the distribution of national QRs between product groups; 
(c) the frequency with which different Member States make use of national QRs; 
(d) and the supplying countries against which national QRs were most often enforced. 
It is important to understand, however, that Article 115 usage is only one, very imperfect, such 
indicator. Its failings relate to the wide variety of restrictions covered by the regulations 
described in Section 4.1 for which systematic details are lacking, the absence of a complete 
overlap between the classification of authorized residual national restrictions, of trade flows 
and of Article 155 restrictions, and the methodological problems referred to in Section 5.2. 
Moreover, as indicated below, usage of Article 115 fell dramatically well before the SMP-
associated changes in Council Regulations described in Section 5.1, complicating attempts to 
use it as an unambiguous, objective empirical element in establishing the relative and absolute 
importance of the SMP changes relating to national trade barriers. 
5.3.1. The incidence and product profile of Article 115 usage 
Data have been collected by various analysts from the Commission's records on recourse to 
Article 115 (see, for example, Pelkmans, 1987; Davenport, 1990 and 1991; Langhammer, 
1990; Schuknecht, 1992). The most up-to-date, extensive analysis is provided in Velia, 1996. 
These exercises normally distinguish only between textiles and clothing, on the one hand, and 
other products, on the other. 
The use of Article 115 increased sharply at the end of the 1970s, reaching a peak in 1980, and 
then generally subsided so that by 1992 applications were already at a very low level (Figure 
5.1). The decline in the usage of Article 115 is even more marked since the decline in 
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applications at the end of the 1980s and start of the 1990s was mirrored by a drop in the rate of 
acceptance (Velia, 1996:95). 
Figure 5.1. Article 115 applications, 1971-92 
400 τ 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Textiles/Clothing ■ ■ ■ O t h e r •Total 
Source: Velia, 1996. 
This pattern is influenced substantially by changes in practice with respect to textiles and 
clothing. A large part of the increased use of Article 115 in the late 1970s/early 1980s is the 
result of applications made with respect to textiles and clothing and, by the same token, the 
decline during the second half of the 1980s is similarly linked to this sector. The use of Article 
115 in relation to textiles and clothing can be shown to have varied in a quite close 
relationship with the negotiations on the MFA over this period (Velia, 1996:94). Applications 
for products other than textiles and clothing were made at a broadly similar rate for much of 
the period covered in Figure 5.1, with a sharp decline in usage occurring only at the very end 
of the period. 
5.3.2. Imposing states 
There have been marked differences in the pattern of Article 115 use by different Member 
States (Table 5.3). Over the period 1984-92, France made the most frequent recourse to 
Article 115 for both textiles and clothing and other products. Ireland received the second 
highest number of acceptances for Article 115 applications in relation to textiles and clothing, 
but made very few applications in relation to other goods. Italy, by contrast, which was the 
second-most-frequent recipient of approvals for Article 115 action on goods other than textiles 
and clothing, made a much smaller number of applications for restrictions to textiles and 
clothing (even though it was the third-most-frequent recipient of acceptances for these 
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products). Spain and the UK received a moderate number of acceptances for both types of 
product, acceptances for Benelux were restricted largely to textile and clothing products, and 
Denmark made only two applications (both accepted) for any Article 115 use over the whole 
period. 
Table 5.3. Percentage of acceptances of applications by applying Member State, 
1984-92' 
Member State 
Benelux 
Denmark 
Spain2 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Textile and clothing applications 
Acceptances 
17 
2 
29 
276 
255 
67 
34 
% accepted 
100.0 
100.0 
42.6 
83.6 
80.4 
82.7 
82.9 
Applications for goods other than 
textiles and clothing 
Acceptances 
4 
0 
64 
135 
9 
111 
20 
% accepted 
66.7 
n.a. 
60.4 
80.4 
90.0 
85.4 
76.9 
Note: Member States not mentioned in the table have not made applications in the period considered. 
1 Excludes 16 applications withdrawn by the Member States over the period. 
1 1986-92. 
Source: Velia. 1996. 
5.3.3. Target states 
The great majority of Article 115 actions have been with respect to the East Asian newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) plus China (Table 5.4). Almost all of the applications which 
were not directed at these four countries were aimed at other developing countries or the 
USSR and Eastern European states (especially Romania and Czechoslovakia). 
Within the NIC group, just over half of all applications applied to Hong Kong. But, this 
country's share of the total fell to a little over one-third in 1991. During the last five years of 
operation of the Article, applications against Korea rose. 
Different Member States have tended to target specific trade partners. It is reported in Velia 
(1996:111) that France and Italy were by far the dominant applicants against Chinese and 
Pakistani textile and clothing imports, while the majority of applications against Hong Kong 
originated from Ireland, those against Taiwan from France, and those against South Korea 
from Spain. Importantly, a comparison of this pattern of applications with the relative share of 
different suppliers in the imports of applying countries suggests that in most cases there is no 
systematic relationship. In other words, the sensitivity of Member States against specific trade 
partners appears not to have been connected to import levels (Velia, 1996:112). 
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Table 5.4. Applications by the Member States against third countries, 1985-92: 
number of cases' 
Applications by... 
against 
Poland 
Czechoslovakia 
Hungary 
USSR 
Romania 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
South Korea 
China 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Macao 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Yugoslavia 
Peru 
Brazil 
Egypt 
Turkey 
Belgium 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Denmark 
2 
France 
1 
4 
4 
24 
45 
29 
38 
74 
18 
1 
4 
2 
1 
4 
23 
3 
11 
3 
6 
7 
Ireland 
4 
106 
38 
21 
11 
5 
5 
1 
7 
29 
9 
8 
7 
Spain 
21 
16 
9 
17 
16 
2 
6 
Italy 
9 
1 
1 
10 
11 
12 
20 
1 
UK 
1 
1 
8 
1 
1 
4 
1 
3 
1 
2 
Total 
1 
14 
7 
2' 
38 
168 
78 
89 
117 
23 
8 
5 
2 
8 
51 
53 
3 
22 
3 
7 
1 
16 
' This table includes all withdrawn cases. The number of applications when added up do not match with the reported total 
number of applications made over the period. This is due to the fact that two applications withdrawn by France were 
omitted in the Commission Summary Statistics Tables. 
2 There were in fact three cases. One was withdrawn and was not reported in the Commission table either as a withdrawn or 
a rejected application. 
Source: Velia, 1996. 
Another important point for the methodology used in this study concerns the countries which 
are not listed in Table 5.4. As explained in Chapter 2, the trade policy changes associated with 
the SMP may have differential effects upon one third party vis-à-vis another. Article 115 could 
not be used against countries with which the EC had negotiated a trade agreement excluding 
the possibility of QRs. Hence, Article 115 could not be used against either EFTA or most of 
the EC's Mediterranean trade partners, or against imports from African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) states. Indeed, in the case of the most celebrated post-SMP dispute with a link to 
Article 115, bananas, the Article was used to protect producers not only in Member States but 
also in favoured third parties (i.e. the ACP). 
5.4. Summary of findings 
The SMP has affected national trade barriers substantially and, hence, has tended to improve 
the conditions of access for third-country products to the EC market. This effect has been 
reinforced by the considerably expanded legal powers given to the European Commission to 
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enforce and protect the single market. And it is the case that the controls have not been 
reimposed. 
However, on the evidence of the WTO, it has not completely removed sub-Community 
differences in the treatment of imports. Moreover, the continuation of such sub-Community 
differences is the result not of incomplete implementation of the SMP but of the continuation 
of policies that permit differentiation. Hence, the further implementation of the SMP will not 
substantially alter the conclusions to be drawn on its impact on external access. 
The main vehicle for the reduction of sub-Community differences in access has been the 
removal of border controls. In consequence, while it is still possible to apply differential 
treatment for some products from some sources (depending upon the nature of the market), 
this now occurs on a much less substantial scale than before the SMP. 
The most reasonable counterfactual against which the SMP changes are to be judged is that 
sub-EC barriers to trade with non-state trading countries would have continued, although the 
situation with respect to state trading countries is not so clear-cut. In the absence of the SMP, 
there might well have been problems in adapting the system of national restrictions to the 
tariffication requirements of the GATT Uruguay Round. However, it must be assumed that 
some way would have been found to permit the Community to continue to operate in the old 
way had the SMP not intervened. Given that conclusion, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
SMP has had a beneficial effect on the market access of some products from some third-party 
suppliers by removing national restrictions that, in most cases, have not been replaced by 
Community-level controls. 
Despite the evidence provided by the empirical analysis reported in Chapter 4, the scale of this 
effect is unclear. This is because of uncertainty concerning the extent to which the pre-SMP 
national restrictions were actually enforced, and also because of methodological questions 
over the effect of such restrictions, and the uncertain empirical evidence on the extent to which 
the QRs restricted imports. Nonetheless, there is some reason to suppose that there will have 
been gains even though the true scale of these cannot be established with any precision. 
These gains are likely to have accrued to a relatively small number of countries, and in only a 
few Member State markets. Only 11 states were subjected to more than 10 applications of 
Article 115 between 1985 and 1992. The great majority of these were Eastern European, East 
Asian or South Asian states, although Turkey and Yugoslavia were also represented. France, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK were the countries most often granted Article 115 rights. 
Only a relatively small number of product chapters were affected by a broad range of national 
quotas. Textiles and clothing, footwear, vehicles, agricultural products, and a range of 
manufactured items figure prominently in the lists. 
It is impossible within the scope of this study to provide any serious quantitative estimate of 
the scale of the restrictions. Too many other factors have to be taken into account when 
interpreting Member State import figures. However, the fact that a significant number of states 
which imposed national QRs recorded no external imports of the products in question in 1992 
suggests that the national QRs had a real impact on trade, even though Article 115 usage had 
declined substantially since the late 1980s. 
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Because the application of national QRs was very restricted, the impact of their removal on 
external suppliers as a whole is likely to be different from that on the countries directly 
affected. It is likely that differential effects between third parties will be an important element 
of the overall picture. Hence, it is perfectly possible that a particular supplier in a non-EC state 
may believe that its relative access to the European market has deteriorated as a result of the 
SMP even though, absolutely, there has been an improvement in access. However, this was 
not a priority area for the study, which was intended to concentrate on absolute changes for all 
third parties - such as administrative simplification, the opportunities offered by a bigger 
market, and increased transparency in the replacement of 12 separate administrative processes 
with one. 
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6. Removal of technical barriers to trade 
The free circulation of goods is one of the corner-stones for the creation of the single market. 
In the period after the formation of the customs union in 1968 differences between national 
technical regulations and standards - technical barriers to trade - became the principal 
impediment to the free movement of goods within the EC. Because of this, roughly half of 
secondary single market legislation is concerned with the production and marketing of goods. 
Removing national technical barriers to trade is also one of the aspects of the SMP that has 
been most successful in terms of implementation narrowly defined. Nonetheless, 258 
complaints regarding obstacles to trade were recorded in 1995 and, according to the 
Commission, 'much remains to be done' in relation to standardization policy (CEC, 1996a:23 
and 30). This is a view that is also reflected in the trade association survey (Appendix A to 
Part II). This chapter concentrates on identifying the changes that would accrue if and when 
the SMP is fully in operation. 
The potential external impact of this process is not unambiguously unidirectional, and may 
vary according to the precise form that technical harmonization and standardization have 
taken. The next section outlines the bare bones of the process as a necessary basis for 
understanding this potentially differential effect. 
6.1. The SMP changes 
6.1.1. The status quo ante 
Prior to the creation of the single market there was a profusion of national technical 
regulations and standards. In 1990 there were 20,000 standards on the books in Germany, 
13,000 in France and 10,000 in the United Kingdom, compared to 1,250 European standards 
(CEC, 1990). Even considering that a significant proportion of the national standards were 
either identical or related to international or European standards, the number and diversity of 
national standards was extensive. 
Thus the European market was fragmented and producers had to tailor their products to the 
respective national markets. This is likely to have had a negative impact on trade in relation 
both to goods originating outside the Community and to those produced in one Member State 
for sale in another. 
This impediment to internal and external trade was compounded by the requirement that some 
products be certified by authorized independent bodies as conforming with the technical 
regulation or standard in question. In most cases the certification had to be carried out by an 
authorized body in the country of destination. This meant that multiple certifications were 
necessary. 
6.1.2. The nature of the change 
The creation of the single market in goods has five components (which, as explained in the 
next sub-section, may have had differential external effects): 
(a) notification of new national technical legislation or standards which could have 
implications for the free circulation of goods; 
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(b) mutual recognition of national regulations and standards (requires equivalent levels of 
protection); 
(c) new approach Directives in which the EC adopts only the 'essential minimum 
requirements' for a measure and refers it to the appropriate European standardization 
body(ies) to develop the voluntary standards to achieve those requirements; 
(d) full harmonization in selected sectors where mandatory standards are necessary; 
(e) mutual recognition of national certification. 
It is helpful to consider these components in three groups. The first two represent a 
decentralized approach; the second two a centralized approach; and the fifth is a necessary 
condition for mutual recognition and the new approach Directives to function properly. 
Under the notification procedure the competent authorities in a Member State must notify the 
relevant European organization of a new law/standard. In the case of proposals for new 
technical regulations notification is to the Commission. For proposed standards, notification is 
to the appropriate European standards body. This procedure has two merits. It increases the 
transparency of national measures, and it provides an opportunity to revise the measures so 
that they do not impede trade. 
Mutual recognition of national regulations and standards means that any good circulating 
legally in one Member State must also be free to circulate in any other part of the EC, except 
where a Member State can demonstrate that the rules of the Member State of origin do not 
afford equivalent protection of the essential public good. 
Legislative harmonization at the EC level is necessary in the relatively few cases in which the 
national legislation of the Member States is not equivalent. It can take one of two forms: the 
'new approach', where legislation is framed only in terms of essential requirements, or 
harmonization, where detailed specifications are provided. 
Because new approach Directives lay down only essential minimum requirements, leaving the 
development of detailed specifications to the European standards bodies, each can cover an 
entire 'family' of products. Moreover, because they are based on reference to voluntary 
standards, manufacturers may choose to comply with a different standard, their own or that of 
another country. In order for goods produced to such standards to circulate freely in the EC, 
however, an authorized third party must certify that the standard used meets or exceeds the 
essential minimum requirements laid down in the Directive. 
As of mid-1996 20 new approach Directives had been adopted (Atkins International Limited, 
1996) regarding: toy safety, simple pressure vessels, construction products, electromagnetic 
compatibility, personal protective equipment, machinery, non-automatic weighing 
instruments, active implantable medical devices, electrical equipment for use in potentially 
explosive atmospheres, explosives for civil use, appliances burning gaseous fuels, new hot-
water boilers fired with liquid or gaseous fuels, hydraulically and oil-electrically operated lifts, 
lifts, telecommunications terminal equipment, satellite earth station equipment, recreational 
crafts, and packaging and packaging waste.16 
16 One new approach Directive (93/68/EEC) amended 12 previous new approach Directives to incorporate common rules 
for CE marking (Atkins (1996) forthcoming in The Single Market Review. Subseries III. Vol. 1: Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC and London: Kogan Page\Earthscan. 1997). 
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In some sectors the new approach is not considered adequate to ensure public policy 
objectives. In such areas detailed harmonized regulations are agreed at the European level. 
Technical harmonization is particularly important with respect to cars, foodstuffs, 
pharmaceutical products for human and veterinary use, and chemicals. Due to their special 
nature, the regulatory regimes governing the first three sectors deserve further description. 
In the case of cars, 45 detailed specifications had been adopted by 1994 governing safety and 
emissions. These comprise the EC's type approval for cars. Cars that comply with all 45 
measures can be sold anywhere in EC. 
Foodstuffs are regulated using both horizontal and vertical measures. The former reflect the 
essential minimum requirement considerations of the new approach; the latter are detailed 
harmonized specifications. Horizontal measures include those that govern the additives that 
may or may not be used, how food products are labelled and how food hygiene is guaranteed. 
The vertical approach measures designate the composition of certain specific products, such as 
chocolate, honey, sugar and jams. 
Because of their importance (direct and indirect) for human health, all pharmaceutical 
products for human and veterinary use must receive authorization from the competent 
authorities regarding quality, safety and efficacy as well as specifications concerning 
manufacturing and marketing. The safety criteria for veterinary products are particularly far 
reaching because of the need to protect consumers of animal-derived foods. 
There are three procedures for obtaining market authorization for pharmaceutical products: 
centralized, decentralized and the national authorization of products for the domestic market. 
The centralized procedure applies to all biotechnology products and is available on request for 
other innovatory products and new chemical entities. It results in a single authorization by the 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency that is valid in all Member States. The decentralized 
procedure applies to the majority of products and allows the extension of an authorization 
granted by one Member State to another, which must decide swiftly whether to recognize the 
authorization. A procedure exists for resolving disputes. Member States remain responsible for 
authorizing products intended only for the domestic market. 
There are two types of certification which can impede trade. The first is obligatory 
certification, which is required by public authorities to ensure that the product in question 
complies with certain, usually safety, requirements. This is the certification required in the full 
harmonization and new approach Directives discussed above. The second is voluntary 
certification, which may be required by consumers or producers in order to check quality, 
assess process control, or ensure compliance with customer specifications. 
In the EC, as elsewhere, responsibility for obligatory certification may in some cases be 
assigned to competent and properly equipped manufacturers. In others it may have to be 
carried out by authorized, specialist third parties, such as testing laboratories and certification 
bodies, as in the case of pharmaceuticals above (see Table 6.1). The proportion of products 
which comes under mandatory certification systems in the Member States is small compared 
with the total quantity of products on the market (CEC, 1989). As noted above, however, 
private bodies may also require product certification. 
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Table 6.1. EC regulated products: certification options 
Product type 
Toys 
Construction products 
Simple pressure vessels 
Large pressure vessels 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
Machinery 
Personal protective equipment 
Gas appliances 
Non-automatic weighing instruments 
Active implantable medical devices 
Telecommunications terminal equipment 
Hot-water boilers 
Hydraulically and oil-electrically 
operated lifts 
Lifts 
Medical devices 
Equipment intended for use in 
potentially explosive atmospheres 
Explosives intended for civil uses 
Satellite earth station equipment 
Recreational craft 
Packaging and packaging waste 
Certification options 
Manufacturer assurance 
At a minimum, manufacturer registration of production quality assurance 
system 
EC type examination 
EC type examination and quality assurance 
Manufacturer declaration 
Manufacturer declaration 
EC type examination with quality control system registration for higher risk 
equipment 
EC type examination and either quality assurance system registration or on-
site checks 
EC type examination and quality assurance registration or EC verification 
Declaration procedure requiring complete quality assurance system subject 
to surveillance or EC type examination and declaration of conformity or EC 
verification 
EC type examination or declaration of conformity with full quality 
assurance 
EC type approval and declaration of conformity 
EC type examination and inspection 
Declaration procedure requiring complete quality assurance system subject 
to surveillance or EC type examination 
Declaration procedure requiring complete quality assurance system subject 
to surveillance or EC type examination and declaration of conformity or EC 
verification 
EC type approval 
EC type examination and quality assurance or product verification or third-
party unit verification 
Declaration procedure requiring complete quality assurance system subject 
to surveillance or EC type examination 
Various options depending on category and size of craft ranging up to EC 
type examination 
Procedures to be determined by the Member States 
Sources: US Department of Commerce 
Directives. 
(cited in Kruger, 1992): Atkins International Limited. 1996; and relevant 
6.2. External effects of change 
Overall, technical harmonization and standardization are likely to benefit trade, to the 
advantage of foreign and EC firms alike. But some aspects of technical harmonization and 
standardization at the European level have specifically external implications. 
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The approximation of standards was the aspect of the SMP that most concerned the US 
business community (USITC, 1993:7-985), but US perceptions of the issue now are generally 
favourable. The elimination of technical barriers within the EC, it is believed, will greatly 
benefit trade, saving money and time, and creating the potential for more fully exploiting 
economies of scale. 
The SMP has benefited third-country producers by providing greater transparency and legal 
certainty in many sectors (GATT, 1993). In addition, the elimination of technical barriers 
among potential markets reduces design, engineering, marketing and transport costs and, in 
some cases, might provide opportunities to exploit greater economies of scale. 
6.2.1. Mutual recognition 
Mutual recognition is a particularly beneficial way of eliminating technical barriers to trade 
from the point of view of third-country firms as it increases market sizes without replacing 
national barriers with European measures. Third-country producers may even enjoy an 
advantage over EC producers in that they can choose to export to the Member State with the 
most favourable regulatory regime, while EC producers must conform to the requirements of 
the Member State of production. 
6.2.2. New approach Directives 
The flexibility of new approach Directives also makes them quite favourable to third-country 
firms. Because their objectives are realized by only voluntary standards, a foreign firm may 
continue to use its national standard so long as a notified third party certifies that this standard 
conforms with the essential requirements of the relevant Directive. This helps to alleviate any 
European bias in the standards, which might occur for no reason other than that this is the 
expertise available in drawing up the standard. 
Another attraction of this approach for foreign firms is that there is a high degree of 
congruence, particularly in the electrotechnical field, between European and international 
standards. According to the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC), in 1991 90% of the draft European standards in the electrotechnical sector were 
prepared at the international level (Nicolas and Repussard, 1995). 
The relative transparency of the European standardization process means that third-country 
parties can gain access to, and comment on, draft standards, thereby facilitating adaptation to 
new European standards. It should be noted that the national standards institutes of the 
members of the EFTA are full members of the European standards bodies. As of early 1994, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Turkey were affiliated members of the European Committee for Standardization, 
and all but Bulgaria, Cyprus and Lithuania were affiliate members of CENELEC. Thus they 
were able to attend as observers general assemblies, technical committees and sub-
committees. 
6.2.3. Full harmonization 
If third-country firms face market access problems it is most likely to be with regard to 
products that are subject to technical harmonization (Woolcock, 1991). This is not to say that 
coping with one common regulation is not more straightforward than complying with multiple 
62 External access to European markets 
national ones nor that the new EC regulations are necessarily more restrictive than the national 
measures they replaced. Indeed, the benefits to third-country producers due to the creation of a 
single regulatory regime as well as to improved transparency and greater legal certainty 
mentioned above apply equally with respect to technical harmonization. However, because 
such regulations address risks that are considered to be too great to be entrusted to more 
decentralized approaches, harmonized measures are detailed and mandatory and therefore are 
harder to comply with than new approach Directives. It is possible that although they were 
adopted in order to realize public policy objectives - such as reducing pollution and ensuring 
consumer safety - and apply equally to domestically produced and imported goods, they may 
suit European firms better than foreign ones.17 
The negative impact of detailed regulations on trade is illustrated by the high priority EC and 
US leaders have attached to reducing barriers to trade in cars caused by divergent safety and 
emissions regulations.18 Similarly, the Japanese government has requested that the EC 
recognize the equivalence of its regulations on safety glazing materials for road vehicles (DG 
I, 1996). 
Although it is easier in general for exporters to comply with one common standard than 12 
different ones, because the harmonized regulations are detailed and mandatory it is possible 
that a product that had previously complied with one Member State's regulations would not 
conform with the European regulation. In such circumstances, in order to retain access to the 
Member State's market the third-country producer would have to adjust to the new measure, 
as would the domestic producer. It is possible, however, that the export market is not 
sufficiently important to the third-country firm for it to make that adjustment and thus it would 
lose market access. Such effects, while potentially significant for individual producers, are 
almost certainly negligible compared with the more general simplification of access. 
Within the category of harmonized regulations, some types of measure may present greater 
problems for foreign firms than others. Some regulations not only govern product 
performance, they may also mandate the composition of the product or the way in which it is 
produced. Where there are requirements on product composition, this may affect suppliers of 
inputs (whether production is based inside or outside the EC). Where the regulations specify 
production processes, adaptation to fulfil the requirement may prove particularly difficult. 
The sector in which compositional requirements are most common is foodstuffs, although they 
also occur in regulations on chemicals and cosmetics. The current attempts to amend the 1973 
Chocolate Directive illustrate how such measures affect third countries. Currently Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK permit the use in chocolate of up to 
5% cocoa butter equivalents (CBEs), while the other Member States require that only cocoa 
fats be used. Depending on the response of European producers and consumers, a measure that 
would permit the use of CBEs throughout Europe might benefit the producers of the 
components of CBEs, such as Burkino Faso and Mali, while potentially damaging cocoa 
17 Divergent national regulations and standards exist because different countries and regions face different problems and 
different governments perceive and respond to risks differently (Héritier, 1996; Previdi, 1997). Further, it is standard 
practice to consult widely when developing regulations. Domestic firms, not surprisingly, tend to be more engaged than 
foreign firms and the resulting regulations are more likely to reflect their concerns. For these reasons European 
regulations are likely to be closer to the regulatory regimes under which European firms are used to operating than to 
those of third countries. 
18 'Joint EU-US Action Plan', Madrid, 3 December 1995. 
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producers such as those in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. By contrast, a measure prohibiting the use 
of CBEs would tend to benefit the cocoa producers at the expense of the CBE exporters. 
Hence the actual external impact will depend on the precise form of the change. The current 
proposal will not prohibit the use of the term chocolate for confectionery containing some 
products other than cocoa, but it will impose stricter requirements on labelling and packaging. 
If the final decision is in line with this proposal then the ultimate effect will depend upon the 
behavioural patterns of consumers, and will therefore not be clear for some time. 
Technical harmonization has been particularly contentious when it establishes requirements 
regarding how goods are produced. The EC's ban on imports of meat and meat products raised 
with the aid of growth promoting hormones, for example, is estimated by the USA to have 
cost it $97 million a year, and also affects Australia, Canada and New Zealand (USTR, 1996). 
The USA has complained that the Third-country Meat Directive requires strict compliance 
with EC standards and does not recognize equivalent protection offered by the exporting 
country's animal and public health regulations (USTR, 1996). If it were not for a derogation, 
EC regulations that require wine imports to be produced using only those oenological practices 
authorized for production of EC wines would prevent the importation of most US wines. 
6.2.4. Certification 
Another potential impediment to trade is the requirement of additional certification that a 
product conforms to specified standards or detailed regulations. How that requirement affects 
third parties varies according to the procedure adopted for particular types of product. 
The obstacle is least significant when the manufacturer's declaration of conformity is 
sufficient, which is the case for a number of products covered by new approach Directives. For 
such a declaration by foreign firms to be considered adequate they may have to be certified as 
having a quality assurance programme in line with ISO 9000. Or they may be required to use 
another method of conformity assessment, such as a combination of a type test and a product 
check by an outside body (Nicolas and Repussard, 1995). For example, the EC does not accept 
the equivalence of Japan's certification of good medical practice and requires inspections of 
Japanese certified factories and manufacturing facilities which produce pharmaceuticals and 
medical equipment (DG I, 1996). 
Multiple certifications are most problematic in sectors where it is logistically difficult and 
costly to transport the product to the notified testing body. Examples include heavy machinery, 
medical devices, pulp and paper and forest products. An Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) survey of the telecommunications sector estimated 
that at least 2% of costs could be saved by mutual recognition of certifications (DG I, 1995b). 
One indicator of the sectors in which multiple certification problems are considered most 
severe is provided by the list of sectors in which the EC is currently negotiating MRAs with 
various countries. This is provided in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2. Sectors in which MRAs are being negotiated (as of December 1995) 
Sector 
Telecommunications equipment 
Electrical equipment (low voltage) 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
Medical devices 
Pharmaceuticals 
Machinery 
Chemicals good laboratory practice 
Recreational craft 
Simple pressure vessels 
Personal protective equipment 
Vehicles 
Number of partners' 
5(1) 
5(1) 
5(1) 
5(1) 
5(1) 
3(2) 
3d) 
3 
2(2) 
2(1) 
2 
' Number in brackets denotes number of countries with which preliminary discussions are being held. 
The need for additional certifications is likely also to impose a particularly heavy cost on small 
and medium-sized enterprises. These are likely to have smaller export volumes and are less 
likely to have the understanding and resources necessary to negotiate the European regulatory 
system (DG I, 1995b). 
The EC has attempted to respond to the potential impediment to internal and external trade 
caused by the need for multiple certifications with its 'Global Approach to Certification and 
Testing'. This, among other things, established principles for negotiating MRAs with third 
countries. Although individual MRAs are not directly part of the SMP, they are only possible 
due to the creation of common standards and regulations and have, as acknowledged in the 
terms of reference (under 2b), the potential to enhance the initial impact of the SMP on 
conditions of access. 
The Global Approach identified three requirements for the conclusion of an MRA: 
(a) the technical competence of the non-EC partner must be adequate; 
(b) the benefits flowing from the agreement must be equivalent; and 
(c) the agreement must be limited to designated bodies (CEC, 1989). 
The Commission has also developed criteria for prioritizing negotiations with partner 
countries. These are: 
(a) the mutual interest in facilitating trade in regulated sectors; 
(b) interest expressed by EC economic operators; 
(c) subscription to the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; 
(d) and the volume of trade between the two parties (DG I, 1995a). 
These two sets of criteria are likely to ensure that in the short and medium term MRAs will be 
negotiated only with the more developed countries. There may be, in consequence, differential 
effects of this aspect of the SMP between third parties. The first six countries with which 
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discussions have commenced are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the 
USA. It should be noted, however, that the negotiation of MRAs has proved difficult and 
slow. As of August 1996 only one MRA, with Switzerland, had been concluded. Thus any 
differential effects of MRAs on market access for different third countries are likely to be 
muted in the short to medium term. Provisions of the EEA Treaty, however, perform a role 
similar to MRA.S for the participating countries. 
In addition, under the 1985 Product Liability Directive the EC-based importer of a defective 
product is responsible under law for the defects. Because of this, it is possible that such 
importers may require third-party certification even when the Directives in question accept 
manufacturer assurance. 
In the more general case of voluntary certification, third-country firms might have a more 
difficult time than their EC competitors, for instance, in furnishing their EC customers with 
third-party certification of the quality of the products. Even in Europe, the web of bilateral 
MRAs among laboratories and certification bodies in the voluntary sphere were melded into 
multilateral agreements covering all European members only relatively recently. The European 
Coordination for Accreditation of Certification (EAC) was only established in 1990, and 
European Coordination for Accreditation of Laboratories (EAL) was not formed until mid-
1994, although precursors emerged during the 1980s. EAC/EAL have been engaged in 
negotiating MRAs with other countries and regions, notably the Asia Pacific Accreditation 
Council (Atkins International Limited, 1996). 
6.3. Assessing the scale and direction of external effects 
An indication of the product groups and characteristics for which technical barriers to imports 
are greatest is given by those that are the subject of MRA negotiations between the EC and 
third countries (see Table 6.3). It should be noted that almost all of these products appear to 
fall within the industrial sectors that Buigues et al. (1990) have identified as those likely to be 
most affected by the SMP. 
It is not possible to indicate in anything other than the most broad-brush, illustrative terms the 
relative importance of the market enhancing and potentially market restricting effects of the 
SMP on external parties. The possible direction of effects will depend on a host of factors 
which are likely to vary between products, markets and suppliers. Although, according to one 
source, only 10% of goods sold in Europe are subject to EC legislation (US Chamber of 
Commerce, 1993), the US Department of Commerce estimates that EC legislation covering 
regulated products will eventually be applicable to 50% of US exports to Europe (USTR, 
1996). 
The precise impact of technical harmonization and standardization will depend on the specific 
relationship between the status quo and the status quo ante, which will differ between 
Member States, third countries and products. For example, the EC has been credited with 
raising the level of consumer safety and environmental protection in some, largely southern, 
Member States (CEC, 1991; Sbragia, 1993). To the extent that these measures govern product 
characteristics, they may have made access for third-country (along with EC) products to those 
previously less regulated markets more difficult, although access to the EC market as a whole 
would have been made more straightforward. 
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Table 6.3. Sectors in which technical barriers to imports are greatest 
Sector 
Vehicles 
Chemicals 
Cosmetics 
Foodstuffs 
Telecommunications terminal equipment 
Electrical equipment (low voltage) 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
Medical devices 
Pharmaceutical products 
Machinery 
Recreational craft 
Simple pressure vessels 
Personal protective equipment 
Detailed harmonization 
X 
X 
X 
X' 
Subject of MRA 
negotiations 
Χ 
Χ 
Χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
' Applies to some products only. 
Note: Harmonized measures are assumed to be more of an impediment to trade than certification. Rankings are based on 
extent of product group covered and number of countries with which MRAs are being negotiated. 
The impact of the 'Global Approach to Certification and Testing' on conditions of access for 
third-country products likewise depends on the specifics of pre- and post-SMP conditions. To 
the extent that EC Member States required that products be certified by an authorized third 
party as conforming to standards, the creation of the single market has benefited foreign firms. 
Instead of having to get their products certified in each Member State, they need now do so 
only in one. The impact of the SMP, at least in the short to medium term, however, may not be 
unambiguously positive. There are some indications that prior to the SMP some Member 
States had MRAs with some third countries (Woolcock, 1991). Such agreements could not be 
extended automatically to all Member States as they had not been parties to the negotiations. 
Consequently, such agreements as there were had to lapse pending the conclusion of EC-wide 
MRAs. In addition, the 'Global Approach' meant that all the Member States had to employ the 
same certification procedures. Before the SMP some had accepted manufacturers' assurances. 
Others had required third-party certification: in some cases voluntary and in others mandatory 
(CEC, 1989). By requiring a common approach to certification, the SMP in some instances 
might have required some Member States to shift from voluntary to mandatory certification or 
from manufacturer assurance to third-party evaluation, thereby making access to the markets 
of particular Member States more difficult for foreign firms. 
There are also differences concerning the extent to which SMP measures may affect all trade 
(internal and external alike) or may affect external suppliers differentially. All EC technical 
regulations and standards apply to EC and third-country firms equally. However, some 
standards and regulations, particularly those governing production processes, may favour EC 
firms. In addition, as noted earlier, complying with technical standards accounts for a larger 
share of the costs of imports from within the EC than those from outside because other price-
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raising barriers - notably tariffs and customs formalities - have been eliminated. 
Consequently, technical harmonization and standardization will benefit EC firms relatively 
more than third-country firms (Koekkoek et al, 1990:115; Hoeller and Louppe, 1994:19). 
This is most likely to occur with respect to products governed by technical regulations and in 
which the costs of multiple certifications are particularly significant. 
What is the relative importance of these differential effects? According to several US 
estimates, trade creation should significantly exceed trade diversion (Ahern, 1992). One broad 
indicator is to consider the relative importance in EC trade of the product groups identified as 
being subject to the greatest potential diversion. Accordingly, data have been collected on the 
level (and source) of EC imports of the product groups for which harmonized measures or 
third-party certification apply. This is an extremely broad-brush exercise, since the scope of 
the product groups covered is not specified in terms of the CN in the relevant Directives. 
Moreover, as noted above, there is only a potential for diversion. 
With these caveats in mind, the total value of extra-EC imports in 1994 has been collected 
where possible for the HS or NACE codes that appear to relate to the products for which 
harmonized measures or third-party certification apply. When expressed as a proportion of 
total extra-EC imports in 1994, this exercise suggests that about two-thirds (by value) of 
imports should, if they are affected at all, benefit from unambiguous improvement in their 
terms of access, while one-third may be potentially subject to unfavourable changes. 
6.4. Summary of findings 
Before the SMP the European market was characterized by a proliferation of standards and 
technical regulations that had the effect of segmenting the market. This was a barrier to access 
into national markets of products both from outside the EC and from other Member States. 
Although the problems caused by differences in national standards have not yet been 
completely eradicated in practice, the most reasonable counterfactual is that without the SMP 
they would continue to be much more extensive than they are at the present time and will be 
when the process of removing technical barriers to trade is complete. 
In many ways, the process of technical harmonization and standardization is unambiguously 
beneficial for market access for products from outside the Community: transparency and legal 
certainty are increased, while design and production costs are likely to be reduced. Where 
mutual recognition applies, barriers between Member States are removed without being 
replaced by barriers at the Community level. Under new approach Directives, the EC measures 
that are adopted are relatively flexible and, therefore, tend not to affect trade very adversely. 
The greatest potential for the SMP to have adversely affected market access for third countries 
directly is with regard to technical harmonization. These measures are inflexible and thus 
harder to comply with than new approach Directives. In addition, there is reason to believe 
that, at least in some cases, in the pursuit of legitimate public policy objectives EC 
harmonization may have raised the stringency of some Member States' regulations, thus 
potentially impeding access for EC and third-country products to their markets. The product 
categories in which the potential for gain is likely to be most ambiguous are those listed in 
Table 6.3. 
Market access for third countries' products may also suffer due to the impact of the SMP on 
EC firms' competitiveness. Not only are technical barriers the most important barriers to intra-
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EC imports, and therefore relatively more important than for extra-EC imports, but EC firms 
may be better able to take advantage of opportunities to exploit economies of scale. 
Given that countries with a strong supply capacity are most likely to be able to benefit from 
the market-enlarging effects of technical harmonization, it is probable that there will be 
differential effects between third parties. The OECD states and NICs will tend to gain most, 
and poor developing countries least. 
It is not easy to identify plausible quantitative indicators of the likely scale of the effect 
separately from those that would be used in a modelling of the overall economic impact of the 
SMP. In qualitative terms, however, the effect of harmonization, while not as immediate and 
direct as the removal of national QRs, may turn out to be the more important in the longer 
term. Certainly, it has been welcomed by third parties such as the US Chamber of Commerce 
and the US International Trade Commission. 
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7. Removal of barriers to the provision of services and 
right of establishment 
The freedom to provide services is one of the four freedoms at the core of the SMP, and is one 
of the issues of particular interest to third countries. The freedom to provide services has two 
components: 
(a) the freedom of establishment; 
(b) the free provision of services across borders. 
It is the consequences of the second that are of most direct concern to this study, focusing as it 
does on access conditions for third-country products, although the former has relevance to the 
wider aims of the study and analysis must sometimes range over both to explain the nature of 
the change. While the objectives are the same in all service sectors, the measures necessary to 
achieve them differ significantly. Consequently they are addressed in separate categories 
below. 
7.1. Financial services 
7.1.1. The status quo ante 
Even before the implementation of the SMP, there were few overt barriers to establishment by 
foreign (non-national EC and non-EC) banking and insurance firms, at least in most of the 
Member States (Price Waterhouse, 1988). National regulations, by and large, applied equally 
to domestic and foreign firms alike, although they may have imposed proportionally higher 
costs on foreign firms. 
Most countries maintained controls on foreign acquisitions of domestic banks and often 
restricted the services that branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks could provide. In 
investment services the overt barriers were more pronounced, particularly regulations that 
prevented foreigners from being licensed as brokers. 
In no financial service was there scope for providing services across borders, that is without 
establishment in the target market. Thus there were significant administrative obstacles to 
entering new markets. 
7.1.2. The nature of the change 
Under the SMP a single authorization permits a financial service - be it a credit institution, an 
insurance undertaking, or an investment service - to operate throughout the EC. 
This single licence system is predicated on the concept of home-country control. This means 
that the Member State issuing the authorization is responsible for regulating activities 
throughout the EC. Only mass risks in non-life assurance and the regulation of an investment 
service's conduct may be subject to some host-country control. 
In order for home-country control to be practicable, a degree of harmonization of national 
regulatory regimes was required. Thus, for banks and other credit institutions EC measures 
were adopted to set minimum capital requirements, common rules on the supervision of 
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internal management and accounting, and to regulate relations with customers in areas such as 
payment cards and cross-border transfers. In insurance there are common rules regarding 
annual accounts, insurance contracts, winding up firms, etc. Minimum capital adequacy 
requirements were established for investment services. 
7.1.3. Implications for third countries 
To a significant extent the single market measures will benefit third-country firms in the same 
way, and to the same extent, as they do non-national EC firms. They grant them access to a 
much larger market with relatively little increase in regulatory burden. 
There are, however, some elements of the legislation that have the potential to deny third-
country firms access to the single market (see Table 7.1). All the Financial Services Directives 
require that firms be established in a Member State. 
Table 7.1. Service sectors in which there are restrictions on third-country firms 
Sector 
Air services 
Maritime transport 
Inland waterway 
Road transport 
Banking 
Insurance 
Investment services 
Ree ìprocity 
Regarding slot allocation and 
aviation-related services 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Additional restrictions 
EC national control 
EC national control 
EC national vessels 
Governed by Member State of 
establishment 
Wholly incorporated subsidiary 
Wholly incorporated subsidiary 
Although most of the Directives apply equally to EC and non-EC firms, all the Directives 
explicitly regarding the freedom to provide services contain reciprocity provisions in order to 
avoid unilaterally liberalizing third-country access to the EC's financial services market (CEC, 
1994c). These provisions require Member States to deny authorization to subsidiaries or 
branches of third-country firms from countries that do not provide national treatment or 
effective market access to equivalent EC firms. As of November 1995, however, these 
reciprocity clauses had not been invoked (WTO, 1995:113). 
These requirements do not apply to the members of the WTO by virtue of most-favoured-
nation treatment. The entry into force of the new WTO Agreement on Financial Services on 
1 September 1996 has not changed this. 
There are other impediments to third-country participation in the SMP for services. In the 
banking and insurance sectors only wholly incorporated branches of non-EC-owned firms are 
allowed to open additional branches or provide services from one Member State to another 
(WTO, 1995:116). It is also possible that non-EC firms may face more obstacles than EC 
firms in listing securities on EC stock exchanges, as some restrictions on such activity are 
prohibited only with respect to companies or legal persons which are nationals of a Member 
State. 
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These potential problems are clearly not considered to be dominant by the most interested 
foreign parties. US financial services companies have indicated that they anticipate benefiting 
from the SMP through increased economies of scale and the creation of new business 
opportunities, particularly in insurance and investment services (US Chamber of Commerce, 
1993:95). Easier movement across Member State borders, and the ability to establish and 
expand operations in the investment and insurance areas, would help US banks to diversify 
both geographically and in terms of product line. This would decrease their vulnerability to 
changes in a particular market. 
7.2. Transport services 
7.2.1. The status quo ante 
Prior to the introduction of the SMP, road and air transport services between the Member 
States were governed by a patchwork of bilateral agreements that regulated access to the 
international transport market and the conditions under which such services could be provided. 
There were no QRs on the provision of international transport on the EC's inland waterways. 
In no transport services were foreign operators (non-national EC or non-EC) permitted to 
provide transport services entirely within another Member State (cabotage). Due to the degree 
of public ownership and the importance of public service obligations, the liberalization of 
national railways, a prerequisite for the freedom to provide services, is only just beginning. 
7.2.2. The nature of the change 
The central objective of the SMP has been to abolish QRs on transport (with the exception of 
rail) between Member States and to establish cabotage rights. The liberalization of market 
access has been accompanied (usually preceded) by price deregulation. In maritime transport 
measures have also been introduced to liberalize shipping with third countries by doing away 
with requirements that only national flag ships can transport some cargoes and eliminating 
cargo-sharing agreements. 
As in financial services, the liberalization of market access has been accompanied by measures 
to harmonize the regulatory regimes of the Member States. This has covered such issues as 
access to the profession, safety, social conditions, the transport of hazardous goods and the 
application of competition rules. 
7.2.3. Direct implications for third countries 
The implications for third countries of the SMP in transport services differ widely: 
(a) among sectors, because of restrictions on foreign ownership (see below and Table 7.1); 
and 
(b) between third countries, because of their proximity or lack thereof. 
The opportunity for third-country firms to benefit from the SMP is limited by two 
requirements: 
(a) in each transport sector, the full benefits of the single market are available only to firms 
established in the EC; 
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(b) in several sectors - marine transport, inland waterways and air services - there are also 
ownership requirements, which restrict the ability of firms controlled by third-country 
nationals to provide transport services. 
In carrying out cabotage services on inland waterways carriers may only use vessels belonging 
to: 
(a) either natural persons domiciled in a Member State and nationals of a Member State; 
(b) or legal persons with their registered office in a Member State and in which Member 
State nationals have a controlling interest. 
Provided it consults the Commission, a Member State may waive this stipulation. 
The provision of marine transport services between two Member States is restricted to 
Member State nationals or to third-country shipping companies using ships registered in a 
Member State and controlled by Member State nationals. The stipulations for the provision of 
marine cabotage are even more stringent. Only EC ship owners using ships registered in a 
Member State, flying the flag of that Member State and registered in the European Register of 
Shipping may provide cabotage services. In the absence of multilateral rules and principles, 
the EC has adopted its own trade policy instruments in marine transport with respect to unfair 
pricing and for coordinated action against countries that restrict or threaten to restrict access to 
cargo transports (WTO, 1995:144). Japanese pricing practices in maritime trade gave rise to 
one of the few investigations carried out to date under the 'New Commercial Policy 
Instrument'. No action was taken as the controversial practice was discontinued. 
In air services, only airlines controlled by Member State nationals may exercise the freedoms 
provided by the SMP. In addition, reciprocity provisions pertain to airport slot allocation and 
computer reservation systems (CRS), although neither had been invoked as of November 1995 
(WTO, 1995:113). The EC listed a most-favoured-nation exemption from its commitments in 
air transport services under GATS19 with regard to CRS and the marketing of air transport 
services (WTO, 1995:136). 
The creation of a single market in the different transport sectors also has varying effects in 
different extra-EC regions. Developments in road and inland waterway transport, for example, 
are of direct concern only to operators from Central and Eastern Europe. Only in air services 
and marine transport do SMP measures have the potential to affect a wide range of countries. 
7.2.4. Indirect implications for third countries 
It is possible that being able reduce costs through taking advantage of cabotage and 
international transport within the EC might increase the competitiveness of EC operators in 
respect of transport to and from third countries. How significant this gain might be is unclear. 
Early indications from the road haulage sector indicate that very few hauliers have taken 
advantage of cabotage rights, although this number has been increasing (Committee of 
Enquiry, 1994). A similar picture exists in marine transport, where only 6% of liberalized 
cargo is transported by operators from another Member State (CEC, 1996a). On the other 
In air services the GATS covers only aircraft repair and maintenance, the selling and marketing of air services, and CRS 
services. 
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hand, US sources have anticipated that the liberalization of the EC's air services market would 
improve the competitiveness of EC carriers and thus lead to increased competition on trans-
Atlantic routes (US Chamber of Commerce, 1993). The emergence of a web of alliances 
between US and EC carriers covering issues such as code sharing, however, might mitigate 
this competition. 
There may be indirect effects of the SMP on the relative competitiveness of European and 
foreign firms. The liberalization of EC transport has the potential to benefit firms exporting to 
the EC, particularly those whose target markets are far from ports or airports, by lowering 
transport costs. But reduced transport costs could be expected to have a greater impact on the 
competitiveness of firms established in the EC, since this will also affect the final cost of all of 
their inputs. 
Another indirect effect of the SMP is that it creates the possibility of negotiating market access 
agreements with third countries. For example, an agreement on market access in inland 
waterway transport was reached in early 1996 with some of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, and 'open skies' negotiations are being conducted with several countries, 
including Switzerland, and may eventually be opened with the USA. 
7.3. Capital movements and foreign direct investment 
SMP measures affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) may have implications for the 
conditions of access of third-country products on the European market. This would be the case 
if the FDI-related measures facilitate, or hinder, trade in goods and services. But because the 
relationship is indirect, the conceptual and empirical uncertainties concerning the relationship 
between trade and investment have to be added to those associated with the role of the SMP as 
opposed to the many other factors affecting FDI trends. 
Among the findings of the study on FDI undertaken as part of the programme of work on the 
SMP are the following (EAG, 1996):20 
(a) the period 1984-93 has witnessed a substantial increase in inward FDI flows into the 
EC, part of which may be attributable to the SMP; 
(b) the evidence strongly suggests that FDI and trade are complementary, with some 
estimates suggesting that as much as one-third of all trade is intra-firm, in effect linking 
the foreign investments of multinational enterprises to exploit the advantages of 
internalization; 
(c) the trade/FDI relationship has been more oriented towards trade in the technology-
intensive sectors than in the less technology-intensive sectors; 
(d) the complementary nature of FDI and trade is most true for downstream services. 
The growth of FDI over the period 1986-92 is illustrated in Figure 7.1. Although the surge in 
FDI at the end of the 1980s was partly from EC sources, there was also a significant rise in 
non-EC investment. 
2 0 Forthcoming in The Single Market Review, Subseries IV. Vol. 1: Foreign direct investment, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the EC and London: Kogan Page/Earthscan, 1997. 
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Figure 7.1. EC and international acquisitions of majority holdings (including mergers) 
in the EC 
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' In 1994 the Commission (CEC, 1994d) began reporting acquisition data that had been gathered in a different fashion 
from those used in this graph. Those data cover the period only from 1987-88. and so do not clearly illustrate the 
change that took place in the wake of adoption of the SMP. The data gathered under the two methods are not directly 
comparable, but for the period of overlap (1987-88 to 1991-92) reveal similar trends. The most significant difference is 
that the new data collection method captures relatively more international activity. The data indicate that in 1992-93 
both international and intra-EC cross-border investment stabilized at roughly the 1991-92 level. 
Source: EC, 1988; 1993; 1994d. 
Some work suggests that the EC's pre-SMP trade policy favoured outward processing vis-à-
vis 'direct' trade and FDI (see, for example, Corado, 1994). If true, then the effects identified 
in Chapter 5 should favour FDI and direct imports of products. 
One implication of this analysis is that inward investment as a result of the SMP may have 
encouraged imports from affiliates of the enterprises implanted in Europe. This may have had 
the effect not only of increasing imports, but of doing so in a way that tended to favour trade 
with countries that were the source of the inward investment relative to those that were not. 
This is important because the inward investment is highly concentrated in terms of country 
origin. Of the inward FDI into the EC in 1993, for example, over one-quarter was sourced in 
the USA, Japan and the EFTA states, in addition to the 60% originating in the EUR-12. Only 
one-eighth came from the rest of the world. 
There have been no new national barriers to foreign investment as a result of the SMP, 
although the EC as a whole can adopt restrictions. But those prohibitions or restrictions at 
national or EC level relating to third countries which were already in place on 31 December 
1993 are untouched. Perhaps the main advantage for third countries is that the decision rules 
adopted in the Treaty on European Union make it easier for the EC to liberalize the treatment 
of third countries than to impose new restrictions. 
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7.4. Summary of findings 
Many of the changes covered in this chapter relate to the freedom of foreign-owned firms to 
establish and operate inside EC states. They do not, therefore, directly relate to the objective of 
this study, which is to assess conditions of access on to the European market for third-country 
products (defined to include goods and internationally traded services). Nonetheless, there are 
some implications for the study. 
In the absence of the SMP the most reasonable counterfactual is that the pre-existing barriers 
to non-EC (as well as non-national EC) service providers would have continued. Hence, it is 
reasonable to attribute most of the improvements as direct SMP effects. 
One of the most important features of the SMP is that it has opened up the possibility of 
providing services across borders, i.e. without establishment in the target market. Since the 
SMP measures benefit third-country firms in much the same way, and to the same extent, as 
non-national EC firms, they increase the scope for internationally traded services to be 
provided. It will still be necessary for foreign firms to be established in at least one Member 
State, but this then provides access to a much larger market with relatively little increase in 
regulatory burden. To the extent that they include an imported element, locally provided 
services provide a bridge for intra-firm trade and, hence, relate to market access for externally 
supplied products. 
In the case of transport services, the direct implications for third-party suppliers of the SMP 
are much more limited. There remain restrictions on foreign ownership in some transport 
sectors, while in others geographical proximity to the EC is required for foreign parties to 
benefit in practice. 
The changing relationship between the capacity to provide services from locally established 
companies and access to trade will contribute, with changes in the regulatory regime for 
goods, to an evolution in the relationship between FDI and trade. However, a serious 
investigation of this relationship is outside the scope of this study. 
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8. Changes to the business environment 
The SMP includes a number of measures relating to the legal framework in which companies 
in Europe operate. Most relate only to companies established in Europe and apply equally to 
EC and non-EC own firms. Hence their implication for market access of third-country 
products is limited, although they are relevant to the broader aims of the study. Intellectual 
property rights protection and some provisions regarding audio-visual services affect 
companies not established in the EC. The EC Directive on television services explicitly 
favours 'European works' over those produced elsewhere (see below). 
8.1. Company law 
8.1.1. The status quo ante 
In the absence of a European Company statute, companies from different Member States have 
been unable to merge without pursuing complex and costly arrangements. 
8.1.2. The nature of the change 
Relatively few measures have been adopted in this sphere so far as a result of the SMP. Those 
that have been adopted largely concern the approximation of national laws on the protection of 
shareholders, creditors and third parties. The crucial European Company statute is still 
pending. 
8.1.3. Implications for third countries 
To the extent that these measures when implemented reduce differences between the Member 
States they will facilitate investment decisions by third-country firms. As with several other 
elements of the SMP, the status quo ante discriminated both against non-national EC and 
third-country firms. Hence, the new rules will not necessarily affect third countries as a group 
differentially, save to the extent that firms from some third countries (e.g. other OECD states) 
are more likely to be able to establish in one Member State and, in the future, extend their 
operations to other Member States than will firms from other third countries (e.g. developing 
states). 
8.2. Intellectual and industrial property 
As with many other elements of the SMP, the principal forces affecting third parties are 
provided under other agreements. In this case, it is primarily the GATT provisions on trade-
related intellectual property rights. The study in the overall programme on industrial property 
rights protection reports that no third-country operators have complained of any discriminatory 
treatment.21 
21 In The Single Market Review. Subseries III, Vol. 4: Industrial property rights, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EC and London: Kogan Page/Earthscan, 1997. 
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8.3. Taxation 
8.3.1. Indirect taxation 
The Commission's objective is to ensure fiscal neutrality in commercial trade and thereby 
create a genuine single market (CEC, 1996a:39). There are, however, numerous problems 
associated with implementing the requirements of the tax system. The Commission has 
concluded that these deficiencies can be resolved only through a new framework, and is 
preparing a definitive VAT regime (CEC, 1996a:39). 
One point that will have to be taken into account by the definitive VAT system is equal 
treatment and neutrality of taxation for domestic and intra-EC transactions. As the EC VAT 
system applies equally to EC and non-EC firms established in a Member State, third-country 
firms established in the EC will benefit from the further approximation of indirect taxation 
alongside their EC competitors. US reactions to the approximation of indirect taxation have 
been positive, as it believes that this will facilitate cross-border trade (USITC, 1993:148). 
8.3.2. Direct taxation 
In the Commission's view, divergent national direct taxation is becoming an increasingly 
important obstacle to the smooth functioning of the single market (CEC, 1996a:40). In 
particular, tax competition for business activities and capital poses a threat to the international 
tax system and to Member States' tax revenues. The Commission has focused its efforts on: 
(a) eliminating double taxation on cross-border income and gains; 
(b) introducing a more neutral system of taxation of savings; 
(c) realizing a neutral system for the taxation of insurance services; 
(d) addressing the problems of individuals who are resident in one Member State but earn 
their living in another; 
(e) the improvement of the fiscal environment of small and medium-sized enterprises (CEC, 
1995b:113). 
US reactions to the harmonization of indirect taxation have been positive, as it is believed that 
this will facilitate cross-border trade (USITC, 1993:132). 
The proposed changes in company taxation strongly appeal to US firms having operations in 
more than one Member State (USITC, 1993:148). 
8.4. Media 
The crucial measure in audiovisual policy as far as third countries are concerned is the 
'Television without Frontiers' Directive (89/552/EEC). It both harmonizes and liberalizes 
single market conditions and encourages the production and consumption of 'European 
works'. It is the second objective that presents problems for third-country firms. 
The Directive requires that 'wherever practicable' a majority of broadcasting time be reserved 
for 'European works'. These are defined as works created by persons located in a member 
state of the Council of Europe. The Commission's 1995 proposed amendment leaves 
essentially unchanged this requirement which effectively perpetuates pre-SMP national 
policies (Hoeller and Louppe, 1994:34). 
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According to the Commission, nearly two-thirds of the channels complied with the required 
European-content provisions of the Directive in 1991-92 (CEC, 1995a:145). Even those that 
did not do so revealed 'an overall upward trend'. All Danish, Dutch, Irish and Portuguese 
channels, and all British and French terrestrial channels, complied with the Directive. 
Although the USA has complained most loudly about the European-content requirement, other 
third countries (excluding the non-EC members of the Council of Europe) may well be 
squeezed out by US dominance of the non-European allocation. The WTO has raised doubts 
about the longer-term sustainability of the quota, given the ascent of new transmission modes 
(satellite and video) and of international co-productions, the origin of which is difficult to 
determine (WTO, 1995:145). 
Another potentially contentious issue concerns media ownership. The Commission is planning 
to bring forth a proposal that would increase the diversity of ownership in the Member States. 
Unless it explicitly excludes ownership by third-country firms or individuals, this would 
probably serve to open the broadcast market to non-EC firms. 
8.5. The free movement of persons 
Since this study is focused exclusively on trade in products, the SMP measures relating to the 
free movement of persons are not of major concern. However, to the extent that the changes 
make it easier for companies to operate in different national markets, they may be said to 
contribute to an improvement in the business environment. The goal of the free movement of 
persons is to be achieved through: 
(a) abolition of controls on people at international frontiers and the removal of border posts; 
(b) rights of residence; 
(c) mutual recognition of qualifications. 
Changes in relation to movement across borders and rights of residence will affect the capacity 
of firms to use third-country nationals in their operations. In 1995, the Council adopted two 
Regulations with potential effect in this area. One established a list of third countries whose 
nationals need a visa in order to cross the external frontiers of the Community. In the case of 
third countries not on this list, the Member States will remain free to decide whether or not to 
require a visa. The other Regulation establishes a uniform format for visas. 
The net effect of these changes, together with the removal of controls on the movement of 
people at internal borders, is likely to make it easier for nationals from countries not requiring 
visas, and for the firms that employ them, to operate effectively as economic agents in the 
Community. By the same token, nationals from countries that require visas may face relative 
disadvantage. 
The measures being taken (but not yet fully in force) to achieve mutual recognition of 
diplomas and other qualifications will also tend to facilitate the effective use of economic 
operators across borders. 
8.6. Summary of findings 
There are relatively few changes to the business environment with direct implications for 
market access for third-country products. However, in broad terms the SMP can reasonably be 
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said to have made business operations easier in the Community, and as more elements of the 
programme are fully implemented this will continue. To the extent, therefore, that 
improvements in the business environment feed through into access conditions for imports 
(for example, by facilitating intra-firm trade of foreign-owned companies established in the 
EC), then the SMP measures may be relevant to this study. 
Those elements of the SMP that have provoked international concern, such as the requirement 
about the proportion of media broadcasting time reserved for 'European works', tend to be the 
exceptions. 
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9. Removal of barriers to public procurement 
This chapter and the next review SMP changes in relation to markets that are subject to close 
government control. Between them they cover both the general issue of government 
procurement and the specific industry situation in relation to telecommunications and energy. 
9.1. The status quo ante 
9.1.1. Public procurement practice 
The removal of barriers to the direct or indirect implementation of public procurement 
contracts by foreign parties could, in principle, bring significant gains. The study on public 
procurement, undertaken as part of the overall programme of work on the SMP by 
EuroStrategy Consultants, included a review of Member State public procurement practice. It 
found that, in general, purchases of foreign origin appeared to account for a smaller share of 
public sector than of private sector purchases.22 Hence, changes that reduce the scope of public 
authorities to favour domestic suppliers have the potential to raise the level of foreign supply, 
at least for some activities, closer to that already experienced in the private sector. 
9.1.2. Non-SMP changes 
The conditions of access to the European market for external supplies have been strongly 
influenced by events that fall outside the SMP. These include the creation of the EEA, the 
negotiation of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), bilateral agreements 
with the USA and other countries, and association agreements with Central and Eastern 
Europe. As in many other cases, therefore, it is difficult to disentangle in a wholly objective 
fashion any changes in the access of third-country products to the European market that result 
directly from the SMP and those that are consequent upon both the SMP change and the 
general context within which the SMP has been implemented. 
The relationship between the two sets of factors also has importance for the distinction made 
in this study between differential effects between third countries, on the one hand, and EC 
producers, on the other, and between one set of third parties and another. Because the 
conditions of access of third-country products in relation to public procurement are heavily 
influenced by other agreements, such as the EEA and the GPA, there is a differential impact 
between those third parties that are covered by the agreements and those that are not. 
9.2. The SMP 
9.2.1 The SMP provisions 
Negotiation of the multilateral and bilateral agreements took place during or shortly after the 
development of the EC's public procurement regime. This regime consists of measures 
regulating works, supply, and services contracts of public bodies (each governed by its own 
Directive(s)) and a separate Directive on purchases by utilities, whether publicly owned or not. 
2 2 This section draws on the findings of the public procurement report by EuroStrategy Consultants (forthcoming in The 
Single Market Review. Subseries III, Vol. 2: Public procurement, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
EC and London: Kogan Page/Earthscan. 1997). 
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The measures regulating purchases by public bodies do not specifically mention third-country 
goods, services or service providers. Thus the EC measures neither discriminate nor prohibit 
discrimination against them. 
The situation, therefore, is that on the face of it the status quo is not necessarily strongly 
different from the status quo ante, since the Directives do not of themselves prevent Member 
States from excluding such products. However, they do prohibit the application of a price 
preference against such products, since the origin of the products is not a permissible award 
criterion. The requirement that contracting authorities must give preference to international 
standards over European standards (where different from international ones) and national ones 
should make it easier for third-country firms to compete for public procurement contracts. 
The Utilities Directive, however, does discriminate against third-country suppliers. In Article 
36 it provides that purchasers: 
(a) may reject third-country offers, defined as those offering products of which more than 
50% originates in certain third countries; 
(b) must reject such offers where their price advantage over the next-best offer is less than 
3%, provided that the next-best offer is equally advantageous in features other than 
price. 
Although the Public Sector Directives do not of themselves forbid the exclusion of third-
country goods, and the Utilities Directive expressly allows it under certain conditions, it has 
been argued in the EuroStrategy Consultants report that practical limitations apply to Member 
States making use of this discretion. These are to be found in the provisions for the free 
movement of goods and services under the Treaty and provisions giving the Community 
power in external trade relations. Even though a degree of discrimination against third parties 
is permitted, the SMP provides some restriction to the scope of that discrimination. As a 
result, the EC's public procurement regime should provide better access for foreign companies 
than did the pre-SMP national preference regimes (Hoeller and Louppe, 1994:34). 
9.2.2. Implications for third countries 
Since the status quo ante discriminated against both non-national EC and third-country firms, 
change will not necessarily result in any clearly identifiable differential effects on the latter as 
a coherent group. But by opening up tendering to non-national companies the Directives create 
significant new opportunities for firms both from third countries and from other EC states, 
even given the disadvantages that the former face under the Excluded Sectors Directive. The 
impact of the Excluded Sectors Directive is hard to assess as its discriminatory article is 
waived for some countries on the basis of bilateral market access agreements. For example, it 
does not apply to US firms in the electricity sector or to Israeli firms in telecommunications. 
The direct impact of the changes in public procurement are likely to be relatively small. The 
EuroStrategy report has calculated public sector import penetration in 1994. It found that an 
estimated 96-98% of total EC public sector purchases were procured from domestic suppliers. 
When indirect foreign purchases were included (i.e. via a domestic supplier such as a 
subsidiary or importer) this proportion fell to an estimated 87-93%. However, the vast 
majority of 'foreign purchases' are procured from other Member States. Third-country 
suppliers accounted for less than an estimated 0.5% of the total. 
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The majority of public sector purchases of foreign origin were in the areas of: paper and 
stationery, office machinery, medical equipment, motor vehicles, and uniforms. 
US suppliers and procurement experts believe that the EC 1992 procurement programme will 
eventually open European public sector markets, and increase awareness of contract 
opportunities, thus creating competition (USITC, 1993:90). However, there is also agreement 
that short-term effects are likely to be small considering procuring authorities will continue to 
favour local suppliers. Enforcement will therefore play an important role in determining 
whether the new laws are implemented effectively. 
US-EC tension has mainly arisen about the ratification of the Utilities Directive. There was 
US concern about the 50% rule in the Directive restricting US suppliers' ability to take 
advantage of more open procurement. Moreover, it was claimed that the rule would result in 
an unpredictable bidding situation and could have the effect of requiring US firms to invest in 
the EC in order to win procurement contracts. Public procurement liberalization will benefit 
unambiguously EC-based subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
9.3. Summary of findings 
Changes to public procurement are unlikely to have major effects on the conditions of access 
for third-country products in the short term, but might have more substantial effects in the 
future. There has been some improvement in absolute access for third-country suppliers of 
products. However, this absolute improvement may be less important than a relative 
deterioration vis-à-vis non-national EC suppliers, for whom barriers have been lifted more 
substantially. Third-party supplies currently form an extremely small share of public 
procurement, and there is no reason to suppose that this situation will change dramatically in 
the short term. 
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10. Removal of barriers in regulated industries 
In addition to introducing a common regulatory regime in many industries, the SMP also 
includes measures to liberalize the national telecommunications and energy markets of the 
Member States. Many of these steps are relatively recent and some are still pending. Both 
sectors are, however, of significant interest to third countries. 
10.1. Telecommunications services 
10.1.1. The status quo ante 
Until recently the national markets for telecommunications services were dominated by one, 
usually state-owned, supplier and in many cases they still are. The segmentation in service 
provision was paralleled by divergent national standards for telecommunications equipment. 
Developments in this area are addressed in general terms in Chapter 6 on the removal of 
technical barriers to trade. 
10.1.2. The nature of the change 
The SMP is expected to have the greatest impact in value-added and basic telecommunications 
services. The provision of value-added services and data services has been opened to 
competition. In March 1996 the EC adopted a Directive on the liberalization of 
telecommunications services, including voice telephony (96/19/EC). The target date for full 
liberalization of all telecommunications services is 1 January 1998, although Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain have been granted longer transition periods. 
With regard to network access, Member States may at present maintain exclusive public 
networks, but must establish objective, transparent and non-discriminatory access conditions. 
No distinction is made between conditions for non-national firms, whether they be based in 
other EC states or outside the EC. The Council has endorsed the general principle of full 
infrastructure liberalization from 1 January 1998, with the same derogations as apply in 
telecommunications services. 
10.1.3. Implications for third countries 
The Directives liberalizing the provisions of telecommunications services do not draw a 
distinction between EC and non-EC firms. But the Council has mandated that measures 
governing the liberalization of infrastructure include reciprocity provisions ensuring 
'comparable access' to foreign markets (WTO, 1995:132-3). 
The US has requested that the EC ensure that non-EC competitors have access to reserved 
services on an equal footing to EC competitors once the services are liberalized (USTR, 
1996:112). The Commission's proposals for third-country access to the market for many of 
these services are linked to the treatment agreed in the GATS negotiations on basic 
telecommunications (USTR, 1996:113). Pending the conclusion of these negotiations, the EC 
and Member States are bound by the obligations listed in the Annex on telecommunications, 
which include the granting of access to, and use of, public telecommunications networks and 
services 'on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions' (WTO, 1995:133). 
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In the USTR's view, the EC's initial negotiating position: 
(a) safeguarded discriminatory provisions against non-EC investors in Belgium, France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain; 
(b) provided for deferment of foreign companies' market entiy rights in Portugal and Spain; 
(c) included a carve-out that would allow denial of virtually any market access by Belgium; 
(d) maintained restrictions on international services in Belgium; 
(e) maintained restrictions on telex and telegraph services in some Member States (USTR, 
1996:113). 
The USA fears that unless the negotiations are concluded promptly access to service sectors in 
Europe may be tied to service opportunities offered to European providers in the USA (USTR, 
1996:113). 
The USA is also concerned by a Commission proposal that companies wishing to benefit from 
mutual recognition of licences for the provision of satellite network or communications 
services be 75% owned by EC nationals (USTR, 1996:109). 
10.2. Energy 
10.2.1. The status quo ante 
Although restrictions on the free movement of petroleum and coal had been liberalized by 
direct application of the Treaty of Rome, the national electricity and gas markets remained 
tightly regulated. Often they were government owned. Consequently, they were largely 
independent of each other. The Member States also controlled access to their national natural 
energy resources. 
10.2.2. The nature of the change 
In energy, as in telecommunications, one of the important first steps towards the creation of a 
single market is liberalization of the national markets. In June 1996 the Council agreed a 
common position on the liberalization of electricity. The new rules foresee the continued 
operation of transmission networks by single operators, subject to certain negotiation 
arrangements. The common position provides for 'eligible' consumers, initially large 
industrial consumers and potentially distributors, to source electricity in other Member States. 
There is also greater scope for entry into the distribution and generation sectors. 
Progress has been more rapid with respect to exploitation. All entities established in the EC 
must receive equal treatment regarding prospecting, exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons. Before 1 January 1997, Member States must abolish all existing provisions 
which reserve to a single entity the right to obtain authorization in a specific geographic area. 
10.2.3. Implications for third countries 
With regard to the liberalization of the energy markets, the most direct impact is likely to be 
for non-energy industries established in Europe. Like non-national EC firms, they will have 
potential access to cheaper sources of energy. There may also be increased opportunities for 
non-EC firms to enter the distribution and power generation sectors. 
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It is only in energy exploration that there are potentially discriminatory clauses concerning 
third-country firms. For national security reasons Member States may exclude from access to 
their national energy sources entities established in the EC but controlled by third countries or 
third-country nationals. Access for firms not established in the EC is subject to reciprocity. 
10.3. Summary of findings 
The liberalizations of the telecommunications and energy markets are unlikely to have major 
effects on the conditions of access for third-country products in the short term. However, they 
might have substantial effects in the future when complete liberalization could provide 
opportunities for third-party suppliers to enter the telecommunications and energy industries. 
By and large, foreign firms will have to establish themselves in the EC in order to take 
advantage of these opportunities. Thus these changes are not the focal point of our study. 
Moreover, it is not easy to assess the likely impact of the liberalization measures as many have 
been adopted only recently and much remains to be done. 
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11. Concluding remarks 
11.1. Diversity of effect 
This chapter is not labelled 'Conclusions' because the nature of the subject does not lend itself 
to a small set of clear, overall findings. Rather, the conclusions are to be found in the sum of 
the final sections of the main chapters, each of them labelled 'Summary of findings'. 
With this caveat, it may be helpful to recapitulate the findings on the various SMP measures 
that would enable a broad order of priority to be established. This prioritization is based upon 
a mix of quantitative and qualitative data to establish a broad order of probabilities. 
11.1.1. Immediate effects 
In terms of the immediacy and directness of its effect on market access for products from 
external sources, the most important aspect of the SMP must be the sharp reduction in national 
differences in the treatment of traded goods. This was achieved by the elimination of formal 
national trade barriers, the elimination of customs formalities at national borders, and the fact 
that these controls were replaced only very partially by Community-level instruments with 
sub-Community effect. 
The direct benefits of these changes are likely to be significant, but only for a relatively small 
number of states. Except in the area of textiles and clothing (where the MFA is probably a 
more substantial influence on trade patterns), most of the national QRs were applied by a 
relatively small number of states in relation to each product and targeted a small number of 
suppliers. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that they had a significant effect on 
imports of the product in question from the targeted source. 
For those third parties that were not subject to national QRs (or were beneficiaries of them), 
the substantial erosion of sub-Community trade policies will not necessarily have been 
beneficial. The improvement in absolute access for formerly restricted suppliers, together with 
no change (as a result of this aspect of the SMP) for other suppliers, will have produced a 
relative deterioration in access terms for the latter group. However, quantification of this 
differential effect between third parties was not a priority for this study. 
11.1.2. Broader, direct effects 
In a broader and longer-term perspective, the erosion of technical barriers to trade may turn 
out to have the greatest importance for third-party suppliers of goods. Certainly it is an area of 
SMP change that has attracted particular interest by foreign suppliers, notably those in the 
USA. 
In many cases, the SMP changes are unambiguously beneficial for third parties, although the 
greatest gains will tend to go to those states with the greatest supply capacity. This differential 
impact is likely to be even more marked in the minority of cases in which the gains are 
ambiguous, since they are subject to potentially onerous compliance requirements. The strong 
balance of probabilities, though, is that trade in the products for which gains will be 
unambiguous is much larger than in products which may be subject to new restrictions as a 
result of SMP measures. 
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The relaxing (but not the removal) of restraints on extra-EC firms bidding for government 
procurement may improve access conditions for extra-EC supplies. However, this is likely to 
be very small in the short to medium term, not least because the relaxation of restrictions has 
been greater for non-national EC firms than for those from outside the Community, so that the 
latter have experienced a relative deterioration in their terms of access compared with the 
former. 
11.1.3. Indirect and longer-term effects 
Many of the other aspects of the SMP could affect access conditions for products from third 
countries, but in most cases this will be an indirect consequence of changes that make it easier 
for foreign-owned companies to establish themselves and do business within the Community. 
Given the high proportion of international trade accounted for by intra-firm transactions, this 
indirect effect could be quite substantial. However, it is not easy to establish a firm basis for 
according it a particularly high priority in terms of SMP effects on access conditions. 
Measures in respect of financial services, taxation, freedom of movement of persons, and 
protection of intellectual and industrial property appear most likely to produce tangible gains 
in the short to medium term. 
The improvements in access for telecommunications products will depend upon both the 
nature and progress of moves towards liberalization and the application of requirements for 
reciprocity. The SMP is expected to have the greatest impact in value-added 
telecommunications services. In energy, the main gains in the medium term are likely to 
accrue to firms consuming energy products (EC and non-EC alike) rather than to foreign 
suppliers. 
11.2. A different perspective 
An alternative way of cataloguing the SMP changes with potential implications for access 
conditions is to distinguish between measures in which there is identical treatment of third-
country and non-national EC operators and those in which there are explicit effects on third-
country operators alone. The measures that are catalogued in this way are all those that have 
been described in the preceding chapters, but by presenting them according to this new two-
way classification their relative importance may be seen in a different perspective. 
11.2.1. Measures involving equal treatment 
Among the SMP measures designed to promote trade are many that affect third-country and 
non-national firms in the same way. These include, for example, the abolition of customs and 
fiscal frontiers to cross-border trade, some aspects of the liberalization of government 
procurement, and the removal of technical barriers to trade. 
In many cases, third-country suppliers not established in the EC will benefit equally with non-
national EC firms from the removal of controls. This would be the case, for example, in 
relation to those aspects of the removal of technical barriers to trade that have been identified 
as being unambiguously beneficial. 
In other cases, however, the gains for European suppliers may be greater, so that absolute 
improvements for third-party suppliers may also represent a relative deterioration. This would 
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be the case for some aspects of technical harmonization with ambiguous effects on third 
parties, together with any difficulties created by the reinforcement of external borders 
consequent upon the breaking down of internal borders. 
To the extent that the SMP has facilitated establishment within the EC, then intra-firm trade 
with foreign-owned companies would benefit from both sets of changes. However, these gains 
are likely to have differential effects on third parties given the different propensities of firms 
from rich and poor states to establish themselves in the EC. Many of the potential gains 
identified, for example, by US firms are predicated on establishment within the Community. 
Since the impact of the SMP on conditions of access for traded services is likely to be closely 
associated with rights of establishment, it is likely that this differential effect will be 
particularly marked. 
11.2.2. Measures involving unequal treatment 
Some aspects of the SMP affect third-country suppliers relatively, and in some cases 
absolutely. This differential treatment may be discriminatory as between third parties. This is 
the case, for example, in cases where the discrimination takes the form of requiring 
reciprocity. In others, such as the Excluded Sectors Directive, it is an absolute discrimination 
against third parties. 
• In other cases, however, changes have been targeted favourably on third-party supplies. The 
elimination of national QRs and the suppression in practice of Article 115 benefit third parties 
but do not affect European suppliers. Hence, there has been a relative improvement in the 
market access of the former. 
11.2.3. The balance of probabilities 
In terms of an overall prioritization, the balance of probabilities is that the gains for third 
parties outweigh the potential losses by a wide margin. In the case of measures affecting 
European and foreign suppliers equally, in most cases absolute improvements in access have 
not been offset by relative declines because European suppliers benefit more. Whilst some 
aspects of the SMP do discriminate against third-party suppliers, these appear to be less 
important than those from which third-party suppliers benefit. Moreover, in the case of 
national trade barriers the differential effect has been in favour of third-party suppliers. 
Because of the diversity of SMP measures, and of the pre-SMP situation as it affected 
particular suppliers, the actual impact of change will vary widely, depending upon the precise 
characteristics and circumstances of the product and supplier in question. Hence, it is perfectly 
possible that the overall conclusion of third-party gain is compatible with the existence of 
cases in which particular third parties have suffered a clear absolute and relative deterioration 
in access for some products. 
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APPENDIX A 
Trade associations' views on obstacles to a single market 
Trade association Business sector Existing obstacles to the establishment of 
a single market 
EURELECTRIC 
International Minerals 
Association 
EUROFER, EISA 
CET. CIELFFA. CIPF. 
EBA. European 
Profiles and Panels 
Producers Federation 
EUROMETAUX 
EUROALLIAGES 
CEMBUREAU 
CEPE 
APAG 
ECPA 
EFMA 
AIS. COLIPA 
Electricity generation 
and distribution 
Physical industrial 
minerals 
Iron and steel 
First processing of 
steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Ferro-alloys 
Cement 
Paints, varnishes and 
printing inks 
Oleochemicals and 
allied products 
Agrochemicals 
Fertilizers 
Soaps and detergents, 
personal care products 
Non-prescription 
pharmaceuticals 
35,36 
43,47 
50 
52 
57,58 
67 
75.76 
77,79 
81,82.83 
84.86 
87, 89, 90 
Await functioning regulatory framework 
High intra-EC export administration 
Customs procedures cumbersome 
Poor control of extra-EC imports 
State subsidies obstacle to competition 
Lack of economic and monetary union 
Exchange rate fluctuations 
No harmonized payment conditions 
Intrastat not satisfactory 
Cross-border shipping restriction 
Energy price differences 
National waste treatment discrepancies 
Clarification of competition issues (dumping, 
subsidization) and energy/environment factors 
needed 
French translation needed for all label information 
Total dedication of ocean vessels considered 
expensive and unnecessary 
Environmental measures insufficiently 
scientifically-based 
No real free movements of goods 
Internal barriers to trade remain (Regulation on 
ammonium nitrate) 
Differences in environmental legislation remain 
Administrative burden imposed by the transitional 
VAT system 
Further concentration of production constrained by 
transport costs 
Risk of disruption of the fertilizer market if 
unharmonized CO,-tax implemented 
Obstacle posed by road transport problems 
(limited cabotage) 
Lack of mutual recognition due to the prevalence 
of national rules 
EC companies disadvantaged by many services' 
high costs 
Marketing authorization still needed in all the 
countries in which they operate 
Companies should be allowed to advertise a 
product which has the same label as a prescription 
medicine 
VAT rate differences between reimbursed and 
non-reimbursed products 
Impossible Europe-wide advertising and selling 
Problem with trade mark 
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Trade association Business sector Page ref. Existing obstacles to the establishment of a single 
market 
ORGALIME 
CECT 
CEO 
SEFEL 
CEMATEX 
EUCHEMAP 
COPAMA 
FEBMA, 
EUROTRANS 
ORGALIME 
ELC 
EUROBIT 
ACEA 
EBMA 
CIAA 
FEDIOL, FEDOLIVE. 
IMACE 
UEA, AVEC, 
CLITRAVI 
Metal products 
Boilers and metal 
containers 
Hand tools 
Light metal packaging 
Textile machinery 
Chemical machinery 
Plastics and rubber 
Machinery 
Bearings and trans-
mission equipment 
Electrical engineering 
Electric lighting 
Computers and office 
equipment 
Transport equipment 
Motor vehicles 
Bicycles 
Food and drink 
Oils and fats 
Meat 
91 
101 
103 
105 
115 
120 
124 
128 
135, 136 
150 
154 
161 
163 
173 
190 
193 
194. 195 
Internal barriers remain (due to differences of 
national laws transposing European Directives) 
Removal of barriers to free movement of goods 
needed 
EC Regulations should be enforced and applied in 
all Member States 
Harmonization of regulations needed 
National environmental protection measures cause 
internal barriers 
Negative impact of the SM on profitability as it 
has led to more bureaucracy 
National standards become internal barriers to free 
intra-EC trade 
Member States should only act in accordance with 
the European competition regulations 
National environmental protection hinders trade 
and economic relations 
Adoption of EC legislation should be completed 
quickly to avoid problems and delays in Member 
States' full acknowledgement of the European 
standard regulation 
Opening of public procurement markets still to be 
completed 
Fully homogeneous market still to be created 
Barriers remain: VAT system, lack of technical 
harmonization, problems of cross-border payments 
and export controls 
Further harmonization needed in : public 
procurement, indirect taxation and cross-border 
payments 
Competition and environmental policy to be 
implemented taking into account the situation at 
world level to avoid a deterioration of the 
competitiveness of the EC transport equipment 
industry 
The SMP should be fully applied to car 
distribution within the EC (the distribution of 
motor vehicles in the EC still operates within the 
basic framework of Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 
which allows a system of exclusive dealership) 
Mutual recognition of rules needed 
Internal barriers remain due mainly to Member 
States' legislation 
Remaining internal barriers due to differences in 
control implementation and VAT levels 
VAT level differences 
Production techniques standards differences 
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Trade association Business sector Page ref. Existing obstacles to the establishment of a single 
market 
OEITFL 
FAFPAS 
EUROGLACES. 
CAOBISCO 
CEPS. UEPA 
Comité Vins 
EUROMALT, CBMC 
UNESDA 
COMITEXTIL 
CEC 
CEI-BOIS 
CEPI 
CITPA 
INTERGRAF, ENPA 
BLIC 
UEA 
CIBJO 
TME. FEJ 
FESI 
Fruit and vegetable 
processing and 
preserving 
Deep frozen products 
Cocoa, sugar 
confectionery and ice 
cream 
Alcohol and spirits 
Wine 
Brewing and malting 
Son drinks and mineral 
waters 
Textiles 
Footwear 
Wood processing 
Pulp, paper and board 
Paper and board 
Converting 
Printing and publishing 
198 
Rubber products 
Furniture 
Jewellery 
Toys 
Sporting goods 
202 
211,212 
220 
222 
223 
227 
230, 232 
238 
244 
248 
251 
254, 255 
257 
260,261 
263 
267 
270 
Harmonization of technical and hygiene legislation 
needed 
Clear definitions of some products needed 
Differences between fiscal structures and taxation 
rates 
Further harmonization needed (in temperatures of 
transport, warehousing and storage of quick-frozen 
foodstuffs, procedures of control) 
Harmonization of taxation needed (indirect 
taxation, VAT) 
Remaining internal barriers linked mainly to 
interpretation of labelling and packaging 
legislation 
Remaining internal barriers linked to different 
advertising legislation, different taxation regimes, 
lack of common technical standards and different 
levels of excise 
Harmonization of advertising legislation needed 
Fiscal harmonization needed 
Harmonization of indirect taxation levels needed 
(VAT and excise) 
Harmonization of advertising legislation needed 
Harmonization of VAT needed 
Prevention of new national barriers connected to 
the environmental issues needed 
Implementation of labelling norms required 
EC currency necessary 
Lack of mutual recognition of certification rules 
Recent establishment of non-tariff barriers 
Restrictive Commission interpretation of 
Construction Products Directive (89/106/EEC) 
helps existing barriers to free trade to continue 
Currency instability 
Environmental and technical obstacles 
Lack of harmonized direct taxation 
Lack of harmonized environmental standards 
VAT differences 
No clear guidelines on some postal charges 
Lack of harmonized advertising regulations 
Uncertainty linked to the definition of cross-media 
ownership 
EC legislation unclear on waste management 
No EC market for public procurement contracts 
Inconsistent application of EC legislation re 
competition and advertising 
Lack of harmonization regarding the marking of 
precious metals 
Lack of harmonization of rules for television 
advertising and infant safety requirements 
Differential interpretation of EC legislation 
Inequalities in indirect taxation 
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Trade association Business sector Existing obstacles to the establishment of a single 
market 
FIEC 
EAZA 
Construction 
Tourism 
Recreation parks 
ECTAA, IFTO, ETOA, 
UITP 
IRU 
IRU 
Port of Rotterdam 
ACI 
FBE 
EUROFINAS 
EMF 
Travel services 
Public transport 
Road passenger 
transport 
Road freight transport 
Union internationale 
de la navigation 
fluviale 
ECSA 
ACE 
AEA 
ERA 
EEO 
POSTEUROPE 
Inland waterways 
transport 
Shipping 
Air transport 
Air transport 
Air transport 
Postal and express 
services 
Postal and express 
services 
CEA 
Sea ports and other sea 
transport facilities 
Airports 
Financial services 
Credit institutions 
Credit institutions 
Credit institutions 
273 
279 
288, 290 
Insurance 
293 
302 
305 
308 
311 
313 
314,316 
319 
320,321 
325 
328 
331 
335 
337 
339 
341 
342. 343 
345 
Slow implementation of EC Directives 
Absence of tax harmonization 
Lack of progress toward economic and monetary 
union 
Lack of direct tax harmonization 
Lack of indirect tax harmonization 
Lack of social security cost harmonization 
Poorly implemented state aid regulations 
No economic and monetary union 
Need further easing of passport control 
Need even implementation of SMP measures 
Inability of current legislation to create a level 
playing-field for inter-modal competition 
Lack of VAT harmonization 
Regulations poorly enforced 
Poor enforcement of existing regulations 
Excise duty harmonization 
National state subsidies providing for unfair 
competition 
Lack of homogeneous infrastructure 
High administration costs 
Unfair competition due to state subsidies 
Liberalization of assistance services at airports 
Differential tax rules 
Cost effect of the Schengen Agreement 
No harmonized air traffic control system 
State subsidies to rail networks 
Need to liberalize cross-border mail 
Incoherent indirect taxation rules 
Different customs clearance formalities 
Need to liberalize transport services 
Need to deregulate transport sector 
Abolish state aids that distort competition 
Suppression of identity checks needed 
Lack of harmonization of taxation rules 
Need efficient adoption of EC measures into 
national law 
Lack of economic and monetary union 
Balance sheet requirements 
Lack of economic and monetary union 
Differential interpretation of EC legislation 
Lack of tax harmonization 
Unsatisfactory provisions of the Second Co-
ordination Banking Directive (89/646/EEC) 
Obstacles to cross-border mortgage activities 
Lack of economic and monetar)' union 
Differences in contract law 
Differences in taxation 
Exchange rate fluctuations 
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Trade association 
FESE 
FIABCI 
EAAA, FEDIM 
FEE 
CEEC, AEEB 
EFCA 
CEOC 
CLGEE 
ELCA 
Federation of 
European Publishers 
CIETT 
COESS, ESTA, LISS 
ECATRA 
LEASEUROPE 
EFF 
ΕΠΑ, EUSIDIC 
Business sector 
Financial 
intermediaries 
Real estate 
Advertising and direct 
marketing 
Accountancy services 
Construction 
economists 
Engineering constancy 
services 
Inspection and quality 
control 
Geodetic surveying 
Landscaping 
Publishing services 
Temporary work 
services 
Security services 
Car rental 
Leasing 
Franchising 
Electronic information 
services 
Page ref. 
347 
349 
353 
361 
372 
375 
376 
378 
380 
384, 385 
386 
392 
393, 394 
397 
399 
405 
Existing obstacles to the establishment of a single 
market 
Lack of economic and monetary union 
Continued fiscal and administrative barriers 
Lack of mutual recognition of diplomas 
Different requirements for licences 
Lack of tax harmonization 
Considerable regulatory differences between states 
High national market protectionism 
No harmonized form of cross-border payments 
Lack of economic and monetary union 
Restrictions to the freedom to provide accountancy 
(and related) services 
Lack of mutual recognition of diplomas 
Problems with cross-border ownership 
Lack of tax harmonization 
Lack of qualification and training harmonization 
Continued state subsidies 
Lack of opening up of the public procurement 
market 
Need more technical harmonization 
Need improved mutual recognition of diplomas 
Differential regulations 
(Semi) public officers still have monopolies in 
some states 
Bidding rules too complicated and therefore 
exclude small and medium-sized enterprises 
Different levels of VAT 
Problems regarding copyright law 
Unfair competition due to unequal access to 
information 
Recent creation of state laws hampering cross-
border trade 
General lack of standardization and harmonization 
within the sector 
Differences in indirect taxation 
Lack of harmonization of the legal, fiscal, and 
accounting frameworks 
No economic and monetary union 
Need to harmonize legislation in the fields of 
copyright, legal protection and databases, privacy 
and data security, access to government 
information and codes of conduct for trains-border 
Audiotex 
Need deregulation of telecommunications industry 
Pan-European toll-free numbers need to be 
established 
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Trade association 
ETNO 
HCEC 
Business sector 
Telecommunication 
services 
Hospitals 
Audio-visual services 
Page ref. 
408 
413 
423 
Existing obstacles to the establishment of a single 
market 
Problems of technical harmonization 
Need harmonization of VAT regimes 
No common European audio-visual standards 
Source: DRI, 1995. 
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PART II: Quantitative analysis 
12. Summary 
12.1. Objective of Part II of the study and terms of reference 
The main purpose of Part II was to provide a quantitative assessment of the effect of the single 
market programme on the access of third-country suppliers to the European Community (EC) 
market. Specifically, the terms of reference required the estimation of the effects of two different 
consequences of the single market: 
(a) the replacement of national quotas or other quantitative restrictions (QRs) by full 
liberalization of access to the EC market; 
(b) the replacement of national QRs by Community-wide QRs. 
The terms of reference required the construction and application of a partial equilibrium model 
similar to those that have been used previously for the purpose of analysing constrained imports. 
The main objective of the model is to quantify the impact of the SMP on exporters to the EU, 
distinguishing between those who were constrained before the change and those who were not. 
For this purpose, two sectors were to be selected as exemplars of the two possible outcomes 
(liberalization or the erection of Community-wide QRs). The study was not, however, expected 
to produce an overall analysis of trade flows as that is the subject of a different study within the 
overall Single Market Review. 
12.2. Approach and main findings 
Following discussions with Commission officials, the two sectors selected for study were 
clothing, where the SMP has led to the replacement of national QRs by a Community-wide 
regime; and footwear where liberalization has occurred except for the introduction of a 
restriction on imports from just one supplier, China. Both sectors are characterized by 
competitive, rather than oligopolistic market structures. 
To assess the impact of the SMP, three complementary empirical exercises were undertaken: 
(a) First, an examination of trends in 'apparent consumption' - the sum of domestic 
production and imports, less exports - to establish the extent to which demand in each 
Member State had been supplied by indigenous production, intra-EU imports and third-
country exporters. This analysis produced clear evidence that the share of imports from 
partner countries and third countries alike had risen substantially. Although there are 
inevitable differences between Member States in the composition of apparent 
consumption, the sharp increase in the extra-EC import share points to improving market 
access. A comparison with the (pre-1995) EFTA countries reinforces this view since, in 
spite of the switch to Community-wide restrictions on clothing, the growth of imports 
into the EC was higher than into EFTA from outside their respective trade zones. 
(b) Second, a detailed examination of quota utilization in the two sectors. The terms of QRs 
vary according to the particular commodity, the partner country and the Member State 
imposing the restraint, and are subject to various rules about when an allocation could be 
100 External access to European markets 
modified. By relating actual outcomes to nominal restrictions, the degree to which quotas 
had been binding (and, thus effective in restraining imports) can be ascertained. Setting a 
benchmark to judge when a quota becomes binding is, in essence, arbitran', and although 
a figure of 90% was used for this purpose, the interest of the exercise lay as much in 
shedding light on what was happening as the SMP was implemented. The analysis 
revealed a mixed picture. In many market segments, quotas do not appear to have been 
much of a constraint on third-country exporters. Moreover, as the '1992' deadline 
approached, exporters seem to have taken advantage of the growing liberalization of the 
market to increase sales relative to quotas. Indeed, several quotas have regularly been 
exceeded. 
(c) The third exercise was the construction and use of partial equilibrium models for the two 
sectors. These were calibrated for two years, 1988 and 1994, and used to simulate either 
(for 1988) a change to the new regime or (for 1994) the reimposition of QRs as they 
existed prior to the SMP. In this way, two different perspectives on the impact of the 
SMP could be appraised. In the construction of the model, use was made wherever 
possible of secondary information on elasticities and other key parameters. Sensitivity 
analysis was carried out to verify that the imposition of parameter values did not distort 
the results. The simulations showed that where the change is to complete liberalization, 
market access is greatly improved, but also that EC consumers benefit substantially. The 
simulations of a move to a Community-wide QR in place of national QRs produced little 
change in market access, but a significant redistribution between Member States. 
Member States which previously imposed the most restrictive QRs see the greatest 
increase in extra-EC imports but gain from lower prices, whereas prices rise in relatively 
unrestricted destinations. 
12.3. Conclusions and policy implications 
The main conclusion of Part II of the study is that, in both sectors, access for third countries 
has improved as the SMP has been implemented. This suggests that in other sectors in which 
similar changes in the trade regime occurred as a direct result of the SMP, the effect on access 
for extra-EC suppliers will also have been favourable. There may, however, be indirect effects 
on the competitiveness of EC producers that may alter their ability to defend their market 
share in future. 
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13. Introduction 
13.1. Terms of reference and approach 
The terms of reference for this contract required the consultants to carry out a quantitative 
evaluation of the impact of the single market programme (SMP) on market access conditions 
for third-country suppliers. While recognizing that the impact of the SMP on third-country 
suppliers has been multifarious, it has been necessary to focus on the effects on third-country 
suppliers of the elimination of quantitative restraints applied at the Member State level. The 
removal of internal borders has rendered inoperable the enforcement of quantitative limits on 
imports from third countries which are specific to a single Member State. Thus, the provisions 
contained in Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome allowing countries to suspend the free 
circulation of products in order to prevent national quotas/voluntary export restraints from 
being circumvented have become unenforceable. As stated in the terms of reference, these are 
the effects which most readily lend themselves to quantitative measurement. 
13.1.1. The research team 
The principal authors of Part II of this report are Iain Begg, Nigel Grimwade and Tannis 
Seccombe-Hett (European Institute, South Bank University). Professor Ian Wooton of the 
University of Glasgow provided overall guidance and help in constructing the simulation 
model presented in Chapter 16. Volker Stabernak of World Systems supplied trade and 
production data and Dr Peter Holmes provided advice. 
13.1.2. Methodology 
As stipulated in the terms of reference, the methodology employed has been that of partial 
equilibrium analysis. That is to say, only the direct impact of the SMP changes on the sectors 
under consideration is measured ignoring any feedback effects from changes brought about in 
other sectors of the economy. The methodology used combines descriptive analysis with 
formal modelling. In the descriptive part, the impact of the SMP on trade flows is examined at 
both an aggregated and more disaggregated level. Changes in the share of imports in apparent 
consumption are set out and analysed for each sector. Next, quota utilization percentages are 
calculated for individual product groups to determine the extent to which quotas have actually 
been binding and the trends in these ratios are used to assess whether or not the removal of 
internal barriers has enabled third-country suppliers to use their EC-wide quotas more 
efficiently. The formal model employed is a relatively simple, partial equilibrium model which 
treats clothing and footwear as homogeneous goods and is used to simulate the policy changes 
taking place in both sectors. 
The terms of reference requested a quantitative analysis of the effects of the SMP on two 
sectors. Following consultations with the Project Evaluation Committee, the two sectors 
chosen to provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of the SMP on market access for third 
countries were clothing and footwear. Several characteristics justify their selection. First, and 
most important, they have been subject to the kinds of quantitative restrictions that have to 
change as a result of the SMP. The sectors are two which have, in the past, been most subject 
to Article 115 restrictions and clothing has also been covered by successive MFA agreements. 
Over the period 1980-90, 1.715 requests to suspend the free circulation of goods (75% of the 
total) were accepted by the Commission. Of these, 1.179 related to textiles and clothing (69% 
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of the total). There were a further 30 cases involving leather and footwear products with 
electronics, vehicles and motorcycles among non-agricultural goods accounting for the 
remainder (GATT, 1991). The choice of the above two sectors was in part influenced by the 
desire to examine two sectors where different changes have occurred. In the case of clothing, 
national quantitative restraints have largely given way to EC-wide measures, whereas, in 
footwear, both national and EC-wide quotas were (with the exception of one supplier) 
eliminated altogether. 
Second, they are sectors in which there are large numbers of suppliers, rather than an 
oligopolistic market structure. This makes it easier to deploy the tools of partial equilibrium 
analysis without having to resort to unrealistic assumptions about the nature of the products. 
Moreover, useful insights can be gleaned from previous studies on such matters as model 
specification or parameter values. 
13.2. The two sectors 
It is useful to set out a few basic statistics about the industries in order to place them in context. 
Although both sectors are generally considered to be industries in decline, they continue to 
provide substantial employment in the EU, especially in some of the Mediterranean Member 
States. According to the most recent annual enquiry into the Structure and Activity of Industry 
1989-92, employment in clothing and footwear (together - NACE industry 45) accounted for 
5.3% of total EUR-12 industrial employment in 1991 (in 1985, it was 5.5%), but only 4.6% of 
value-added (4.9% in 1991). Estimates in the latest Panorama of EU Industry (1995/6) put the 
1994 share of clothing in total manufacturing employment at 4.0%, and footwear at 1.1%, 
illustrating that the decline in employment continues. The clothing and footwear industry as an 
aggregate had the lowest apparent productivity of all two-digit NACE industries in every 
Member State except Denmark. 
Both sectors are heavily traded, and the volume of trade has comfortably outpaced production. 
The volume of trade rose by 79% between 1988 and 1994 in clothing and by 59% in footwear. In 
1994, according to Panorama the industries accounted for 1.9% (clothing) and 1.0% (footwear) 
of extra-EC exports, and 5.2% and 1.3% of extra-EC imports. Table 13.1 shows how the value 
of extra-EC imports has risen from below half the total to 60% between 1988 and 1994. 
Table 13.1. EC imports of clothing 
(% of total imports by value at current prices) 
Intra-EC 
Extra-EC 
1988 
50.3 
49.7 
1989 
49.6 
50.4 
1990 
49.7 
50.3 
1991 
47.2 
52.8 
1992 
47.4 
52.6 
1993 
40.3 
59.7 
1994 
39.7 
60.3 
Source: Eurostat. 
The main extra-EC suppliers of clothing (Table 13.2) in the late 1980s were Hong Kong, 
Turkey, Korea and China, but China has progressively increased its share such that it is now 
easily the biggest exporter. The decline in the shares of Korea and Hong Kong have been so 
substantial and seem to coincide so closely with the rise in Chinese exports that there must be 
a suspicion that the explanation lies in a relabelling of exports. It is also noteworthy that the 
shares of some other major exporters, some of which were subject to MFA restrictions, have 
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broadly been maintained in the period observed. 
Table 13.3 shows that footwear has also exhibited a steady tendency towards a higher extra-EC 
share, with the intra-EC share dropping from nearly two-thirds to just over a half between 1988 
and 1994. 
Table 13.2. Main extra-EC exporters of clothing to the EC 
China 
Turkey 
Hong Kong 
Tunisia 
Morocco 
Poland 
India 
EFTA 
Indonesia 
South Korea 
Other 
1988 
7.0 
8.2 
16.6 
4.0 
4.1 
2.0 
4.0 
7.1 
1.4 
7.6 
38.0 
1989 
7.5 
9.5 
15.1 
4.4 
4.8 
2.0 
4.6 
6.4 
2.0 
5.9 
38.0 
1990 
9.9 
9.9 
12.6 
5.1 
5.5 
2.6 
4.8 
5.7 
2.4 
4.0 
37.5 
1991 
13.2 
9.1 
11.4 
4.5 
4.9 
3.1 
3.8 
5.0 
3.1 
4.0 
37.7 
1992 
12.8 
10.2 
10.2 
5.1 
5.1 
4.0 
4.0 
4.9 
3.7 
3.0 
37.1 
1993 
13.4 
10.0 
10.4 
5.1 
5.2 
4.6 
4.4 
4.3 
3.6 
2.3 
36.7 
1994 
13.5 
9.6 
9.4 
5.5 
5.4 
5.2 
4.9 
3.9 
3.6 
1.8 
37.2 
Source: Eurostat. 
Table 13.3. EU imports of footwear 
lntra-EC 
Extra-EC 
1988 
64.9 
35.1 
1989 
64.6 
35.4 
1990 
64.6 
35.4 
1991 
59.6 
40.4 
(% of total imports by value at current prices) 
1992 
58.9 
41.1 
1993 
54.5 
45.5 
1994 
54.6 
45.4 
Source: Eurostat. 
Turning to individual suppliers, the market is more concentrated. Up to 1991, Korea and Taiwan 
were the dominant external suppliers, but have since been replaced by China (Table 13.4). As in 
clothing, the rise of China coinciding with the decline of its close neighbours gives grounds for 
suspicion about the true origin of the exports. Despite the decline, for obvious reasons unrelated 
to the SMP, in the share of Yugoslavia, other areas have also increased their shares markedly, 
such as Thailand and Romania, all of which testifies to a comparative easing of market access. 
The most recent index of production figures shows that between 1989 and 1995, output of 
clothing has declined in all but three (Belgium, Denmark and Italy) of the Member States - see 
Table 13.5. In footwear and leather, the picture is broadly similar with two of these same 
countries (Denmark and Italy) standing out, and, to a lesser extent, Portugal. An index of 
specialization in clothing and footwear (Table 13.6) reveals that both industries are especially 
prominent in Portugal and Italy. 
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Table 13.4. Main extra-EC exporters of footwear to the EC 
Source: Eurostat. 
(% of extra-EC imports by value at current prices, ranked by 1994 shares) 
China 
EFTA 
Thailand 
India 
South Korea 
Brazil 
Yugoslavia 
Romania 
Taiwan 
USA 
Other 
1988 
6.1 
11.0 
3.0 
4.5 
18.4 
8.0 
8.6 
1.6 
18.9 
3.6 
16.4 
1989 
7.2 
10.3 
4.3 
4.4 
16.4 
8.2 
9.1 
1.1 
17.4 
2.9 
18.5 
1990 
7.8 
9.4 
6.5 
5.5 
17.6 
6.1 
8.5 
1.2 
11.1 
3.4 
22.8 
1991 
11.6 
7.3 
7.2 
4.7 
16.7 
5.9 
6.9 
1.2 
9.5 
3.0 
25.8 
1992 
15.9 
7.0 
7.3 
4.4 
13.8 
5.5 
2.4 
1.6 
6.0 
2.9 
33.2 
1993 
17.9 
7.8 
7.3 
5.3 
8.2 
5.8 
4.6 
2.8 
4.0 
2.7 
33.5 
1994 
17.3 
7.2 
7.0 
5.9 
5.1 
4.4 
4.2 
4.1 
3.1 
2.5 
39.2 
Table 13.5. Production trends of clothing and footwear 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
EUR-15 
Clothing 
1989 
90.9 
100.6 
102.6 
87.9 
98.1 
104.5 
98.3 
101.2 
na 
94.8 
90.6 
100.2 
n a 
1992 
108.3 
104.4 
84.4 
99.5 
84.5 
87.7 
83.8 
98.4 
69.4 
91.6 
98.7 
91.7 
91.7 
1995 
114.1 
107.4 
58.5 
75.1 
82.3 
75.6 
70.2' 
109.1 
21.1 
88.6 
79.01 
93.9 
86.6 
(index 1990 - 100) 
Leather and footwear 
1989 
102.7 
94.1 
102.1 
126.0 
103.5 
98.4 
103.6 
99.5 
na 
98.0 
96.8 
113.9 
n a 
1992 
82.4 
116.8 
83.2 
89.0 
89.8 
89.1 
77.5 
94.7 
n a 
90.0 
97.2 
83.2 
90.9 
1995 
41.7' 
130.3 
59.9 
83.3 
76.5 
79.4 
na 
112.0 
n a 
83.1' 
99.3' 
84.6 
93.9 
' These figures were part estimated. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Table 13.6. Specialization index for clothing and footwear 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
(share of sector in manufacturing value added compared with EC) 
Clothing, 1993 
1.14 
0.54 
0.75 
2.20 
1.32 
0.89 
0.59 
1.82 
0.22 
0.25 
4.27 
0.82 
Footwear, 1993 
n a 
0.71 
0.41 
1.26 
1.28 
0.79 
0.10 
2.89 
0.00 
0.19 
7.27 
0.63 
Source: Panorama of 'EU Industry 1995/96. 
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13.3. Structure of the report 
The next chapter summarizes relevant background material, focusing on the characteristics of 
the trade regime and previous empirical research on market access and the SMP. The 
following two chapters present the results of the empirical work while a concluding chapter 
discusses the main findings, and draws out the policy implications. Appendices contain more 
detailed background material and tables of results. 
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14. Institutional context and previous empirical work 
This chapter presents an overview of relevant background material that bears on the 
subsequent empirical work. This material is presented in more depth in the appendices. First, 
we summarize the main characteristics of the trade regime that applies to clothing and 
footwear, and discuss the consequences of the SMP for market access. The second part of this 
chapter reviews previous research into market access and the analysis of trade flows. 
14.1. Summary of the main consequences of the single market for market access 
The move to complete the single market has resulted in a number of changes in the conditions 
under which third countries have access to the EC market. In this section, we provide a 
summary of the relevant changes in market access conditions and assess their expected 
consequences for the two sectors. Appendix A to Part II provides a detailed review of the EC 
import regime for the two sectors, clothing and footwear, covered by this study and of the 
changes to the regime directly brought about by the realization of the single market. 
14.1.1. Single market measures which affect trade 
A thorough examination of the range of SMP measures which have had an impact on market 
access conditions for third-country suppliers is provided by the qualitative evaluation carried 
out for Part I of this study. This provides a typology of SMP changes which seeks to describe 
the potential effect of these changes on external suppliers. Using a system of classification 
employed by the European Commission, seven categories of measures are described: 
(1) The removal of quantitative restraints (QRs) on imports or their replacement with 
Community-wide measures. 
(2) The removal of physical barriers between Member States (e.g. border controls). 
(3) The elimination of technical barriers through a mixture of harmonization and the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition. 
(4) Measures to remove barriers to the provision of services, to enforce the right of 
establishment and ensure free movement of capital. 
(5) Measures to remove barriers in the business environment (e.g. intellectual and industrial 
property, company law, taxation and media). 
(6) Measures to eliminate discrimination in public procurement. 
(7) Measures to remove barriers in regulated industries such as energy and 
telecommunications. 
All of these measures were found potentially to affect external suppliers, in most cases in a 
favourable manner. In some cases, the nature of the external effect is a complex one and not 
straightforward. Moreover, in most cases, the precise effect is not susceptible to measurement. 
The only one of these changes which can in any meaningful sense be made subject to 
quantitative measurement is the first one. This is because QRs have effects on prices similar to 
those of tariffs and these effects can, with some difficulty, be measured. These changes are, 
therefore, those which this study has primarily focused upon. It should, however, be pointed 
out that quantifying the impact of these measures necessarily fails to capture the full extent of 
the SMP on third countries. 
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14.1.2. The import regime 
Before discussing these effects, we begin with a simple description of the import policy 
regime with specific reference to clothing and footwear as it operated before the completion of 
the SMP. In the case of clothing, the main barriers to access impeding imports from third 
countries were import quotas applied at both the Community level and Member State level. 
Following the implementation of the tariff reductions agreed in the course of the Tokyo Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations (1973-79), the EC's weighted average Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariff on clothing imports stood at 13.2%. Although this was higher than for 
manufactured products in general, of greater impediment were the various kinds of 
quantitative limits which the EC, along with other Western industrialized countries, applied to 
imports coming from the developing countries. Some 19 major suppliers of clothing products 
to the EC were subject to bilaterally negotiated quantitative limits under the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA). A few other countries which were not signatories of the MFA were 
subject to MFA-type agreements, while suppliers from state-trading countries faced 
unilaterally imposed quotas (the so-called autonomous restrictions). The only countries which 
enjoyed quota-free access to the EC market were other advanced industrialized countries (e.g. 
the USA) and those countries which had signed preferential trading agreements with the EC 
(members of EFTA and the Mediterranean countries, although imports from the latter were 
closely monitored with provisions for safeguard arrangements in the event of the EC market 
being disrupted). 
Taking textiles and clothing together for the moment, it was estimated that, in 1988, roughly 
one-half of all imports entered the Community under some sort of quantitative limitation (or 
preferential surveillance), about one-quarter were subject to the so-called 'basket exit 
mechanism" but not restricted (see Appendix A to Part II) and that about one-quarter of MFA 
products were not covered by any form of arrangement (CEC. 1993b). In all cases. EC-wide 
quotas were broken down into individual Member State quotas. 
in the case of footwear, while being rife in the late 1970s and early 1980s, QRs were much 
less important by the mid-1980s, the time of the launching of the SN4P. Moreover, unlike 
clothing products, such quotas as did exist were operated at the Member State level. Most 
imports from state-trading countries were subject to autonomous restrictions analogous to 
those applied to clothing imports. However, in 1988. the EC negotiated with Taiwan and 
South Korea (the two major suppliers to the EC) voluntar}' export restraint (VER) agreements 
with respect to the French and Italian markets. In July 1990. this was replaced with one of the 
first ever EC-wide VERs regulating imports from these two countries to the entire EC market. 
As with clothing, third-country suppliers also faced a relatively high MFN tariff of some 
13.5% measured on a weighted average basis. Further possible barriers to market access 
affecting suppliers in both sectors could rise from the application of anti-dumping measures 
(although there were none applying at this point in time) and the application of surveillance 
measures which, while not restricting imports, may herald the threat of quantitative restrictions 
and. as such, deter exporters. 
To prevent national quotas from being undermined by imports being deflected through another 
Member State, Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome allowed a Member State, at any time, to 
request authorization from the Commission to intervene temporarily at the internal frontier 
and to suspend such products from Community treatment. The European Commission was 
empowered to consider any such applications and to grant the necessary approval as well as to 
set time limits on the application of any such measures. The abolition of internal frontiers. 
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however, has rendered Article 115 unenforceable. Prior to the abolition of internal frontiers on 
1 January 1993, the Commission began a progressively stricter application of Article 115. In 
consequence, the number of protective measures under these provisions fell progressively over 
the live years leading up to 1992. The use of Article 115 was largely confined to a small group 
of products most subject to QRs. Of the 1.715 acceptances over the period 1980-90, 1.179 
were accounted for by textile and clothing products and 64 by agricultural products. Other 
important products included electronics, vehicles, motorcycles and leather and footwear 
(GATT. 1991). 
The fact that Article 115 could no longer be enforced once internal frontiers were dismantled 
necessitated either the abolition of all national controls or their replacement with Community-
wide restrictions. In reality, examples of both approaches exist. In the case of textiles and 
clothing, the allocation of Community-wide quotas to individual Member States ended in 
October 1993, although there are provisions for the re-establishment of regional quotas in the 
event of 'excessive concentration' leading to market disturbance in individual Member States. 
(The new wording of Article 115 appears to give the Commission more power to prevent 
national measures.) Likewise, in July 1991. the various VERs/quotas which the Member 
States applied to imports of Japanese automobiles were replaced with a new EC-wide VER to 
last up until the end of 1999. In the case of footwear, as mentioned above, an EC-wide VER 
applying to imports from Taiwan and South Korea had already come into being. However, it 
was allowed to expire at the end of 1992. Indeed, footwear largely fitted the model of total 
liberalization as opposed to the mere replacement of national with Community-wide measures 
to be found in textiles and clothing and automobiles. In March 1994, the Council of Ministers 
announced the elimination of a further 6,700 national restrictions on a wide variety of products 
including footwear. Only in the case of certain products (mainly from China) were these 
national quotas replaced with Community-wide measures. 
14.1.3. Other influences on trade 
The difficulty faced in making any quantitative assessment of the effects of these SMP-related 
changes in the import regime is the need to isolate these effects from those caused by changes 
not related to the SMP which were taking place at the same time. Table 14.1 summarizes the 
main changes in legislation affecting market access taking place over the period from 1986 to 
1995 including both SMP-related changes and those which were not the consequence of the 
SMP. With regard to the latter, the most important changes affecting third-country access to 
the EC market were the accession of new members to the EC (Spain and Portugal in 1986 and 
Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995), the signing of the Europe Agreements granting 
preferential access to the EC market for the former Communist Central and East European 
countries (CEECs) and the completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Of these, the most important changes pertain to the period after 1995. The 
second of the two enlargements took place on 1 January 1995, while the measures contained in 
the Uruguay Round Final Act (including those which provide for a phasing out of the MFA) 
similarly took effect from the same date. With regard to the Europe Agreements, certain of the 
interim Agreements commenced in March 1992. However, the timetable for removing barriers 
on imports from the CEECs was more protracted for the sensitive goods sectors such as 
clothing and footwear. 
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Table 14.1. Changes in legislation affecting market 
Date 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1989 
1990 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
-
-
- January 
-September 
- January 
- January 
- November 
- December 
- January 
-July 
- March 
- January 
- May 
- December 
- February 
- March 
-July 
- January 
February 
March 
Clothing 
access, 1986-95 
Footwear 
Accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC (five-year transitional period) 
Launching of Uruguay Round 
Council Regulation on OPTs 
New Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA4) commences 
Bilateral agreement with China commences 
EC negotiates VERs on imports with South Korea 
and Taiwan for the French and Italian markets 
Liberalization of QRs under Uruguay Round 'Roll-back' provisions 
New Lomé Agreement signed (Lomé 4) 
Bilateral agreement with Soviet Union 
Suspension of UK VER on Poland 
EC-wide arrangement covering footwear imports 
replaces French and Italian VERs on South 
Korea, Taiwan (valid until end of 1992); 
surveillance introduced 
France imposes quotas on shoe imports from 
China for one year 
Interim Europe Agreements with Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland 
Single market created 
EEA created to replace existing free trade agreements between the EU and EFTA 
Phasing in of Europe Agreements begins 
Interim agreement with Romania 
Interim agreement with Bulgaria 
Full Europe Agreement with Hungary, Poland takes effect 
Council Regulations introduced which eliminate national restrictions; a limited number of Community 
quotas are introduced in their place 
Free Trade agreements negotiated with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
Regional OPT quotas replaced by EC-wide quotas 
Accession of Austria, Finland, Sweden to the EC (Finland allowed three-year period to harmonize all 
external tariffs) 
Revised GSP takes effect 
MFA4 superseded by ATC (Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing) 
Full Europe Agreement with CSFR, Romania takes effect 
Quotas (from March 1994) revised upwards to take into account accession of new members, and to 
increase the levels in real terms 
14.2. Previous studies of the impact of the single market on third-country suppliers 
This section gives a brief summary of the type of methodology that has been used in previous 
studies of the impact of the single market on third-country suppliers, and the types of 
assumptions this work has involved. The two questions relevant to us here are: what are the 
potential effects of (i) trade liberalization and (ii) completion of the single market, or quota 
unification. A detailed summary of the literature and the main empirical results may be found 
in Appendix B. 
One of the most basic issues to address in modelling the effects of quantitative restrictions is 
that of market structure. For both the clothing and the footwear sectors, all previous empirical 
work has modelled the two sectors as perfectly competitive. The number of different 
producers and lack of significant market power by any group of firms or countries justifies this 
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assumption. Less obvious, however, is how to address the question of product homogeneity or 
heterogeneity. Empirical evidence suggests something less than perfect substitutability 
between both suppliers and markets in both sectors. Modelling heterogeneity, however, 
requires assumptions about a range of elasticity parameters. Because these are not always 
accurate, and because heterogeneity appears to be relatively mild, it is not clear that one 
approach should be strictly preferred to the other. As a result, both approaches have previously 
been used to model the sectors in question. 
A substantial amount of literature now exists on the effects of quantitative restrictions on 
trade. Prominent in this area are simple partial equilibrium models which quantify the effects 
of VERs by converting them into import tariff equivalents (MTEs). Their welfare effects may 
then be estimated in a manner similar to studies of tariffs. This process is theoretically 
straightforward. Empirically, however, it may be difficult to achieve, since the size of quota 
rents cannot be directly observed. Instead, it must be estimated using variables such as the 
prices of export licences (where such licences may be traded), the unit value of imports into 
restricted versus unrestricted markets, or the change in exporters' prices following the 
introduction of restrictions. None of these measures is ideal; however, in the sectors relevant 
to this study significant empirical work has been conducted to estimate these values. Estimates 
range from 13 to 33% for the European clothing sector and from 16 to 28% for footwear 
(depending on the country and the year). 
Other accounts of the restrictiveness of VERs have concentrated on deriving quota-utilization 
ratios, and trends in variables such as the number of products or percentage of trade covered 
by restrictions. This approach has been especially important in studies of the MFA, and can be 
particularly useful in enlightening the difference in restrictiveness between European countries 
and the importance of trade diversion. 
Empirical work applying all of these approaches to the clothing and footwear sectors 
demonstrates that the potential effects of trade liberalization are significant and positive for all 
European countries. Studies of the effects of quota unification, however, have produced 
differing conclusions depending on the assumptions about the existing degree of market 
segmentation, product heterogeneity and market structure. In sectors which may be treated as 
perfectly competitive, it may be demonstrated that quota unification will never harm the union 
as a whole, and can usually be expected to benefit it. However, the costs and benefits of this 
process will be unevenly distributed between Member States and between producers and 
consumers. 
Studies of the effects of these processes on external suppliers, as opposed to the domestic 
markets, are not as common. However, examinations of recent trends in the clothing and 
footwear sectors show strong evidence of external trade creation. 
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15. Empirica! analysis 
15.1. Overview 
'Ine conceptual framework adopted in l'art II of this study involves three separate yet related 
exercises. The first examines changes over time in the share of extra-area and intra-area 
imports and domestic production in apparent consumption for both clothing and footwear. 
(Apparent consumption is defined as domestic production plus imports minus exports). The 
use of shares analysis to analyse ex post the effects of integration on trade flows has a well-
established pedigree (see Sapir, 1995. discussed above). Since the SMP has involved a 
progressive removal of internal barriers culminating in the abolition of internal borders on 
1 January 1993. changes in these shares resulting from the SMP should be discernible at an 
early stage in the time series. The second exercise observes the impact of changes in the EC's 
import policy regime for clothing and footwear at a more disaggregated level by focusing on 
the extent to which quotas have been more fully used by third-country suppliers. The 
procedure is to calculate quota utilization ratios (the ratio of actual imports to quota 
constrained imports) for relatively narrow product categories and to examine trends in the 
average ratio for individual Member States, the Community as a whole and individual supplier 
countries over time. The purpose of the exercise is to determine which quotas have been 
binding and whether or not quotas have become more binding over time. Finally, the third part 
employs a more formal yet simple partial equilibrium for each of the two sectors calibrated 
separately for two years and then simulates various policy changes. The first counterfactual 
entails the replacement of individual national quotas with exactly equivalent EC-wide quotas. 
The second simulates the effects of quota abolition (total liberalization). 
15.2. Share of imports in apparent consumption 
A broad indication of the evolution of market access can be obtained by looking at trends in 
the sources of supply of 'apparent consumption', i.e. the demand for the goods in question. 
Consumers in any country can obtain goods from indigenous producers, from EU partner 
countries or from third countries, so that a comparison of the market shares of these three 
suppliers provides a measure of developments in market access. 
The calculation of apparent consumption for any Member State is straightforward: 
AC, - (P, - Χ,) -i- Min + M1X 
e 
where AC, is apparent consumption of country /. P¡ is the total production of country /'. X¡ is 
xports from country /'. M,„ is intra-EC imports of country /' and M¡x is extra-EC imports of 
country /. The focus of interest is in whether the respective shares of the three main sources of 
supply change as a result of the SMP. For the EC as a whole, internal trade counts as domestic 
production, so there is no M¡nterm. 
15.2.1. Apparent consumption in the EC in aggregate 
Aggregate figures for the EC have been presented in successive issue of Panorama of ELI 
Industry and are reproduced here for clothing and footwear as 'fable 15.1. For clothing, the table 
shows that the share of extra-EC imports in apparent consumption has risen consistently since 
the SMP was launched in the mid-1980s. In 1984. imports only provided 7.69% of demand. 
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but by 1993, the last year for which full data are available, the proportion had risen to 25.57%. 
Estimates produced by DEBA and OETH for 1994 and forecasts for subsequent years show 
the share of extra-EC imports continuing to rise. This has been associated with a steady 
deterioration in the extra-EC trade balance which went from a deficit of just over 5% of 
apparent consumption in 1984, to 10.2% in 1990 and up to 15.5%» by 1993. The forecasts 
anticipate a further deterioration. 
Table 15.1. Shares of imports and domestic production in apparent consumption 
(million ECU) 
Clothing 
Apparent consumption 
Production 
Extra-EC exports 
Domestic supply 
Imports from extra-EC 
Domestic supply, % 
Imports from extra-EC, % 
1984 
49,171 
49,630 
4,240 
45,390 
3,781 
92.31 
7.69 
1988 
60,475 
55,172 
5,093 
50,079 
10,396 
82.81 
17.19 
1989 
63,408 
57,689 
6,218 
51,471 
11.937 
81.17 
18.83 
1990 
68,525 
61,471 
6,727 
54,744 
13,781 
79.89 
20.11 
1991 
73,749 
63,747 
6,682 
57,065 
16,684 
77.38 
22.62 
1992 
76,040 
66,301 
6,853 
59,448 
16,592 
78.18 
21.82 
1993 
70,336 
59,438 
7,086 
52,352 
17,984 
74.43 
25.57 
1994e 
69,200 
57,100 
7,300 
49,800 
19,400 
71.97 
28.03 
1995f 
69,500 
56,000 
7.500 
48.500 
21,000 
69.78 
30.22 
1996f 
70.700 
55,500 
7,900 
47.600 
23.100 
67.33 
32.67 
1997f 
72,700 
55,500 
8.200 
47.300 
25.400 
65.06 
34.94 
Footwear 
Apparent consumption 
Production 
Extra-EC exports 
Domestic supply 
Imports from extra-EC 
Domestic supply, % 
Imports from extra-EC, % 
1984 
11,297 
13,297 
3,643 
9.654 
1,643 
85.46 
14.54 
1988 
13,421 
13,881 
3,192 
10,689 
2,732 
79.64 
20.36 
1989 
14,240 
15,139 
3,923 
11,216 
3,024 
78.76 
21.24 
1990 
15,678 
16,548 
4,116 
12,432 
3,246 
79.30 
20.70 
1991 
17,472 
16,991 
3,938 
13,053 
4,419 
74.71 
25.29 
1992 
17,317 
17,029 
4.176 
12,853 
4,464 
74.22 
25.78 
1993 
16,718 
16,270 
4.349 
11,921 
4,797 
71.31 
28.69 
1994e 
17,344 
17,291 
5,173 
12,118 
5,226 
69.87 
30.13 
1995f 
18,070 
18,000 
5,500 
12,500 
5,570 
69.18 
30.82 
1996f 
18,600 
18,500 
5.700 
12.800 
5,800 
68.82 
31.18 
1997f 
19,240 
19,100 
6,100 
13.000 
6.240 
67.57 
32.43 
Note: Figures for 1994 are part estimated; figures for 1995-97 are forecasts. 
Source: Panorama of EU Industry 1995/96. 
In footwear, a rise in the share of extra-EC imports can be also seen, although because the 
initial market share for imports was higher, the growth is not so rapid. Once again, the 
forecasts produced by DRI suggest that the import share will continue to rise, and that this will 
result in a worsening of the trade balance. Between 1984 and 1993, this moved from a surplus 
of 17.8%) of apparent consumption to a deficit of 2.6%. 
In both industries, an initial growth in the share of imports occurred in the mid-1980s, and the 
advent of the single market seems to have coincided with a further jump in market share from 
1991/92 onwards. Factors other than the completion of the single market are, however, bound to 
have influenced the degree to which import penetration of the EC market increased during the 
period 1988-94. Without constructing a fully specified trade model, the effects of other variables 
cannot be assessed with precision, and it is for this reason that the comparison with the EFTA 
countries is valuable. Among the other factors that might have been expected to play a part, the 
most important are the external trade regime, exchange rate movements and other systematic 
influences on relative prices, possible shifts in patterns of consumption, the realignment of 
market power, product innovation or major shifts in consumption patterns. 
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In practice, the nature of the markets for clothing and footwear is such that many of these factors 
would not be expected to have much impact. As described above, the external trade regime was 
fairly consistent in the period in question. For clothing, MF A4 was extended because of the 
delays in concluding the Uruguay Round, and there were no major changes affecting footwear 
other than those which flowed directly from the SMP. New arrangements negotiated as part of 
the Uruguay Round changes only come in to effect after the period in question. 
Exchange rate movements or similar changes in relative prices are more likely to have had some 
effect on the share of imports. Although the underlying assumption of product homogeneity 
cannot be sustained (a pair of Gucci loafers is far removed from cheap Chinese imports, even 
though both can be described as leather shoes), both sectors are characterized by ease of market 
entry, a lack of dominant suppliers and, thus, a market which comes closer than most to the 
stylized perfect market. For this reason, producers will nearly always be price-takers, so that the 
main effect of exchange rate changes will manifest itself in profitability rather than price. In 
clothing and footwear, most third-country exporters tend to regard the dollar as the numéraire 
currency, so that the comparative weakness of the dollar vis-à-vis the ECU may partly explain 
the rise in import shares. However, exchange-rate-induced gains would be expected to be 
transitory, so that this is belied by the consistency of the rise in imports. 
While fashion is fast-moving, information on fashion trends is readily available to all suppliers 
and the basic nature of products (cotton shirts, leather shoes, woollen garments) is stable, and 
producers typically adapt rapidly to new trends. For these reasons and bearing in mind the 
fragmented supply side of the industries, neither technological advances nor product 
differentiation can reasonably be put forward as a very plausible explanation for changes in 
import shares. 
15.2.2. Apparent consumption by Member State 
To take this analysis further, trends in apparent consumption were calculated for individual 
Member States. The source for this work was the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database 
which provides harmonized data for a range of variables, including exports and imports, using a 
standard industry classification. Eurostat data on intra- and extra-EC trade for the two classes of 
goods were used to obtain the necessary split of the import data. The STAN database has the 
advantage of being harmonized and consistent, but does not have complete coverage of EC 
countries. To overcome this, additional data for Ireland were obtained from the VISA database. 
VISA data or statistics from national sources were also linked to the STAN data to provide 
estimates for 1994. STAN does, however, have the added benefit that it covers several of the pre-
1995 EFTA countries, making possible comparisons between the EUR-12 and the EFTA 
countries. 
Tables 15.2 and 15.3 show the results of this exercise. For clothing, the table shows that the 
share of imports in apparent consumption has risen in nearly all the Member States between 
1986 and 1994. The exceptions are Belgium where the share of imports fell after 1992, and 
Greece and Portugal where the proportion fell slightly after 1989. Data for these latter two 
countries are, however, rather erratic so that not too much significance should be attached to 
their figures. The results for some of the smaller Member States are generally prone to be 
unreliable because of the unpredictable effects of re-exporting and OPT. Import shares in excess 
of 100% for the Netherlands - accentuated by the fact that Rotterdam is a principal port of entry 
for the EC - exemplify this phenomenon. 
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Table 15.2. Imports as a proportion of apparent consumption: clothing 
Import share, % 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EC 
Austria 
Iceland 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
EFTA 
1986 
73.1 
87.2 
27.5 
51.7 
* 
106.8 
15.0 
102.5 
* 
7.6 
33.6 
40.6 
83.9 
83.0 
45.8 
88.4 
92.9 
69.2 
77.2 
1987 
76.1 
93.5 
30.9 
54.3 
* 
106.7 
15.2 
106.1 
* 
10.1 
36.6 
42.9 
86.6 
83.1 
54.0 
89.2 
93.5 
69.9 
78.9 
1988 
73.1 
94.5 
31.9 
54.9 
93.5 
108.6 
17.9 
123.3 
* 
12.5 
37.2 
43.6 
86.6 
78.9 
58.6 
90.8 
92.2 
72.7 
80.2 
1989 
72.9 
96.4 
35.1 
57.1 
158.5 
112.8 
16.9 
128.5 
32.5 
i 6.4 
39.7 
44.8 
89.3 
84.7 
59.7 
92.3 
93.7 
79.2 
83.5 
1990 
74.2 
106.1 
37.8 
59.4 
71.0 
113.9 
17.8 
136.9 
25.1 
19.6 
43.0 
47.3 
91.4 
80.2 
66.3 
91.8 
96.4 
79.0 
85.2 
1991 
79.9 
123.7 
39.9 
63.8 
113.9 
132.5 
21.4 
142.7 
26.2 
24.5 
46.7 
51.1 
94.8 
80.5 
68.5 
91.9 
95.8 
77.2 
85.5 
1992 
80.6 
118.0 
42.2 
64.1 
184.7 
139.8 
23.4 
144.5 
27.3 
30.2 
47.0 
52.0 
98.1 
75.3 
77.2 
92.2 
96.3 
76.8 
87.4 
1993 
72.1 
127.3 
42.2 
64.8 
96.3 
138.7 
30.8 
142.2 
24.3 
26.6 
49.0 
54.3 
97.8 
70.5 
80.3 
91.9 
101.9 
73.2 
86.6 
1994 
66.5 
123.5 
43.7 
66.2 
99.1 
143.3 
33.7 
162.7 
24.3 
28.8 
50.5 
56.2 
98.0 
70.1 
85.2 
91.9 
97.8 
70.4 
85.0 
Extra-EC import share, % 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EC 
Austria 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
EFTA 
1986 
10.1 
44.8 
11.8 
30.1 
* 
18.4 
7.6 
32.9 
* 
2.9 
19.1 
19.3 
81.6 
40.6 
74.6 
72.1 
80.1 
64.5 
69.5 
1987 
12.3 
50.4 
14.8 
32.8 
* 
19.7 
8.5 
35.5 
* 
4.0 
21.9 
21.6 
84.5 
48.7 
74.9 
75.0 
82.3 
65.5 
72.1 
1988 
14.0 
51.9 
13.8 
33.1 
12.1 
10.3 
9.9 
44.8 
* 
3.2 
22.4 
21.7 
84.6 
53.7 
71.0 
77.3 
81.5 
68.4 
73.8 
1989 
15.1 
52.7 
15.7 
35.2 
19.1 
12.1 
9.2 
49.4 
3.7 
4.3 
23.9 
22.6 
87.4 
55.0 
76.2 
80.9 
83.7 
74.8 
77.5 
1990 
17.3 
60.0 
18.0 
36.3 
8.9 
12.4 
9.2 
52.9 
2.5 
5.8 
24.9 
23.8 
89.7 
61.7 
73.7 
82.7 
87.8 
74.7 
80.0 
1991 
20.4 
80.1 
19.8 
40.0 
16.8 
14.7 
12.0 
57.4 
2.5 
8.3 
28.9 
27.0 
93.2 
64.5 
75.3 
84.3 
88.8 
73.1 
81.0 
1992 
22.0 
74.6 
20.6 
39.6 
30.0 
14.3 
13.6 
64.2 
2.4 
11.1 
29.3 
27.4 
96.5 
72.5 
71.3 
85.2 
90.6 
73.0 
83.2 
1993 
21.4 
82.9 
23.1 
44.5 
18.1 
18.2 
19.6 
85.3 
2.5 
8.6 
36.1 
32.4 
96.2 
76.4 
67.0 
86.0 
97.1 
70.0 
83.2 
1994 
22.5 
81.6 
24.3 
46.0 
15.6 
20.8 
21.9 
96.7 
2.2 
8.9 
36.4 
34.8 
96.4 
81.6 
66.6 
91.9 
93.2 
67.6 
82.0 
* These figures have been suppressed because of erratic source data. 
Source: Authors' calculations from Eurostat data. 
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Table 15.3. Imports as a proportion of apparent consumption: footwear 
import share, % 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EC 
Austria 
Iceland 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland** 
EFTA 
1986 
90.8 
89.2 
41.5 
47.8 
18.3 
94.0 
27.7 
101.5 
* 
9.2 
40.3 
47.3 
64.5 
87.5 
51.6 
91.7 
91.1 
84.9 
1987 
92.7 
89.4 
44.7 
50.0 
22.2 
96.0 
30.2 
103.8 
* 
17.7 
38.8 
49.8 
64.6 
91.1 
55.2 
91.8 
93.6 
85.0 
1988 
94.6 
95.7 
51.3 
53.5 
26.9 
94.4 
40.4 
110.5 
* 
16.9 
44.3 
53.4 
65.4 
98.0 
54.5 
93.1 
97.3 
85.1 
1989 
94.6 
88.8 
52.7 
58.2 
41.8 
98.3 
35.7 
114.4 
40.5 
15.0 
47.5 
54.7 
69.0 
92.5 
63.8 
94.7 
99.1 
89.1 
1990 
96.0 
85.1 
52.6 
61.4 
37.1 
101.1 
34.3 
120.2 
26.8 
19.6 
50.6 
55.9 
70.4 
88.9 
64.7 
95.0 
100.0 
90.2 
1991 
99.2 
86.2 
54.8 
67.5 
39.4 
105.2 
40.2 
124.5 
22.8 
24.7 
52.3 
59.1 
68.3 
90.8 
63.9 
95.6 
98.6 
86.8 
1992 
99.9 
85.8 
56.6 
66.4 
40.0 
112.3 
40.5 
137.0 
25.5 
29.2 
51.9 
59.3 
77.2 
95.9 
68.0 
96.5 
98.6 
94.1 
1993 
108.9 
90.3 
57.6 
65.8 
34.8 
125.6 
57.5 
156.2 
36.6 
42.9 
55.7 
64.8 
84.1 
95.1 
72.9 
96.4 
100.2 
104.7 
1994 
109.9 
93.3 
61.0 
67.4 
39.8 
132.7 
56.0 
173.3 
55.9 
72.3 
62.8 
69.5 
82.4 
95.4 
71.6 
96.5 
99.8 
100.7 
Extra-EC import share, % 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EC 
Austria 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland** 
EFTA 
1986 
8.1 
31.0 
9.6 
15.5 
5.7 
16.1 
16.9 
20.3 
* 
3.9 
12.0 
13.4 
62.7 
45.8 
78.6 
74.8 
78.5 
76.9 
1987 
11.2 
34.1 
12.1 
17.0 
9.4 
18.5 
19.5 
23.5 
* 
8.5 
14.2 
15.8 
63.0 
49.8 
82.1 
77.3 
82.4 
77.3 
1988 
15.4 
37.9 
15.4 
19.6 
11.8 
10.7 
26.2 
30.9 
* 
9.3 
18.3 
18.8 
64.2 
50.8 
89.8 
77.6 
86.6 
77.9 
1989 
14.4 
33.5 
16.6 
20.6 
18.2 
13.2 
24.6 
32.5 
4.3 
7.5 
19.7 
19.4 
67.7 
59.6 
84.6 
82.4 
89.9 
82.9 
1990 
14.9 
31.9 
15.9 
21.3 
15.6 
19.3 
22.0 
36.1 
3.3 
10.2 
22.2 
19.8 
69.1 
60.8 
81.0 
84.7 
91.5 
84.6 
1991 
19.9 
34.9 
19.6 
26.0 
18.7 
27.2 
27.5 
43.1 
3.3 
15.3 
25.3 
23.9 
67.1 
60.5 
83.0 
86.0 
91.0 
81.8 
1992 
22.0 
29.9 
19.8 
26.0 
19.5 
48.4 
28.6 
49.1 
4.1 
18.8 
23.3 
24.4 
75.3 
64.6 
90.7 
87.2 
90.4 
88.8 
1993 
28.4 
30.7 
20.8 
31.3 
17.8 
67.5 
42.9 
69.6 
9.2 
19.2 
25.1 
29.5 
82.2 
70.8 
91.7 
87.7 
92.8 
99.6 
1994 
27.1 
32.3 
20.8 
31.4 
14.5 
58.9 
42.5 
83.7 
16.0 
39.3 
27.2 
31.5 
80.6 
69.8 
92.2 
87.8 
91.8 
96.2 
* These figures have been suppressed because of erratic source data. 
** Swiss production data cannot be disaggregated in an appropriate manner for footwear. 
Source: Authors' calculations from Eurostat data. 
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In several countries, a high proportion of imports comes from EC partners. Nevertheless, the 
progressive elimination of Article 115 restrictions and the move towards Community-wide QRs 
seems to have been associated with a steady increase in the share of extra-EC imports in apparent 
consumption in all Member States except Portugal. Third-country penetration of the protected 
Italian and French markets has increased notably, while extra-EC sales into other major markets 
such as Germany and the UK have continued to climb. The overall figure shown in this table for 
the EC differs slightly from that in Table 15.1 above because of differences in estimation 
procedures and coverage. 
For footwear, the share of imports in apparent consumption is generally high throughout the 
EUR-12 Member States, although similar caveats about possible distortions of the results as a 
consequence of re-exports apply. As for clothing, the share has been rising in most Member 
States, indicating a progressively more open market. 
Extra-EC import shares have risen everywhere except Denmark, in some cases, such as Italy, 
reaching surprisingly high levels. This bears out the evidence from the production data shown in 
Chapter 13 which highlighted these two countries as the exception to the rule in terms of their 
output trends. The steady increase in this extra-EC share therefore provides compelling evidence 
of a favourable impact of the SMP on market access. Although the prima facie evidence is that 
the SMP has been associated with an improvement in the market access of third countries, it 
could be argued that changing competitive conditions account for this improvement. A means of 
checking for this is to compare the EC with other, similar importers which have not been subject 
to the same sort of change as the SMP. For this purpose, the EFTA countries have been selected. 
These countries have an equivalent level of economic development and economic structures, 
have been subject to broadly the same macroeconomic influences in the last decade, but unlike 
the US and Canada with the formation of NAFTA, did not enter into a major new trading 
arrangement. 
The aim of the comparison with EFTA is to show how the EC market shares might have evolved 
had the SMP changes not been introduced. In other words, the EFTA data could be used to 
'normalize'. In the event, the comparison is not very illuminating because in both clothing and 
footwear the expansion of imports into the EC from third countries was more rapid than those 
into EFTA, in spite of the restrictions imposed on access to the EUR-12 market. Table 15.4 
presents these results, revealing that the growth of extra-zone imports into the EC exceeded 
those into EFTA in each year from 1987 to 1994. Over the full period, the (ECU) value of extra-
zone imports of clothing into the EC rose by 146%, and those of footwear by 100%. Over the 
same period the corresponding figures for the EFTA countries were 29% for clothing and 26% 
for footwear. 
The clear inference to draw from these different exercises in looking at imports in apparent 
consumption is that access to the EUR-12 market has improved for third-country exporters of 
both clothing and footwear. Whether this is as a direct result of the SMP or stems from parallel 
changes in the trade regime cannot, strictly, be resolved purely by analysing apparent 
consumption. The following sections therefore widen the empirical analysis. 
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Table 15.4. Growth in value of extra-zone imports of clothing and footwear 
(ECU% change in period) 
EU - Clothing 
EFTA - Clothing 
EU - Footwear 
EFTA - Footwear 
86-87 
21.98 
12.25 
21.47 
5.93 
87-88 
3.47 
-0.33 
26.17 
0.65 
88-89 
13.88 
7.13 
10.04 
10.27 
89-90 
14.83 
10.09 
10.16 
5.75 
90-91 
23.73 
3.90 
33.35 
-0.25 
91-92 
1.96 
-0.34 
0.65 
-2.68 
92-93 
9.55 
0.84 
9.28 
4.30 
93-94 
6.72 
2.92 
9.54 
8.15 
86-94 
99.57 
26.31 
145.70 
28.52 
15.3. Trends in quota utilization ratios 
QRs only restrict imports to the extent to which they are binding. A prerequisite for any 
analysis of the effects of QRs on imports of clothing and footwear, including any changes in 
the degree of restrictiveness, must be an examination of the extent to which quotas have 
actually constrained imports. The methodology employed in this part of the study has involved 
the calculation of quota utilization (QU) ratios for EC imports of clothing and footwear and to 
observe any changes in trend of average utilization ratios. (This method has been used in past 
studies of the effects of the MFA on clothing and textile imports by others, for example Trela 
and Whalley (1989) and Erzan, Goto and Holmes (1989)). 
15.3.1. Clothing 
For clothing, QU ratios have been calculated for the period 1989-94 (i.e. the duration of 
MFA 4) for six supplier countries subject to quota restraint in respect of certain products -
China, Hong Kong, India, Poland, Indonesia and South Korea - which, in 1993, accounted for, 
respectively, 12.5%, 11.7%, 5.1%, 4.3%, 3.4%, and 2.3%, or 39% in total of extra-EC imports 
(GATT, 1995). According to the GATT (1991) MFA-restrained imports account for roughly 
46% of all imports of textiles and clothing products, so that the EC was marginally less 
protectionist than other parts of the world. QU ratios were calculated for each individual 
Member State and for the Community as a whole. The ratios were calculated using the quota 
limits for individual MFA categories published in various issues of the Official Journal of the 
European Communities and the volume of imports for these same categories using the 
customs statistics published by Eurostat. (A concordance was used to aggregate the trade data 
to fit the MFA categories.) 
A key issue addressed concerns what QU ratio percentage constitutes a binding quota. The 
convention of other empirical work (e.g. Erzan, Goto and Holmes, 1989) has been to take a 
ratio of 90%o or above as binding although the rationale for doing so has never been fully 
explained. Clearly, the higher the QU ratio, the greater the likelihood that exports will be 
restrained. However, even a QU ratio of 100% may not be binding if, in the absence of quotas, 
imports would have amounted to exactly the same amount. A further consideration concerns 
the flexibility provisions discussed above which may allow exporters to exceed their quota for 
a particular product in any given year. The Council Regulations setting out 'Common Rules 
for Imports of Certain Textile Products Originating in Third Countries' include precise details 
about flexibility provisions along with the actual quotas for different product categories. These 
make clear that, for all supplier countries, the maximum cumulative increase in the volume of 
imports for any one year over and above the Community-wide quota was 17% (12% in the 
case of Hong Kong and South Korea). 
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However, these provisions should not affect the average QR over products and over time. 
Advance utilization of a quota for a particular product category or carry-over of amounts not 
utilized in a previous year will mean that the quota will be under-used in the next or previous 
year leaving the average rate unchanged over several years (although years at the beginning or 
end of the time period could be affected). Transfers between product categories are permitted 
in specific cases. However, for the same reasons, these will simply mean the underuse of other 
product limits such that the average across product groups (but not within product groups) is 
unaffected. In some cases, EC regulations prescribe certain sub-limits within MFA quota 
categories. So, although an exporting country may have underused its quota for the MFA 
category, nevertheless exports are constrained at a more disaggregated level. Inter-regional 
transfer of quotas within the Community may affect QU ratios for individual Member States. 
Thus, an export supplier may exceed its quota in any one Member State if it has under-used its 
quota in another by less than 80%. 
The percentage by which an individual Member State quota could be exceeded for supplies 
coming from non-dominant suppliers was progressively raised from 2% in 1987, to 4% in 
1988, to 8% in 1989, to 12% in 1990 and to 16% in 1991. (However, for Hong Kong, Macao 
and South Korea, the figures were set at 1% in 1987, 2% in 1988, 4% in 1989, 6% in 1990 and 
8% in 1991.) 
In view of these flexibility provisions, it is clear that an EC-wide quota may not be truly 
binding below 117% (112% for Hong Kong and South Korea) and an individual Member State 
quota below 102% in 1987, 104% in 1988, 108% in 1989, 112% in 1990 and 116% in 1991 
(101%, 102%, 104%, 106% and 108% in the case of Hong Kong, Macao and South Korea). 
On the other hand, if all flexibility provisions have clearly been exhausted and assuming that 
imports would otherwise have been greater, a QU ratio of 100% may still be binding. We have 
therefore chosen to stick with the tradition of previous empirical work and to define a binding 
QU ratio as 90% while recognizing that this may amount to a very lax definition of 'binding" 
in particular cases and that the movement towards '1992' meant that the QU ratio at which 
quotas were binding at the individual Member State level was increasing with time. 
However, the opposite may also be true: a QU ratio for the Community as a whole of less than 
100%) could be binding ifall flexibility provisions have been exhausted. If, in an important 
individual Member State market, an external supplier had exhausted its flexibility provisions 
(116% for non-dominant suppliers in 1991), then the fact that its Community-wide quota was 
still under 100% (say, 70%) would mean that it was quota-constrained. In other words, 
account should be taken of whether or not an external supplier was quota-constrained in 
individual Member State markets and not just at a Community-wide level. 
Since, in theory, no Community-wide QU ratio can exceed 117% (112% in the case of Hong 
Kong and South Korea) and no individual Member State quota can exceed the limits 
prescribed for the inter-regional transfer of quotas set out above, it is necessary to disregard 
any QU ratio above these amounts. (Erzan, Goto and Holmes (1989) adopted the same 
procedure.) This has been done by adjusting the quota upwards to yield a QU ratio of the 
requisite amount. Data deficiency may be one explanation why in certain cases recorded trade 
significantly exceeded the maximum quota limit. A further complication arises where recorded 
imports include both direct and OPT imports. Of the six countries considered, Poland is the 
only country for which OPT trade has been important. Comparing trade statistics with import 
licensing figures for product groups in which Poland's imports appeared vastly to exceed 
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quota limits confirmed that QU ratios calculated from trade statistics for these product groups 
gave a grossly distorted picture. This is not surprising since the figures for OPT trade show 
that OPT imports account for a high proportion of EC imports from Poland. According to 
Corado (1994). in 1992, 62% of total MFA imports from Poland were OPT imports. Over the 
period in question, OPT trade also appears to have been increasing. OPT quotas applied to 
eight out of the 18 MFA categories for which quota limits applied to Poland's trade. In four of 
these categories, QU ratios calculated from trade statistics were clearly excessive. In these four 
cases, QU ratios were recalculated using import licensing statistics drawn from the Textile 
Surveillance Returns for 1989-92 and SIGL data base in Brussels for 1993-94. These import 
licensing statistics have the attraction that they distinguish between direct and OPT imports. 
This means that the OPT element of trade can be excluded, thereby removing this element of 
inaccuracy. 
Although Poland is the only country included in the QU ratio exercise which engaged in OPT 
trade, import licensing statistics have been used to check QU ratios for other countries where 
these looked suspiciously high. If the import licensing statistics showed a significantly lower 
volume of imports for these categories, the QU ratio was recalculated using the import 
licensing statistics. Finally, imports of a particular product by an individual Member State may 
exceed quota limit if goods destined for a particular Member State enter the Community 
through another Member State. Although import licences are only issued when the goods enter 
into free circulation, customs statistics will show the goods as entering both Member States, 
first as extra-EC imports and then as intra-EC imports. It follows that the QU ratio will be 
higher for the country through which the goods are passing and lower for the country for 
which they are destined. Care should therefore be taken in interpreting the QU ratios for 
individual Member States. 
A further issue concerns the degree to which external suppliers can circumvent quotas even 
when they are fully utilized and flexibility provisions have been exhausted. Two ways in 
which external suppliers may get around binding quotas are through altering the product mix 
(product diversification) and re-routing products through unconstrained countries or countries 
where quotas have not been fully used (geographical diversification). Where quotas are 
binding, external suppliers may seek to upgrade the product by moving up-market into higher 
quality lines within quota categories. In this way, the value of exports may still be increased. 
In the past, Hong Kong clothing producers appear to have responded to quota constraints by 
seeking to increase the degree of fashion sophistication of the clothing products exported. 
Geographical diversification may occur through producers in quota-constrained countries 
investing in countries where no quotas apply or quotas are not fully utilized. Thus, in recent 
years, Hong Kong producers have sought to get round quota limits through substantial foreign 
investment in neighbouring China. A further response of producers in quota-constrained 
countries may be to falsify the declaration of origin of products exported. Allegations have 
been rife that Chinese T-shirts have been imported fraudulently under an 'origin of 
convenience' (Bangladesh or the Emirates). More recently, customs investigations in the 
United States found that imports of jogging suits made in China were falsely identified as 
'made in Turkey' and Chinese-made cotton shorts and trousers were imported with counterfeit 
certificates of origin from Mongolia (reported Financial Times, 11 September 1996). 
The EC divides quotas into three groups - IB, IIB and HIB - according to their 'sensitivity' or 
level of import penetration. In 1986, there were 5 MFA categories in IB, 21 in IIB and 29 in 
HIB, or a total of 55 MFA categories. Group IB contains the most sensitive clothing products, 
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namely, T-shirts (category 4), pullovers (category 5), trousers (category 6), blouses (category 
7) and shirts (category 8). Table 15.5 shows the proportion of quota-constrained products 
within each of the three groups for the six MFA supplier countries considered in this study. 
Table 15.5. Number of products in each MFA category subject to QRs 
Country 
Hong Kong 
China 
South Korea 
Poland 
Indonesia 
India 
Group IB 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Group HB 
16 
17 
19 
12 
-
4 
Group HIB 
4 
4 
4 
1 
-
-
Total 
25 
26 
28 
18 
5 
9 
Thus, all six countries were subject to quota restraint for sensitive goods. By contrast, very 
few categories within the HIB group were subject to quota restraint. China and South Korea 
were subject to quota constraint for more than half of all MFA categories, while Indonesia and 
India were subject to restraint for only a few of the most sensitive product categories. 
For each supplier country, QU percentages were calculated for all MFA categories subject to 
quotas for suppliers both to the Community as a whole and to individual Member States. The 
detailed calculations may be found in Appendix C. For each year, a weighted average QU ratio 
has been calculated for each supplier country. The period covered was from 1988-94 covering 
the second half of MF A4. (The change in trade nomenclature in 1988 meant that it was 
desirable not to extend the exercise to earlier years.) However, because import licensing 
figures are not available for 1988 and these are needed where trade statistics are unreliable, it 
was decided not to include the results obtained for 1988. Table 15.6 sets out the average rates 
for the six supplier countries examined. 
China appears to have faced the greatest degree of restriction, with an average QU ratio in 
excess of 90% throughout the five-year period. In 1989, it faced binding quotas (90% or more) 
in only three out of 12 categories. By 1994, this had risen to 10 out of 17, suggesting that the 
degree of restriction had increased. On average, quotas do not appear to have been binding on 
Hong Kong for the first four years of this period although the average rate was binding by 
1993-94. In 1989, eight out of 23 MFA categories were binding. By 1992, however, only five 
out of 23 categories were binding. So, although the average QU rate was high by the end of the 
period, the number of quota-constrained categories had fallen. The average QU ratio was still 
lower in the case of South Korea and falling from 1991 onwards. At no stage were quotas 
binding on average. In 1989, only one out of 26 MFA categories were binding. By 1994, none 
were. This suggests that, for South Korea, the restrictiveness of quotas was diminishing over 
this period. In the case of India, the average QU rate was a little higher and binding for the 
years 1991-93. In 1989, in only one of nine restricted categories were quotas binding. By 
1994, this had risen to three out of nine. There is therefore some evidence that quotas were 
becoming more restrictive in the case of India. In the case of Poland, the average is distorted 
by the decrease in the number of restricted categories over the period. However, the average 
ratio is noticeably much lower although rising slowly from 1990 onwards. In 1989, only two 
out of 13 categories were binding. By 1994, out of 10 restricted categories, none were binding. 
Finally, in the case of Indonesia, the average QU ratio was high, binding after 1991 and rising 
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from 1990 onwards. In 1989, none of the four restricted categories were binding. However, by 
1994, four out of the six categories were. Thus, for Indonesia, quotas appear to have exerted 
an increasingly restrictive effect on its exports to the EC. 
Table 15.6. Average quota utilization rates: clothing 
China 
Benelux 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
Hong Kong 
Benelux 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
South Korea 
Benelux 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1989 
1.02 
1.39 
1.20 
1.64 
0.80 
0.79 
0.60 
0.91 
1.01 
1.18 
1.01 
1989 
0.86 
0.86 
0.76 
1.52 
0.95 
0.70 
0.67 
0.93 
0.12 
1.04 
0.89 
1989 
0.67 
0.71 
0.43 
1.70 
0.74 
0.58 
0.61 
0.83 
0.28 
0.80 
0.69 
1990 
1.24 
1.14 
1.01 
1.46 
1.03 
0.31 
0.66 
0.72 
1.13 
0.98 
0.99 
1990 
0.78 
0.82 
0.77 
4.39 
0.78 
0.76 
0.42 
0.73 
1.92 
0.82 
0.77 
1990 
0.62 
0.77 
0.46 
1.89 
0.89 
0.52 
0.65 
0.85 
0.08 
0.67 
0.68 
1991 
1.16 
1.16 
1.06 
1.80 
0.99 
0.45 
0.75 
0.56 
2.12 
0.95 
LOO 
1991 
0.76 
0.82 
0.82 
3.20 
0.78 
0.66 
0.51 
0.53 
1.46 
0.81 
0.76 
1991 
0.76 
0.83 
0.58 
2.26 
0.96 
0.40 
0.72 
0.84 
0.09 
0.75 
0.77 
1992 
0.88 
1.23 
1.11 
2.89 
0.76 
0.50 
0.89 
0.80 
0.70 
0.97 
1.03 
1992 
1.12 
0.89 
0.79 
3.84 
0.91 
0.60 
0.58 
0.67 
0.50 
0.88 
0.86 
1992 
0.78 
0.71 
0.68 
2.41 
0.60 
0.37 
0.49 
0.62 
0.37 
0.60 
0.61 
1993 
0.96 
1993 
0.93 
1993 
0.57 
1994 
0.95 
1994 
0.92 
1994 
0.47 
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Table 15.6. (continued) 
India 
Benelux 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
Poland 
Benelux 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
Indonesia 
Benelux 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1989 
0.89 
0.98 
0.80 
0.94 
0.77 
0.18 
0.30 
0.73 
0.20 
0.91 
0.80 
1989 
0.58 
0.67 
0.59 
0.02 
0.35 
0.00 
0.28 
0.41 
0.00 
0.86 
0.39 
1989 
0.94 
0.92 
1.00 
0.86 
1.02 
0.22 
0.27 
1.06 
0.00 
0.97 
0.81 
1990 
0.86 
1.13 
0.93 
1.94 
0.83 
0.25 
0.35 
0.73 
0.35 
0.87 
0.87 
1990 
0.46 
0.62 
1.12 
0.05 
0.32 
0.00 
0.23 
0.62 
0.00 
0.50 
0.36 
1990 
0.95 
0.97 
0.85 
1.22 
0.80 
0.05 
0.40 
0.45 
0.00 
1.01 
0.81 
1991 
0.90 
1.19 
0.96 
2.37 
0.88 
0.35 
0.46 
0.78 
0.74 
0.86 
0.90 
1991 
0.50 
0.77 
0.81 
0.04 
0.42 
0.00 
0.38 
0.16 
0.00 
0.34 
0.44 
1991 
1.00 
1.07 
0.64 
0.97 
0.89 
0.18 
0.48 
1.20 
0.00 
1.22 
0.91 
1992 
1.26 
1.16 
0.91 
2.25 
0.82 
0.25 
0.51 
0.70 
0.44 
0.96 
0.95 
1992 
0.71 
0.84 
2.57 
0.02 
0.22 
0.00 
0.29 
0.08 
0.35 
0.21 
0.45 
1992 
1.06 
1.04 
1.03 
0.69 
1.02 
0.13 
0.34 
0.75 
0.00 
1.11 
0.95 
1993 
0.91 
1993 
0.44 
1993 
0.99 
1994 
0.88 
1994 
0.50 
1994 
0.95 
The picture of how binding quotas have been is, therefore, a mixed one. For some countries 
(Indonesia, China and perhaps India), quotas were fairly restrictive, with some evidence that 
they were becoming more so over the period in question. In other countries, this clearly was 
not so. Even where Community quotas were being used more fully, it might have been the 
case that this reflected the greater flexibility with which goods could be moved from Member 
States where quotas were underused to Member States where they were already fully used as 
use of Article 115 was gradually relaxed. It should be noted, however, that QU ratios for 
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individual Member States may be subject to the distortions mentioned above and therefore of 
reduced value in showing whether or not this was occurring. If such a shift were occurring, 
one would expect to see QU ratios going up in the markets where quotas were already fully 
used and going down in the rest. 
Changes in market conditions may, in part, offset such a tendency, but when looked at across 
the board, such a trend should be discernible. We therefore estimated the standard deviations 
for average QU ratios across Member States for each of the six supplier countries. 
Significantly, in all six countries, the standard deviation was higher in 1992 than in 1989. 
(Because regional allocations came to an end in 1993, the effects of abolishing internal borders 
on QU ratios for individual Member States could not be determined. However, the progressive 
relaxation of Article 115 in the build-up to 1993 can be expected to have increased flexibility.) 
This might be taken as evidence that goods were indeed being moved more freely within the 
EC between 1989-92. It would suggest that third-country suppliers, even if quota-constrained 
at the EC level, were able to overcome quota-constraint at the individual Member State level 
by shifting goods from underused quota markets to quota-constrained markets. 
Since averages are sometimes deceptive, it is useful to focus attention on specific MFA 
categories. Clearly, the most interesting are the five Group IB categories as these cover the 
most sensitive product groups. Table 15.7 sets out the position at the beginning and end of the 
period for each of these categories. 
Table 15.7. QU rates and numbers of binding quotas: Group IB 
MFA category 
MFA4 (T-shirts) 
MFA5 (Pullovers) 
MFA6 (Trousers) 
MFA7 (Blouses) 
MFA8 (Shirts) 
Measure of restrictiveness 
Average QU rate 
Number of binding quotas 
Average QU rate 
Number of binding quotas 
Average QU rate 
Number of binding quotas 
Average QU rate 
Number of binding quotas 
Average QU rate 
Number of binding quotas 
1989 
0.80 
1 out of 6 
0.85 
2 out of 5 
0.69 
2 out of 6 
0.87 
1 out of 5 
0.84 
3 out of 6 
1992 
0.81 
3 out of 6 
0.86 
3 out of 6 
0.70 
2 out of 6 
0.96 
4 out of 5 
0.73 
3 out of 6 
In all products except shirts, the average QU rate rose and, overall, the number of binding 
quotas was higher in 1994 than in 1989. This would suggest a trend towards greater 
restrictiveness in the case of sensitive products. On the other hand, in no case except blouses 
was the average QU ratio binding. Once again, however, what we need to know is whether 
countries have been using their Community quotas more efficiently by shifting goods from 
markets where quotas are underused to those where quotas are already fully used. To test for 
this, the standard deviation was once again calculated for each supplier country for all five 
product categories. In most cases (5 out of 5 in Hong Kong and India, 4 out of 5 in China, 3 
out of 5 in South Korea, 2 out of 4 in Poland and Indonesia), the standard deviation of QU 
ratios increased when comparing 1992 with 1989. This suggests that, given the trend towards 
greater overall restrictiveness, most supplier countries were using the increased flexibility of 
the SMP to make more efficient use of their quotas in the sensitive product groups. 
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15.3.2. Footwear 
A similar exercise was performed for footwear. As explained above, prior to the completion of 
the SMP imports of footwear were subject to a wide variety of QRs, some operating at a 
Community level, others at Member State level. The large number of quotas for different 
products (usually defined at the eight-digit level) applied by individual Member States and 
subject to alteration each year means that the calculation of a comprehensive range of QU 
ratios for footwear imports has not been possible. As with clothing, we have performed a 
selective exercise. Attention has been focused on the QRs applied to footwear imports from 
South Korea and Taiwan, the two largest suppliers of footwear to the EC during this period. 
(In 1988, Taiwan accounted for 18.9% and South Korea for 18.4% of total extra-EC imports.) 
Thus, the proportion of imports subject to QRs for which this exercise has been performed is 
about the same as for clothing, although the exercise is more straightforward because of the 
smaller number of supplier countries considered. 
As with clothing, QU percentages were calculated using published quota limits and the official 
customs statistics. Since quota limits were set in pairs of shoes and customs statistics in 
tonnes, and since no official conversion rate was provided, a conversion rate derived from 
trade figures was used. For a number of years, quotas were set for 12-monfhly periods 
commencing halfway through the year. In these cases, it was necessary to make a judgement 
as to how best to allocate imports between the first and last six months for the purpose of 
calculating a QU percentage. (It was found best to allocate annual imports 60% to the first six 
months and 40%> to the last six months.) Two separate phases in the application of VERs to 
imports from South Korea and Taiwan can be identified. From 1 July 1988 to 30 June 1990, a 
bilateral VER operated on imports of footwear to France and Italy only. From 1 July 1990 to 
31 December 1992, an EC-wide VER operated on imports to the Community as a whole with 
no regional allocation. 
Table 15.8 sets out the QU ratios for each supplier country for the period 1988 to 1992. Under 
the bilateral VER applied by France and Italy, the QU ratio fell over the duration of the 
agreement. Although it appeared to be binding over the first six months of the agreement, this 
was clearly not the case by the time the agreement had reached its end. In the case of the EC-
wide VER which came into play in July 1990, the agreement appears to have been non-
binding in the case of imports from Taiwan. However, in the case of South Korea, the ratio has 
been well in excess of 100%. Moreover, if the data are reliable, it would appear that South 
Korea failed to restrict exports to the specified limits. (Being a VER, the responsibility for 
restraining the volume of trade resides with the exporting country. Although the agreement 
was accompanied by measures for prior import surveillance, this does not imply any actual 
import restriction.) In other words, the agreement was unsuccessful in achieving the planned 
levels of quantitative restraint. 
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Table 15.8. 
Exporting 
country 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Quota utilization rates: 
Restricting 
Member State 
France 
Italy 
EC 
France 
Italy 
EC 
1988 
109* 
112** 
67 
107** 
footwear 
1989 
60 
75 
70 
44 
1990*** 
48 
72 
120 
32 
33 
56 
1991 
166 
68 
1992 
127 
43 
In operation from July 1988. 
In operation from February 1988. 
National quotas replaced by Community-wide quotas in July 1990. 
Clearly, the replacement of a bilateral quota which applied to imports to only two Member 
States with a Community-wide quota which restricted imports to all Member States could be 
expected to alter import shares. Specifically, imports to the previously restricted markets 
(France and Italy) might be expected to expand relative to the unrestricted ones. Table 15.9 
shows the share of the restricted markets relative to the non-restricted markets in total imports 
from the two countries. 
Table 15.9. Share of imports to restricting 
VER Agreement 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
France 
Italy 
France 
Italy 
Member States: footwear 
1988-90 
19.82 
18.12 
12.27 
8.39 
1991-93 
15.94 
20.69 
10.59 
6.91 
In the case of imports from Taiwan, the share of both France and Italy in EC imports from 
Taiwan fell during the time of the EC-wide agreement when compared with the time of the 
bilateral agreement. In the case of imports from South Korea, France's share fell while that of 
Italy rose. Of course, changes in the share of individual Member States in EC markets may 
reflect a wide variety of influences (changes in the level of economic activity, changes in the 
pattern of tastes, etc.). However, it is perhaps not surprising that the expected shift towards 
previously restricted markets did not occur as the evidence suggests that the bilateral VERs 
were non-binding. 
15.3.3. Conclusions on quota utilization 
The analysis in this chapter of the report has made possible an assessment of how binding 
quotas have been in the period immediately prior to the abolition of internal borders and to 
determine the extent to which the progressive relaxation of Article 115 has brought about 
more efficient use of Community quotas by third-country suppliers. Of the six clothing 
exporters considered, quotas appear to have been binding on average in three countries and the 
degree of restrictiveness also increased in these cases. In the case of sensitive products, 
although quotas were on average not generally binding, the number of binding quotas appears 
to have been increasing and the degree of restrictiveness has increased. There is, however, 
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some evidence that the progressive relaxation of Article 115 has given exporters greater 
flexibility which they have used to shift products from markets where quotas were underused 
to those where quotas were more fully used. In the case of footwear, the bilateral VER applied 
to imports to Italy and France from Taiwan and South Korea appears to have been non-
binding. The EC-wide quota applied after 1990 was also relatively ineffective as imports from 
South Korea consistently exceeded its quota. 
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16. A formal model and policy simulations 
In this chapter, we construct a simple partial equilibrium model for each of the two sectors and 
use it to simulate the policy changes relevant to each. The aim of the models is to provide a tool 
for assessing how the changes brought about by the SMP will affect exports from third countries. 
The model comprises systems of equations in which supply and demand are balanced for a base 
year using various simplifying assumptions about prices and the impact of QRs. This process of 
calibration can be done for any year for which the requisite data are available, although it follows 
that the relationships so described will reflect the circumstances ofthat base year. Clearly, if the 
base year is more remote from the year for which any simulation is to be done, the underlying 
structure it describes will be less likely to mirror reality, and it is for this reason that the model 
was calibrated for two years, 1988 and 1994. By departing from this 'base' case, the model can 
be used to simulate the effects of changes. This is achieved by varying relevant parameters or 
imposing restrictions. 
The next part of this chapter sets out the formal system of equations in the model and describes 
some of its properties. We then explain how the model was calibrated for the two years. Section 
16.3 describes how the simulations were carried out and presents an overview of the findings for 
the EC. The results of the simulations for individual Member States are then presented, followed 
by some sensitivity analysis. Concluding remarks complete the chapter. 
16.1. The model 
The model treats the product of each sector as homogeneous, that is to say it assumes perfect 
substitutability between domestically-produced and foreign-produced goods. This assumption 
greatly simplifies calibration of the model and is common in studies of this kind. Although 
perfect substitutability is a somewhat restrictive assumption, clothing and footwear are two 
sectors where it is not too unrealistic. 
While we treat each good as homogeneous, we distinguish between the various national 
markets in order to capture the effects of alterations in national restrictions. Although certain 
Member States have been more active in the use of Article 115 restrictions (see Table A.3 in 
the appendix), no distinction has been made between restricting and non-restricting Member 
States. The reasons for this are as follows. In the case of clothing, all Member States were 
subject to regional allocations. The highly disaggregated analysis of Chapter 15 combined 
with the problems involved in interpreting quota utilization ratios for individual Member 
States discussed in Section 15.3.1 meant that it was impossible to say whether or not quotas in 
aggregate had or had not been binding in different Member States. Furthermore, as Table A.4 
illustrates, most Member States appear to have made some use of Article 115 (only Greece 
and Portugal made no use). In the case of footwear, there is again a complex problem in 
distinguishing restricting from non-restricting Member States. As is explained in Section 
15.3.2, for the period from July 1988 to June 1990, VERs applied to imports from South 
Korea and Taiwan were restricted only in the French and Italian markets. However, from July 
1990 to December 1992, imports to all Member States from these countries were, in theory, 
quota constrained. The picture is further complicated by the fact that most Member States 
applied quotas on imports from state trading countries. 
Over the period 1980-90, there were 16 Article 115 acceptances covering trade in leather and 
footwear products for France, five for Ireland, four for Italy, four for Spain and one for the UK 
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(GATT, 1991). On this basis, a distinction might have been drawn between these countries 
and the rest in the case of footwear. However, the failure to use Article 115 need not imply 
unrestricted trade. For these reasons, it was considered more appropriate to treat all the 
Member States as restricting imports in both sectors. 
Trade is broken up into three country groupings: E, extra-EC exporters subject to restrictions; 
F, extra-EC exporters free of restrictions; and D, domestic (European) suppliers. For each 
Member State i we construct the following set of equations: 
Supply: 
0) 
(2) 
Sid _ 
SiE = 
a¡d 
a,E 
+ 
+ 
bidPid 
biEPiE 
(3) SiF = alF + bipPiF 
where S¡d is domestic supply to the z'th Member State, SJE is the export supply from quota-
constrained countries to the z'th Member State and S¡F is export supply from unconstrained 
countries to the z'th Member State. 
Pjd, PÍE and P¡F are the respective supply prices and b¡d, b¡E and b¡F are slope parameters derived 
using the respective supply elasticities. The elasticity of supply is the rate of change of supply 
with respect to price and can, therefore, be used to derive the b¡ parameters. Thus, if Es is the 
elasticity of supply, then 
Esi = bj.Pi/S, 
Demand: 
(4) Dj = q + di Pi 
where d¡ is derived from the price elasticity of demand in a similar manner to that described 
above for supply. If Ed is the elasticity of demand, then 
Edi = d,.Pi/Di 
Equilibrium condition: 
(5) Di = Sid + SiE + SiF 
Prices: 
(6) Pid = (1 +1) PiF 
(7) PiF = (1+qOPiE 
where t is the Common External Tariff (CET), and q¡ is the import-tariff equivalent of the 
quota applied by the z'th Member State to imports from constrained countries. Thus, while all 
exporters from the rest of the world sell their goods at the same price in the EC market, 
namely P lF (the domestic price, P¿d, less the CET), the price received by the quota-constrained 
Λ formal model and policy simulations 131 
countries contains an element of quota premium given by q¡ Thus, the price at which they 
would have been prepared to supply the EC market was PjE By contrast, unconstrained 
suppliers receive no quota rents, since the price at which they are prepared to supply the 
quantity in question is P¡F which is higher than P¡E. The logic behind this is illustrated by 
Figure B.l in the appendix. {Note: PÆ and P¡F here correspond to OPn in the figure if a zero 
rate of CET is assumed.) 
16.2. Model calibration 
Having established the logical structure of the model, the next stage is to assemble data for a 
base year in order to 'calibrate' so that it can then be used to simulate the effects of a major 
institutional change such as the SMP. Two different approaches can be adopted. The first is to 
calibrate the model for an early year as close as possible to the launching of the SMP, thereby 
capturing the world as it was, and to project forwards the policy changes under consideration. 
To this end, the model was first calibrated for 1988. However, the drawback of this approach 
is that it 'freezes' the levels of trade, output, consumption and prices at that time. No account 
is therefore taken of actual changes in these variables, whether as a direct result of the 
dynamic consequences of the SMP or consequent upon other influences on markets. The 
alternative approach is to calibrate the model for as late a year as possible and to run the policy 
simulations backwards. To resolve this, the model was calibrated to replicate the equilibrium 
of two separate years - 1988 (to capture the period before the SMP took effect) and 1994 (by 
which time most of the changes wrought by the SMP were in place). Counterfactual exercises 
were then performed to simulate the effects of different policy changes. 
Eurostat trade statistics were used to obtain the volume of imports from constrained (SJE) and 
unconstrained countries (S¡F) and the unit values of these imports were taken as proxies for the 
export supply prices (P¡E and PJF). Demand in an individual Member State (D¡) was taken to be 
apparent consumption and was derived from data on domestic production less total exports 
plus total imports (intra- and extra-EC). Again, this was based on Eurostat data. 
Values for the different elasticities needed to calibrate the model were drawn from previous 
empirical work. To our knowledge, estimates of the elasticity of demand for clothing for the 
EC as a whole do not exist. However, Deaton (1975) estimated the elasticity of demand for 
clothing for the UK economy at -1.086 and this was the value used by Greenaway (1985) in 
his study of the effects of VERs on clothing imports for the UK. This seems the best 
estimated value to use as other studies either combine clothing with textiles or footwear as a 
single sector (e.g. Batchelor and Minford, 1977) or relate to the United States (e.g. 
Houthakker, 1965). For footwear, Deaton (1975) estimated elasticity of demand for the UK 
economy at -0.25. Winters and Brenton (1991), in a more recent study of the effects of quotas 
applied to UK footwear imports, derived a value of-0.75. We have chosen to use the estimate 
in the more recent work of Winters and Brenton. It would seem reasonable to assume that the 
elasticities for other Member States are not vastly different. 
As is well known, supply elasticities are more problematic. The absence of any actual 
estimates means that most empirical work has had to make assumptions about the value. Thus, 
Greenaway and Hindley (1985) assumed values of domestic supply elasticity of 1 and 2 for 
both footwear and clothing. For clothing, Erzan, Goto and Holmes (1989) assumed an 
elasticity of 1.5 for domestic suppliers and 2.0 for both constrained and unconstrained 
developing-country suppliers. Winters (1992) uses elasticities of supply of aggregate EC sales 
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ranging from 2 to 5 for domestic suppliers and 2 to 10 for external suppliers, although he 
regards the lower end of the range as most plausible. Here, the approach adopted by Erzan, 
Goto and Holmes (1989) is followed, and we assume an elasticity of 1.5 for domestic supply 
and 2.0 for external supply. (A large importer such as the EU will face an upward sloping 
world supply curve, but world supply to the EU will be more elastic than domestic supply.) To 
assess the robustness of the results with respect to changes in the values of the elasticity 
parameters, sensitivity analysis has been used in both sectors (see Section 16.5, below.) 
A key variable in the model is the quota premium, since this reflects the degree of protection 
that is in place. The concept is, however, an abstract notion, rather than something that is 
easily measured, and must therefore be inferred. For clothing, the value of the quota premiums 
were taken from Hamilton (1990b). Hamilton used the market prices for import quotas traded 
in Hong Kong for clothing imports to derive the import-tariff equivalent (MTE) of the EC's 
quota restrictions on clothing imports for the period 1980-89. The MTE is given by the quota 
price divided by the unit value of imports expressed as a percentage. Hamilton calculated the 
MTE for four Member States, namely, West Germany, France, the UK and Denmark, at 13, 
12, 15 and 8% respectively for the year 1988 (see Appendix B, Table B.l). For the other 
Member States for which similarly calculated MTEs are not available, the difference between 
the unit value of their imports of clothing from Hong Kong and those of the Member State 
with the lowest MTE, Denmark, was used to infer an MTE - Denmark also had the lowest unit 
value of imports from Hong Kong. 
One might expect the Member States which were the most prolific users of Article 115 to have 
the highest quota premiums. This, however, was not always the case. France and Ireland have 
been the most active users of Article 115 in respect of clothing, but both had relatively low 
MTEs. However, unit values of imports may reflect quality differences between countries as 
well as the extent to which imports from third countries are restricted. Moreover, as Hamilton 
(1990b) has demonstrated and is discussed in Appendix Β of Part II, different MTEs may arise 
where the EC market is still fragmented by the existence of partner, as opposed to third-
country, NTBs. 
For footwear, it was not possible to determine MTEs in the same way as for clothing from 
observation of quota prices. Instead, we used estimates of the MTE for footwear imports to the 
UK as a guide and compared the unit value of UK imports with those of other Member States 
to obtain an individual quota premium for each Member State. Greenaway (1986) estimated 
the quota rent for UK imports of footwear from Taiwan in 1982 at 13%. In a later study, 
Winters and Brenton (1991) estimated that the 'price wedge' for UK imports of footwear from 
three countries (Poland, Taiwan and Korea) ranged from 16-28% over the period 1978-84. 
Since the figure for imports from Korea was significantly higher than for imports from Taiwan 
and seems generally higher for imports from state trading countries, it would seem appropriate 
to regard Greenaway's estimate as a minimum. We have therefore set the average MTE of 
QRs for the EC at 15%. Using the difference between the unit value of UK imports from 
Taiwan and those for other Member States, individual MTEs were obtained. This makes the 
assumption that the different Member States import broadly the same mix of footwear 
products, that there are only minimal differences in quality and that transport costs are broadly 
the same. None of these assumptions are wholly valid. However, it seems likely that whatever 
differences do exist, these are of not too great a magnitude. Moreover, in the case of footwear. 
Member State differences in the value of the MTE of quotas are less important than the value 
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of the average EC MTE, because the policy simulation involves the removal of all QRs not 
quota unification as for clothing. 
16.3. Simulations for the EU as a whole 
From the perspective of third countries, the critical question is how the SMP affects access to 
the EC market as a whole. Individual exporters (companies as well as countries) will, no 
doubt, have stronger contacts with some Member States than with others, and might 
consequently be concerned about how particular national markets will change. But in order to 
test the impact of the SMP in aggregate, we start by presenting findings for the EUR-12 as a 
whole for the two sectors. As noted above, the simulations based on the 1988 calibration 
'work forwards' by modelling the effect of introducing the SMP; those derived from the 1994 
calibration 'work backwards' by reimposing the restrictions that applied prior to the SMP. In 
this way, two perspectives on the changes are obtained. The counterfactual exercises consisted 
of removing or reintroducing quotas, or of moving from/to national to/from Community-wide 
quotas. The former is of greater interest for the footwear sector, while the latter is of more 
relevance for clothing. Together, these counterfactuals may be viewed as the two extreme 
cases. Any reduction in restrictions to trade, or indeed increases in quota utilization ratios 
which result from market integration, will result in changed conditions of market access 
somewhere between the two. 
16.3.1. Policy simulation results: clothing 
The essence of the changes brought in for clothing by the SMP is that separate national quotas 
are replaced by a single Community-wide quota. The effective removal of Article 115 
restrictions means that third-country suppliers are able to shift supplies between Member 
States so as to equalize the quota rent per unit of imports in all 11 markets. This forms the 
basis of the first simulation exercise in which it is assumed that the effect of the SMP is that 
national quotas are replaced with a Community-wide quota exactly equal to their sum. To 
model this, therefore, all Member States are assumed to have the same quota premium, so that 
the MTE is equalized in all markets, while the total volume of imports is held constant. A 
second simulation for clothing sought to approximate the effects of complete elimination of 
quotas, i.e. full liberalization. This was simulated by assuming that the quota premium 
disappears, so that there is no longer an MTE. Under this scenario, there are no longer any 
constrained suppliers to the EC market. Summary results of both simulations for the 1988 
calibration are shown in Table 16.1. The detailed workings of the model are included as 
Appendix D. 
The results of the SMP simulation are as one would expect: imports from constrained 
countries are redistributed within the Community from the less restrictive Member States to 
the more restrictive ones. At the same time producers in previously more protected markets 
lose while those in previously more open markets gain. Concurrently, some degree of price 
convergence takes place, with prices rising in the less restrictive countries and falling in the 
others. The EC as a whole benefits from this process, although the gains and losses are 
unevenly distributed both between Member States, and between consumers and producers. 
Additionally, constrained exporters gain by being able to sell to their preferred markets rather 
than being constrained by differing national quotas. This freedom to sell at the margin within 
the Community enables them to equalize their 'quota rents' (i.e. to make the optimal returns), 
thereby increasing their producer surplus. 
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The results presented here must, however, be interpreted as a lower bound on the benefits of 
the SMP. This is because the simulation does not allow for the process of integration to affect 
quota utilization ratios of constrained countries. As demonstrated in Chapter 15 of this report, 
there is evidence that the reduction of internal barriers to trade has benefited certain countries 
by allowing them to transfer unused portions of quotas in some Member States into other, 
more restrictive states. Quota utilization ratios for the Community as a whole could, therefore, 
be expected to rise. Although we found evidence of this in half of the restricted countries that 
we examined, we do not have any estimates for the magnitude of this effect for restricted 
countries as a whole. To the extent that this process occurs, the market share of imports from 
these countries can be expected to rise, reinforcing the welfare effects. 
Table 16.1. Policy simulation results: clothing, 1988 
Imports from constrained countries 
Imports from unconstrained countries 
Domestic supply to European market 
Total demand 
Changes in: 
Total consumer surplus 
Domestic producer surplus 
Net change in welfare 
(1,000 tonnes) 
(million ECU) 
(million ECU) 
Original calibration 
501 
316 
1,702 
2.519 
Policy simulation 1 
(completion of the 
single market) 
501 
316 
1,702 
2,519 
23 
-2 
21 
Policy simulation 2 
(complete 
liberalization of 
trade) 
603 
303 
1,661 
2.568 
1.010 
-590 
420 
Evidently, the magnitude of benefits arising from liberalization of trade is much greater. 
According to our policy simulations, exports from constrained countries would rise by 20%, 
while domestic supply and imports from unconstrained countries fall. Interestingly, imports 
from unconstrained countries fall by relatively more than domestic supply. However, the 
orders of magnitude are small: 4% and 2% respectively. 
Calibrating the model for 1994 and running the policy simulations backwards gives changes of 
much the same relative magnitude. In this case, the counterfactual assumed that the 1988 
differences in Member State MTEs were restored, giving the same average MTE rate but with 
individual differences. The results presented in Table 16.2 show that reverting to national QRs 
instead of the Community-wide regime would only have a marginal impact on the welfare 
variables. Full liberalization of trade would, however, result in quite substantial gains in 
exports for constrained countries. 
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Table 16.2. Policy simulation results: clothing, 1994 
Imports from constrained countries 
Imports from unconstrained countries 
Domestic supply to European market 
Total demand 
Changes in: 
Total consumer surpl us 
Domestic producer surplus 
Net change in welfare 
(1.000 tonnes) 
(million ECU) 
(million ECU) 
Original calibration 
1.057 
546 
2.081 
3,684 
Policy simulation 1 
(reintroduction of 
national quotas) 
1.057 
546 
2.081 
3.684 
-77 
1 
-76 
Policy simulation 2 
(complete 
liberalization of 
trade) 
1,255 
515 
2,016 
3,785 
2.020 
-901 
1,120 
16.3.2. Policy simulation results: footwear 
For footwear, the model calibrated for 1988 is used to simulate the effects of complete quota 
liberalization. In fact, quotas have not been entirely removed: certain imports of footwear from 
China are still subject to quota restraint. However, compared to the position prevailing in 
1988, there has been a significant movement towards complete quota liberalization. The 
results of the 1988 calibration and counterfactuals are presented in Table 16.3. 
Table 16.3. Policy simulation results: footwear, 1988 
Imports from constrained countries 
Imports from unconstrained countries 
Domestic supply to European market 
Total demand 
Changes in: 
Total consumer surplus 
Domestic producer surplus 
Net change in welfare 
(1,000 tonnes) 
(million ECU) 
(million ECU) 
Origi nal calibration 
164 
100 
737 
1,000 
Policy simulation (complete liberalization of 
trade) 
205 
96 
715 
1,016 
253 
-200 
54 
In this case, the combination of import liberalization and completion of the single market have 
a much greater impact. Prices fall in all Member States (by an unweighted average of 2.4%), 
while the volume of imports to the Community rises by 25%. Again, the Community as a 
whole benefits as a result, although European producers of footwear lose out. Exports from 
unconstrained countries fall by almost 10%, while European production falls by 3%. Again, 
there is a redistribution of supply between Member States. However, as discussed in Section 
16.1, it is of less significance in this case since data on national MTEs are less accurate. These 
effects are in any case small relative to the overall changes. 
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As for clothing, in the 1994 simulation we reintroduced the MTE rates prevailing in 1988. In 
this case, the group of constrained supplier countries has changed, so the results are not 
directly comparable. Between 1988 and 1994, restrictions were lifted on all previously 
restricted countries, but were introduced for China. Therefore, in the 1994 calibration, China is 
the only restricted country, with the previously constrained countries now falling in the 
'unconstrained' category. This means that reintroducing the 1988 MTEs is not the 'mirror 
image' of the forward simulation from the 1988 calibration. To facilitate comparison, the 
share of these countries' imports is also calculated. 
The reintroduction of restrictions on previously constrained suppliers would benefit both 
Chinese and European suppliers, while exports from the countries which were subject to 
restraints in 1988 fall by 23% (Table 16.4). This restoration of pre-SMP quota restrictions 
would, therefore, have a much smaller impact than the liberalization simulation based on the 
1988 calibration. This reflects the fact that although, unlike clothing, aggregate imports into 
the EC footwear market did not change greatly between 1988 and 1994, there were significant 
shifts between partner countries, with China, especially, coming to the fore (see Chapter 13 of 
the report). 
Table 16.4. Policy simulation results: footwear, 1994 
(1.000 tonnes) 
Imports from constrained countries 
Imports from unconstrained countries 
Domestic supply to European 
Total demand 
Changes in:,) 
Total consumer surplus 
Domestic producer surplus 
Net change in welfare 
market 
(million ECU) 
(million ECU) 
Original calibration 
143 
355 
of which, previously constrained 
producers form 63% 
713 
1,211 
Policy simulation (reintroduction of 
national quotas) 
146 
329 
of which, previously constrained 
producers form 47% 
726 
1.200 
-200 
+ 130 
-70 
16.4. Effects on Member States 
The simulations for a shift from national to Community-wide QRs leave the aggregate level of 
EC imports from third countries unchanged, but result in a redistribution between Member 
States. It should be noted, however, that these simulations assume that quotas are fully utilized, 
so that if the switch to a Community-wide restriction alters the degree to which quotas are taken 
up, there would be a separate effect on total imports. Full liberalization, predictably, increases 
the level of imports from previously restricted countries in all Member States. 
16.4.1. Clothing 
The Member States differ in the degree to which they imposed protection through quotas on 
clothing imports. This is captured in the values for MTEs, with above average levels in the UK 
and Spain, but below average for Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium/Luxembourg. 
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Table 16.5. Effects of move from national to Community-wide QRs for clothing 
(% change from 1988 calibration of the model) 
France 
Belgium/Lux. 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Creece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Restricted imports 
-1.18 
-6.20 
-4.82 
0.41 
0.46 
3.19 
-6.03 
-5.55 
2.13 
-4.61 
2.23 
Unrestricted 
imports 
0.08 
0.40 
1.83 
-0.09 
-0.05 
-0.85 
0.58 
2.94 
-0.15 
0.21 
-0.05 
Domestic 
production 
0.06 
0.30 
1.38 
-0.07 
-0.04 
-0.64 
0.44 
2.21 
-0.11 
0.16 
-0.04 
Domestic demand 
-0.05 
-0.22 
-1.00 
0.05 
0.03 
0.46 
-0.32 
-1.60 
0.08 
-0.11 
0.03 
Domestic price 
0.04 
0.20 
0.92 
-0.05 
-0.02 
-0.43 
0.29 
1.47 
-0.08 
0.10 
-0.03 
Table 16.5 summarizes the consequences of moving from separate national QRs to a 
Community-wide QR, based on the 1988 calibration. Imports from exporting countries subject 
to restrictions would fall most in Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark, to be 
redistributed principally to the UK and Spain. The effects on domestic production would be 
minimal, although some redistribution of supply between national markets would occur, the 
largest loss of market share taking place in the UK, with gains occurring in the Danish and 
Dutch markets. On the whole, the effects on unrestricted exporters would also be small, with 
loss of market in the UK, and gains principally in the Netherlands and Denmark. Price changes 
would also be small. 
Table 16.6. Effects of reverting from a Community-wide QR to pre-SMP national QRs 
for clothing 
France 
Belgium/Lux. 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Restricted imports 
1.57 
6.44 
3.93 
0.00 
0.00 
-2.58 
6.31 
4.36 
-1.54 
5.37 
-1.66 
Unrestricted 
imports 
-0.22 
-0.87 
-3.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.91 
-0.99 
-4.68 
0.22 
-0.08 
0.09 
(% change fi-om 1994 calibration of the model) 
Domestic 
production 
-0.16 
-0.65 
-2.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.69 
-0.74 
-3.51 
0.16 
-0.06 
0.07 
Domestic demand 
0.12 
0.47 
1.79 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.50 
0.54 
2.54 
-0.12 
0.05 
-0.05 
Domestic price 
-0.11 
-0.43 
-1.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.46 
-0.50 
-2.34 
0.11 
-0.04 
0.05 
Table 16.6 shows the consequences of reverting to national restrictions on clothing imports, 
based on the 1994 calibration of the model. This means that the 1988 MTEs are restored, but 
the changes from the base calibration shown in the table reflect the magnitudes of key 
variables as they were in 1994, rather than 1988. Clothing imports, overall, grew substantially 
between 1988 and 1994, albeit at different rates for different Member States. For this reason, 
the size of the changes is not a mirror image of those shown in Table 16.5. 
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If full liberalization of clothing imports were to occur, previously restricted exporters to the 
EC market would gain significantly. Table 16.7 summarizes the effect of such a change which 
would result in price falls and demand increases to varying degrees in all Member States. 
Sales by restricted exporters would rise by up to a quarter, offset by more modest reductions in 
both domestic production and sales by unrestricted exporters. 
Table 16.7. Full liberalization of clothing imports 
France 
Belgium/Lux. 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Restricted imports 
22.49 
22.57 
13.35 
18.40 
21.34 
18.57 
22.08 
11.75 
22.43 
25.54 
24.47 
Unrestricted 
imports 
-3.11 
-3.04 
-11.20 
-6.73 
-4.13 
-6.58 
-3.47 
-12.61 
-3.16 
-0.40 
-1.36 
(% 
Domestic 
production 
-2.33 
-2.28 
-8.40 
-5.05 
-3.10 
-4.93 
-2.60 
-9.46 
-2.37 
-0.30 
-1.02 
change from ¡994 calibration of the model) 
Domestic demand 
1.69 
1.65 
6.08 
3.65 
2.24 
3.57 
1.88 
6.85 
1.72 
0.22 
0.74 
Domestic price 
-1.55 
-1.52 
-5.60 
-3.36 
-2.06 
-3.29 
-1.73 
-6.30 
-1.58 
-0.20 
-0.68 
16.4.2. Footwear 
Because the footwear MTEs are assumed to be uniform in the model, the variations between 
Member States are lesser than were found for clothing. Such variations as there are are 
attributable, instead, to differing structures of supply. As Table 16.8 shows, the elimination of 
barriers, based on the 1988 calibration, results in substantial increases in market access for 
restricted countries to all EC Member States. These are offset by smaller reductions in the 
sales of domestic producers and previously unconstrained exporters to the EC. Consumers 
gain from price reductions averaging just under 2.0% 
In the 1994 calibration for footwear, China is the only country with restricted exports. By 
reintroducing quota restrictions for other exporters, China benefits, which is the reason that 
most Member States actually increase their imports from restricted countries in this 
simulation. EU producers also gain, as can be seen in Table 16.9. By contrast, those exporters 
which, in 1994, were part of the unconstrained group lose as a result of MTEs being 
reintroduced. 
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Table 16.8. Liberalization of footwear imports 
France 
Belgium/I.ux. 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Restricted imports 
24.40 
27.79 
23.23 
27.57 
19.99 
26.37 
30.82 
25.13 
24.18 
27.18 
31.31 
Unrestricted 
imports 
-4.48 
-5.09 
-5.35 
-4.09 
-5.78 
-3.16 
-1.31 
-5.30 
-3.19 
-1.68 
-2.03 
(% 
Domestic 
production 
-3.36 
-3.82 
-4.01 
-3.07 
-4.34 
-2.37 
-0.98 
-3.98 
-2.40 
-1.26 
-1.52 
change from 1988 calibration of the model) 
Domestic demand 
1.68 
1.91 
2.01 
1.53 
2.17 
1.18 
0.49 
1.99 
1.20 
0.63 
0.76 
Domestic price 
-2.24 
-2.54 
-2.67 
-2.04 
-2.89 
-1.58 
-0.65 
-2.65 
-1.60 
-0.84 
-1.02 
Table 16.9. Reimposition of quotas for footwear 
(% change from 1994 calibration of the model) 
France 
Belgium/Lux. 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Restricted imports 
1.80 
-1.17 
4.06 
0.86 
7.42 
1.74 
0.68 
0.51 
2.33 
1.20 
-1.09 
Unrestricted 
imports 
-7.16 
-6.52 
-7.05 
-9.84 
-7.99 
-4.38 
-9.82 
-6.14 
-5.50 
-3.19 
-7.09 
Domestic 
production 
1.05 
1.55 
2.62 
2.16 
3.22 
1.30 
2.04 
1.21 
0.31 
0.31 
1.57 
Domestic demand 
-0.53 
-0.77 
-1.31 
-1.08 
-1.61 
-0.65 
-1.02 
-0.60 
-0.15 
-0.15 
-0.78 
Domestic price 
0.70 
1.03 
1.75 
1.44 
2.15 
0.87 
1.36 
0.80 
0.20 
0.21 
1.05 
16.5. Sensitivity analysis 
Because estimation of supply and demand elasticities would have been well beyond the scope of 
the present study, the values for these parameters estimated in previous similar work were used. 
This could, conceivably, have biased the results. To test for such a bias, sensitivity analysis was 
carried out to explore the effects of using alternative parameter values. This exercise substituted 
values of-0.5 (instead of-1.075 for clothing and -0.75 for footwear) for the demand elasticity 
and of 1 and 0.75 for the supply elasticities (instead of 2.0), and the effects on the change in key 
variables was then scrutinized. Table 16.10 summarizes these results for clothing, showing the 
percentage difference in the change from the base calibration of the model. 
The base case here is our original calibration of the model. The elasticities used are 1.5 for 
domestic supply and 2 for foreign supply. The elasticity of domestic demand is assumed to be 
-1.086 in the case of clothing, and -0.75 in the case of footwear. Case A estimates the effects 
of changing the supply elasticities to 1 and 0.75 for foreign and domestic suppliers 
respectively, while leaving the demand elasticity unchanged. Case Β is a change in the demand 
elasticity to a lower level of-0.5, but with the supply elasticities as in the original calibrations. 
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Here we present the change in imports from constrained supplier countries, as this is the key 
variable of interest. 
These experiments indicate that the results are not, in fact, especially sensitive to the choices of 
demand elasticities, but that the gains for third-country exporters will tend to be lower, although 
of the same sign, if supply elasticities are low. Thus, for the direction of change, the findings can 
be accepted with confidence, but the magnitudes will depend on the supply elasticities. This does 
not rule out the possibility that implausibly different elasticities would result in bigger 
differences, but it also has to be borne in mind that the elasticities used are consistent with past 
research, and this, too, supports the plausibility of the simulation results. 
Table 16.10. Sensitivity analysis: clothing, 1988 
Imports from constrained countries 
Importing country 
France 
Belgium/Lux. 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
EC total 
Policy 
h 
base case* 
(tonnes) 
54.069 
9,810 
46,703 
194.851 
361,32 
134.136 
2.227 
19,611 
445 
173 
3,348 
501,505 
simulation 1 (quota 
armoniza tion) 
case a** case b*** 
(percentage change from 
base case) 
-0.6 
-3.2 
-2.3 
0.2 
0.2 
1.4 
-3.1 
-2.5 
1.0 
-2.4 
1.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Policy simulation 2 (complete 
liberalization of trade) 
base case 
(tonnes) 
66.879 
12.217 
55,310 
23,4187 
44,342 
159.832 
2,756 
22,875 
549 
215 
4.168 
603,330 
case a case b 
(percentage change from 
base case) 
8.9 
7.0 
5.0 
8.0 
9.1 
8.5 
6.8 
3.9 
10.0 
7.9 
10.6 
7.9 
0.4 
0.3 
1.2 
1.1 
0.6 
1.5 
0.4 
1.3 
0.5 
0.2 
0.2 
1.1 
* base case: elasticity of domestic supply = 1.5; elasticity of foreign supply = 2: elasticity of domestic demand = -1.086 
** case a: elasticities of supply changed to 0.75 for domestic suppliers and 1 for foreign suppliers 
*** case b: elasticity of demand changed to -0.5 
The sensitivity analysis for clothing shows that changing the demand elasticity has virtually no 
effect. A lower supply elasticity does, however, mean that exporters are less able to meet an 
increase in demand, with the result that the gains to third countries from full liberalization are 
less pronounced. Similar results are, unsurprisingly, obtained for footwear, as summarized in 
Table 16.11. The effect of changing elasticities in the simulation which looks at the effect of 
switching from national to Community-wide QRs is much more marginal. This is because the 
magnitude of the policy effect is, itself, pretty modest. 
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Table 16.11. Sensitivity analysis: footwear, 1988 
Imports from constrained countries 
Importing country 
France 
Belgium/Eux. 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
EC total 
Policy simulation: Complete liberalization of trade 
base case* 
(tonnes) 
43.841 
8.493 
16,241 
50.673 
31.287 
38.988 
1.005 
5.313 
3,369 
154 
5.627 
204.990 
case a** case b*** 
(percentage change from base case) 
9.3 
10.3 
8.8 
10.4 
7.7 
10.1 
11.6 
9.5 
9.4 
10.5 
11.7 
9.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
0.4 
0.6 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.5 
* base caserelasticity of domestic supply = 1.5; elasticity of foreign supply = 2; elasticity of domestic demand : 
** case a: elasticities of supply changed to 0.75 for domestic suppliers and 1 for foreign suppliers 
*** case b: elasticity of demand changed to -0.5 
-0.75 
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17. Conclusions and policy implications 
Although the main thrust of the SMP was always to liberalize markets, there were bound to be 
concerns in third countries that access to the EC market would become more difficult as the 
single market was consolidated. There are three main routes by which the SMP might have made 
access more difficult: by diverting demand from third countries to partner countries; by creating 
a more dynamic EC economy such that European producers gain in competitiveness; and by 
translating national quantitative restrictions on imports (QRs) into Community barriers that 
restrain imports more effectively. Part II of this study was concerned exclusively with the third of 
these and has, therefore, sought to assess whether or not the move away from QRs imposed by 
Member States has altered market access. 
To do so, the study has explored the quantitative impact of the SMP on two sectors in which the 
SMP has had a direct effect on the trade regime. The first, clothing, has seen a switch from, 
largely, Member State based QRs to a Community-wide restriction on certain major exporters to 
the EC. Previously, the Member State constraints on clothing imports had been supported by the 
use of Article 115 authorizations to prevent single movement of the goods. Now, although 
Article 115 remains in place (although its new wording appears to give the Commission more 
power to prevent national measures), it has become virtually unenforceable because 
implementation of the SMP has all but eliminated internal customs checks. This has seen the 
number of Article 115 authorizations dwindle to a trickle, itself an indication of the effects of the 
SMP. In footwear, the second sector examined, the change has been to abolish QRs, except for 
the imposition of a Community-wide restriction on China, the exporter with the third largest 
market share in 1990, but which is now the leading supplier. Other exporters now enjoy 
unfettered access. 
The emphatic conclusion of the study is that far from curbing market access, the SMP has led to 
a steady improvement in the access that third countries enjoy to Community markets. In the 
process, third-country penetration of the EC market has grown sharply. At the same time, 
domestic production in both industries has declined, with very substantial falls in some Member 
States. On its own, this evidence of relative growth in third-country exports to the EC, although a 
strong pointer, cannot unequivocally be attributed to the SMP, because other influences such as 
anticipation of the Uruguay Round changes in the commercial policy regime or, indeed, 
underlying shifts in competitiveness will play a part. 
However, the different empirical exercises undertaken in the course of this study all provide 
complementary evidence that the changes engendered by the SMP have led to an easing of 
restrictions. Collectively, they enable a convincing case to be made that, at least in the two 
sectors studied, the SMP has made it easier for third countries to export to the EU. This 
conclusion does not preclude the possibility that the stimulus that completion of the single 
market is expected to give to the underlying competitiveness of EC industry may, in time, see 
indigenous producers regain market share, although in the two industries in question this must be 
considered unlikely. 
Although there are bound to be idiosyncrasies in the circumstances of the two sectors studied, the 
findings of this study can, with some reservation, be extrapolated to other sectors where similar 
SMP induced changes take place. Where the SMP leads, as in footwear, to the abolition of 
national QRs, the expectation must be that this will give a boost to market access for third 
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countries. To the extent that QRs can be seen as symptomatic of a perceived lack of 
competitiveness of indigenous industry, it would, therefore, be expected that sectors in the EU 
which lose such protection as a result of the SMP will see indigenous producers experience a fall 
in market share. 
The replacement of national QRs by Community-wide restrictions cannot be so easily predicted. 
In principle, a simple translation of national QRs into a Community-wide QR redistributes 
imports from previously unrestricted to previously restricted Member States, raising prices in the 
former, and lowering them in the latter. But, as the analysis of quota utilization shows, a static 
comparison of 'before' and 'after' with changed rules may understate the impact of the SMP by 
neglecting the consequences of changes in the rules. What seems to have happened is that as the 
'1992' deadlines for single market liberalization approached, some quotas became more fully 
used, even though few were found to be firmly binding. One explanation for this is that exporters 
appear to have taken advantage of the increased flexibility provisions as a way of circumventing 
remaining national restrictions. Thus, a significant increase in the volume of exports was 
possible without breaching QRs. It can be argued further that anticipation of the single market 
might induce exporters to maintain high utilization rates because the unwinding of intra-EC 
border controls would make monitoring less feasible. 
Simulations using the partial equilibrium model set out in the preceding chapter indicate how the 
SMP has affected the supply and price of imports from third countries. As would be expected, 
unilateral abolition of QRs leads to a jump in extra-EC imports with a fall in price, so that third-
country exporters benefit from increased sales while consumers' 'surplus' is increased. When 
national QRs are replaced by Community-wide measures, the outcome still leaves extra-EC 
imports slightly higher in some Member States, because the main impact is to redistribute supply 
from extra-EC exporters. 
Although the simulation which looks at the replacement of national QRs by a Community-wide 
QR does not, on its own, suggest any change in aggregate market access because of the 
assumption that the new QR is exactly equal to the sum of the national ones, the key question is 
whether the change allows third country exporters to use their quotas more fully. In this regard, 
the evidence from the quota utilization exercise that, on the whole, the SMP has coincided with 
fuller utilization of quotas suggests that market access has improved a little because of the shift 
away from national QRs. One reason may be the simplification of administrative procedures 
which means that rather than having to orchestrate indirect access to specific regional markets by 
various forms of quota-shifting, the exporter has a clear entitlement to the overall EC market. 
The modelling exercise is, however, subject to the limitations of the technique; in particular, it 
does not allow for the fact that as quota utilization rates increase because of more flexible terms 
for carry forward and other means of'stretching' quotas, the effectiveness of quotas diminishes. 
Since this appears to have happened, the model results understate the true gains in market access 
for third countries. If, however, a Community-wide QR were to be operated more stringently, 
with strictly enforced rules, it is conceivable that a switch from national QRs to a Community-
wide regime might become more restrictive for third countries. However, the weight of evidence 
is against such an interpretation, and the spirit of the SMP seems, moreover, to have encouraged 
a generally more liberal trade regime. Given that this will be reinforced by the GATT/WTO 
agreements that are coming into force, the outlook for third countries' access to the single market 
should continue to be favourable. 
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APPENDIX A 
The effects of the single market programme 
The single market programme has affected market access conditions for third-country 
suppliers in a variety of ways. The aspect of this process with which this study is primarily 
concerned is the elimination of quotas applied to third-country imports and which have a 
specifically national application and/or their conversion into EC-wide measures. Although 
Articles 110 to 115 of the Treaty of Rome contain clear provisions for a common commercial 
policy, various (mainly quantitative) restrictions (QRs) on imports from third countries 
continued to operate at Member State level prior to the elimination of internal borders and 
despite progress made in other areas. These took the form of both unilaterally imposed quotas 
and voluntary export restraints (VERs) which Member States had negotiated with third 
countries. Because of the possibilities which this created for third-country suppliers subject to 
such restrictions to deflect trade through a Member State where no restrictions applied, Article 
115 allowed a Member State at any time to request authorization from the Commission to 
intervene temporarily at internal frontiers and suspend such products from Community 
treatment. More precisely, any Member State wishing to impose restrictions on intra-area trade 
under these provisions was required to make an application to the European Commission 
setting out the intended duration of such restrictions. The Commission had the task of 
considering each application on an individual basis and granting the necessary approval before 
such measures could be enacted. 
Although Article 115 still exists, it is clear that its provisions cannot realistically be enforced 
now that border controls have been removed. The approach of the single market has therefore 
necessitated that these QRs either be abolished altogether or replaced with EC-wide 
restrictions. Shortly after the launching of the SMP, the Commission, with the authority of the 
Council, adopted a programme for the completion of the common commercial policy. This 
provided for the gradual elimination of all remaining national QRs and/or their replacement 
with measures applied only at the Community-wide level. In addition, the measures provided 
for the establishment of a new computerized system for operating at an EC-wide level any 
QRs that it was deemed desirable to retain. At an internal level, this was to entail a 
progressively stricter application of Article 115 as the date for the removal of internal borders 
approached. Thus, between 1987 and 1992, the number of protective measures authorized 
under Article 115 fell from 157 to 6. At the same time, the number of intra-Community 
surveillance measures fell from 1,300 to 4. As of 1 July 1992, no textile or clothing products 
were any longer subject to Article 115 measures. In fact, the only industrial products which 
remained subject to such measures were cars and motorcycles (CEC, 1992b). 
At the external level, for certain products then subject to voluntary export restraint or other 
similar bilaterally negotiated arrangements, provisions were made for new EC-wide VERs to 
replace the existing national ones. Thus, in July 1991, a 'consensus' was reached with the 
Japanese authorities for the regulation of imports of Japanese motor vehicles from 1993 
onwards. Under this consensus, all national import restrictions on such imports were to cease 
with effect from 1 January 1993, and Article 115 measures were no longer to be applied. At 
the same time, Japan agreed to monitor the growth of its vehicle exports to the EC as a whole 
and to the five Member States which were at that time applying restrictions for a transitional 
period lasting up until the end of 1999 when the EC market would become fully liberalized. 
146 External access to European markets 
In the case of textiles and clothing, existing bilateral quotas were in part governed by the 
Multifibre Arrangement, the future of which was dependent upon the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. MF A4 was due to expire in July 1991, but was 
extended for a further three and a half years to allow time for the Uruguay Round to be 
concluded. In October 1993, new EC-wide quotas replaced the existing bilateral quotas but 
with no provisions for regional allocations of quotas as in the past (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3030/93). The new agreement allows the Commission to re-establish regional quotas valid 
for three years should 'excessive concentration' of exports 'disturb markets' in individual 
Member States. However, it remains unclear how such quotas could be enforced in the 
absence of any border controls. In the case of footwear, also, EC-wide measures in part 
replaced national restrictions. In July 1990, on the authority of the Council, imports of 
footwear from Taiwan and South Korea, which had previously been subject to restriction in 
France and Italy only now became subject to an EC-wide self-restraint agreement 
accompanied by prior import surveillance (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1735/90). The 
arrangement lasted up until the end of 1992, whereupon it was allowed to expire. It should be 
pointed out that, under the new Safeguards Agreement reached as part of the Uruguay Round, 
all WTO Member States are required to phase out all existing 'grey-area measures' such as 
voluntary export restraints within a period of four years with effect from 1 January 1995, or 
bring such measures into conformity with the Agreement. However, every Member State was 
allowed to retain one such measure for a further 12 months to the end of 1999. The EC has 
named its voluntary export restraint agreement with Japan covering automobiles as the 
exception. 
In respect of products subject to unilaterally imposed national quotas (the so-called 
'autonomous measures'), these were either abolished altogether or replaced with EC-wide 
measures. Some of these measures were eliminated ahead of the removal of internal borders as 
part of other liberalization measures. For example, many quotas previously applied to the 
former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe disappeared following the signing of 
various trade and co-operation agreements with these countries and then with the enactment of 
the Europe Agreements providing for these countries to become EC associates. Some quotas 
were also eliminated in the course of the Uruguay Round as a gesture of unilateral 
liberalization. Finally, in March 1994 the Council announced the elimination of a further 
6,700 national restrictions on a wide variety of different products. On products which still 
remained subject to restriction (mainly, imports from China), Community quotas replaced 
national measures. On 6 March 1995, the latter were revised upwards to take account of the 
accession of new members and to provide for an element of liberalization. 
Table 14.1 in the main text sets out a detailed summary of recent changes in EU legislation 
which have affected market access. 
A.l. The import regime for clothing 
EC trade with the rest of the world is subject to a wide variety of different kinds of restraints. 
Firstly, imports from outside the EC are subject to the Common External Tariff (CET). 
Immediately prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the simple and weighted average 
MFN tariffs on imports of textiles and clothing were 10.1 and 7.6% respectively, with a range 
from 0 to 17%. For clothing, the average was 13% and 13.2% respectively, with a range from 
0 to 14% (GATT, 1991). As in most industrial countries, this represented quite a high level of 
tariffs compared with other sectors. A variety of different groups of countries enjoy tariff-free 
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entry under the EC's preferential regime. Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
all GSP-eligible developing countries enjoy duty-free access within tariff quotas/tariff ceilings. 
Mediterranean countries with trade or association agreements with the EC enjoy tariff-free 
preferential treatment generally with no quantitative limits, although in a few cases 
administrative co-operation exists to avoid disruption of the EC market. Finally, ACP 
countries also enjoy tariff-free treatment with no limitations. 
Table A.l. Suppliers of textiles and clothing products with bilateral agreements or 
arrangements with the European Union, 1 January 1995 
MFA Agreements 
ASEAN 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
SOUTH ASIA 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh* 
FAR EAST 
Hong Kong 
Republic of Korea 
Macao 
China 
LATIN AMERICA 
Argentina 
Peru 
Brazil 
Uruguay* 
Columbia* 
Guatemala* 
Mexico* 
MFA-type Agreements 
Albania 
Armenia* 
Azerbaijan* 
Belarus 
Georgia* 
Kazakhstan* 
Kyrgyzstan* 
Moldova* 
Russian Federation 
Tajikistan* 
Turkmenistan* 
Uzbekistan 
Ukraine 
Mongolia 
Vietnam 
Estonia* 
Latvia* 
Lithuania* 
Slovenia* 
Preferential Arrangements 
Mediterranean countries 
Egypt 
Turkey 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Malta 
Europe Agreements 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Autonomous Arrangements 
Chinese Taipei 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Croatia 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
People's Democratic 
Republic of Korea 
* No restrictions imposed. 
Source: GATT, 1995. 
Secondly, imports from certain supplier countries are subject to bilaterally negotiated, 
quantitative limits under the Mult ¡fibre Arrangement (MFA). As noted above, the last MFA 
agreement (MFA4) was scheduled to run from 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1991 but was 
extended up to the date of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (i.e. end-1994). (The 
agreement with China ran from 1 January 1988 because China joined the MFA after the 
signing of MFA4.) Within the framework of MF A4, the EC negotiated 19 bilateral agreements 
to restrain imports of textile products (down from 23 under MFA3). The 19 countries were 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand (ASEAN); India, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka (South Asia); Argentina, Peru and Brazil (Latin America); Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania (Eastern Europe) and Hong Kong, South Korea, Macao, and China (Far 
East). In addition, there were four further agreements which involved an 'exchange of letters' 
but did not provide for restraint or the possibility of introducing restraints and two agreements 
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providing for the possibility of restraints in the case of real risk or market disruption. Table 
A.l lists the exporting countries subject to MFA Agreements on 1 January 1995. 
In each agreement, the restraints on individual products are determined. In addition, three 
different kinds of flexibility provisions allowed exporters to exceed their quotas for any 
particular product category in any given year. 'Carry-over' allowed an exporter to use the 
under-utilized portions of a quota for any one year in the following year. 'Carry-inward' 
permitted in any one year advance drawing against next year's quota for a particular product. 
Finally, 'swing' made possible the transfer of free parts of a quota from one product category 
to another. In most agreements, swing was available for up to 7% of a quota level; in other 
agreements (with dominant suppliers and East European countries), it was limited to 4%. 
Carry-over was usually limited to 7% of an individual quota. In the case of dominant suppliers 
(Korea, Hong Kong and Macao), consultations were to be held when 2% was reached. In the 
case of carry-forward, the corresponding shares were 5% and 1% respectively. Agreements 
with the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania contained provisions on 
prices (price clauses). In these cases, consultations could be requested by the EC if a textile 
product was imported at an abnormally low price. In extreme cases, the EC could temporarily 
suspend imports of the products concerned until a mutually acceptable solution was reached. 
However, these provisions do not appear ever to have been applied. 
The individual agreements under MF A4 contained undertakings on the part of the EC not to 
resort to Article 3 of the MFA or Article XIX of the GATT, although the EC may still avail 
itself of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures (see below). Categories which were not 
restrained were subject to 'basket exit mechanisms' whereby, if imports of a given country 
reached a specified share of total imports, consultations might be held with a view to 
introducing mutually agreed limitations. The 'trigger levels' varied across five groups of 
countries and three product groups. If no agreement was reached, the EC could impose 
restrictions unilaterally according to a prescribed formula. EC action required the prior assent 
of Member States to a Commission proposal in the context of the EC Textile Committee. By 
July 1989, the exit mechanism had been applied 27 times to impose new restrictions. One out 
of four basket exits was EC-wide, as against one out of 20 under MF A3 (GATT, 1991). 
Substantial differences existed among the MFA bilateral agreements as to the number of 
restrained product categories. In the case of large suppliers, there were up to 40 restrictions. In 
the case of smaller suppliers, there were only one or two. The EC quantitative limits were 
allocated among the Member States. There were also cases where individual quantitative 
limits were applied without an EC-wide limit. Most MFA quotas were set for two or three 
years, after which they could be modified (European Economy, 1993). On 1 January 1995, the 
EC's bilateral agreements negotiated under the MFA were superseded by the provisions of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). (The MFA bilateral agreement 
with China will continue until it becomes a member of the WTO when the ATC will apply.) 
Including China, there are now 15 MFA agreements (the original 19 less the 4 East European 
countries which now have association agreements). As noted above, the new bilateral MFA 
agreements have no provisions for regional allocation of quotas among Member States which 
would anyhow be largely unenforceable, but do include provisions which would allow the 
Commission to re-establish regional quotas valid for three years should excessive 
concentration of exports disturb markets in individual Member States. On 1 January 1995, 
MFA quotas were adjusted to take account of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to 
the EC. Quotas were increased on the basis of either actual 1993 imports into the three new 
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Member States or, whenever higher, an averaging formula linked to EUR-12 imports of the 
affected product categories from suppliers restrained in the EC. 
In addition to the MFA Agreements, the EC has entered into various kinds of MFA-type 
agreements with certain non-MFA participants. Thus, the EC had an MFA-type agreement 
with the former Soviet Union which took effect on 1 January 1990 and covered all MFA 
products. When the USSR broke up, all restrictions contained in the bilateral agreements were 
attributed on a cumulative basis and by agreement to the new independent states, with the 
exception of the Baltic states, for whom individual surveillance for each country was 
introduced. Bulgaria was similarly subject to an MFA-type agreement. In 1993, the EC 
replaced several unilateral, autonomous regimes (see below) vis-à-vis non-GATT contracting 
parties with bilateral agreements. These included Vietnam, Mongolia, and the former members 
of the Soviet Union. Table A.l, above, lists the countries subject to MFA-type agreements on 
1 January 1995. 
Thirdly, imports from certain countries, mainly the former and still existing state-trading 
countries, have been subject to unilaterally-imposed, autonomous restrictions. EC regulations 
provide for imports from state-trading countries being subject to quantitative restrictions at 
Member State level applied on a yearly basis (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3420/83). In the 
case of some countries which had concluded MFA or MFA-type agreements with the EC, the 
autonomous regime applied only to categories not covered by the bilateral agreements and to 
outward processing traffic (OPT) (see below). Following negotiations with the Central and 
East European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania), 
OPT quotas were incorporated into bilateral agreements. Countries subject to autonomous 
restrictions have included Albania, Mongolia, North Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. Following 
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the countries concerned also became subject to 
autonomous arrangements. As noted above, many of these autonomous restrictions have since 
become subject to MFA-type bilateral agreements. In February 1994, all outstanding measures 
were either abolished or converted into Community-wide quotas (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 517/94). The countries having autonomous arrangements with the EC on 1 January 1995 
are listed in Table A.l. 
Imports coming from countries which have signed preferential trading agreements enjoy 
privileged access. Producers in the Member States of EFTA have tariff-free entry to the EC 
market with no quantitative limits. Producers in the Mediterranean countries enjoy tariff 
preference for a fixed amount of imports (tariff quotas) and, in theory, are not subject to any 
quantitative restrictions. However, each of the agreements concluded with these countries 
provides for a system of administrative co-operation whereby exports of certain categories of 
textiles and apparel to the EC are subject to close monitoring. The aim is to avoid export 
increases of certain sensitive products causing disruption in the EC market. If this should 
occur, safeguard measures can be invoked. Administrative arrangements for trade in textiles 
have existed with Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Malta, providing for export self-
restraint over a two to three year period. On the EC side, a system of import surveillance (see 
below) is established. In the case of Turkey, which was the second most important supplier of 
textiles to the EC, self-restraint was agreed with the textiles manufacturer. 
The preferential agreements between the EC and the Central and East European countries -
the 'Europe Agreements' (EAs) - contained textile protocols. Countries covered were the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia - see Table A.2. In June 
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1995, EAs were also agreed with the three Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Although the full Europe Agreements only came into effect on 1 February 1994 for Hungary 
and Poland and 1 February 1995 for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and the Slovak 
Republic, Interim Agreements governed the period between the signing of these Agreements 
and their ratification by national parliaments. 
Table A.2. Europe Agreements 
Hungary 
Poland 
Czech Republic' 
Slovak Republic' 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Interim Agreement 
1.3.92-31.1.94 
1.3.92-31.1.94 
1.3.92-31.1.95 
1.3.92-31.1.95 
1.5.93-31.1.95 
31.12.93-31.1.95 
Final Agreement 
1.2.94-
1.2.94-
1.2.95-
1.2.95-
1.2.95-
1.2.95-
1 The Interim Agreements with the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) were subsequently replaced with 
individual IAs with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
(Prior to the signing of the Europe Agreements, a number of CEECs had signed trade and 
commercial and economic agreements with the EC which provided for some liberalization of 
trade. New protocols in 1990 and 1991 provided for quota increases for Hungary and Poland 
and for the elimination of residual QRs of Member States. Also, in November 1989, non-MFA 
textile imports from both these countries were eliminated. OPT quotas for Hungary were 
suspended for 1990.) 
All these countries (except Bulgaria) were MFA signatories and had MFA bilateral 
agreements with the EC before 1993. (Bulgaria had an MFA-type agreement with the EC.) 
Under the terms of the textiles protocols contained within the EAs, tariffs on direct imports 
were to be phased out over six years (in contrast with other products where tariffs were to be 
either immediately abolished or phased out over a period of one to five years). Tariffs on re-
imports of products under the EC's OPT regime (see below) were eliminated immediately on 
the date of entry into force of the Agreements. With regard to quantitative restraints on textiles 
and clothing products, the new protocols replaced the previous bilateral agreements and 
provided for their total elimination within half the period of the Uruguay Round but in no case 
before 1 January 1998. (Under the Uruguay Round, MFA quotas are to be phased out in three 
stages within a period of ten years, but the choice as to which products were to be included at 
each stage, subject to certain limits, is left to individual countries.) Under the accelerated 
liberalization schedule, tariffs were to be completely eliminated by the end of 1996, while the 
textile quotas of the CEECs were doubled. 
As noted above, before 1993, quotas negotiated under bilateral agreements were generally 
negotiated for the EC as a whole and allocated to individual Member States according to 
criteria based on traditional trade patterns. A burden-sharing formula, based on a range of 
economic indicators, was also applied whereby import growth rates during the term of the 
agreements were higher in those Member States which, at the beginning, had not been 
assigned their appropriate share. Special provisions were also set up to facilitate inter-regional 
transfers of quotas. These were subject to quantitative ceilings which were to be gradually 
expanded up to 1991 (the expiry date of MF A4). For non-dominant suppliers, quotas of 
individual Member States could be increased by a maximum of 16% in 1991 compared with 
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2% in 1987. In September 1988, an important ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
stated that national fixed-scale quotas were contrary to the principle of free competition. 
Flowever, it recognized that the breakdown of an EC quota by Member States was justifiable 
on administrative, technical and economic grounds. 
Table A.3 sets out the main users of Article 115 for textile and clothing products over the 
period 1980-90. 
Table A.3. Use of Article 115 by Member State, 1980-90 
Member State 
Benelux 
Denmark 
France 
Germanv 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Total 
Number of cases 
85 
6 
485 
9 
0 
402 
98 
0 
12 
72 
1,169 
Percentage of total 
7.3 
0.5 
41.5 
0.8 
0 
34.4 
8.4 
0 
1.0 
1.0 
100.0 
Source: GATT. 1991. 
The majority of Article 115 authorizations have concerned textiles and clothing, with France, 
Ireland, Italy and the UK being the main users. Between 1980-90, there were 1,169 Article 
115 authorizations for textiles, of which France accounted for 485, Ireland for 402, Italy for 
98, the UK for 72, Benelux for 85, Spain for 12 and Denmark for 6. Hong Kong, China, 
Taiwan, Korea, India and Pakistan collectively attracted more than 90% of all cases. 
Following the ECJ ruling, the restrictiveness of these arrangements for dividing quotas among 
Member States was gradually relaxed. The share of quotas which could be transferred 
automatically to other Member States was increased from 16 to 40% in 1992, with additional 
transfers available on the approval of the Commission. At the same time, the application of 
Article 115 to textiles and clothing declined from 48 authorizations in 1990 to 32 in 1991. No 
further Article 115 authorizations on textiles and clothing were made in 1992. From 1 January 
1993, each Member State was entitled to issue import authorizations valid for the entire EC 
market. All regional quotas and ceilings were eliminated. Community surveillance was to be 
assured through a computer link between the Commission and the competent national body. 
However, as noted above, in the event of a regional disturbance, the EC might still seek to 
negotiate certain supply patterns with third countries, but it can no longer operate internal 
border controls to ensure compliance. This is permitted under the ATC reached in the Uruguay 
Round. 
Several bilateral agreements (MFA Agreements and preferential trading agreements) contain 
specific access provisions with respect to outward processing traffic (OPT). This means that, 
in addition to normal quotas, quotas exist for the amount of imports which have been subject 
to offshore processing which may be allowed entry to the EC. Offshore processing entails an 
EC firm supplying a firm in another country with textile fabrics and a design and 
subcontracting the overseas firm to supply a finished product for sale in the EC market. The 
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main advantage of such an activity for EC firms is to shift the more labour-intensive stages of 
production to countries where labour costs are relatively low. Providing OPT imports to the 
EC do not exceed the stipulated quota, they are subject to a tariff only on the value-added 
abroad, not the final price. In the past, the main users of the OPT provisions have been French 
and German clothing manufacturers. The main sources of OPT imports have been the former 
Yugoslavia (36% of all OPTs), the East European countries (38%) and Mediterranean 
suppliers (16%) (GATT, 1991). In 1992, OPT imports accounted for an estimated 10% of all 
extra-EC imports, but 62% of imports from the six CEEC countries and 51% for the former 
Yugoslavia (Corado, 1994). In addition to bilateral agreements, outward processing of MFA 
and non-MFA clothing in certain countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech and 
Slovak Republic) was subject to unilateral import quotas. (The quotas for Hungary and Poland 
were suspended in 1990.) New arrangements have also been introduced for OPT quotas. 
Under Council Regulation (EEC) No 3036/94, the conditions of eligibility in the distribution 
of specific OPT quotas have been harmonized and regional quotas have been replaced by EC-
wide OPT quotas. There are no specific origin rules for OPT quotas, only the general origin 
rules governing EC trade being applied. 
Although imports of textiles have been subject to anti-dumping measures, this has not been 
true of imports of clothing products during the period covered by this study. On 1 September 
1990, there were six anti-dumping measures maintained by the EC on textile imports affecting 
17 countries. These were acrylic fibres, polyester yarn, polyolefin woven bags, sisal twine and 
synthetic textile fibre of polyester. 
A further source of import restriction may arise from the application of rules of origin. EC 
rules require that certificates of origin be submitted in respect of all products imported from 
abroad. Products imported from countries not covered by preferential trade agreements, 
association agreements or the GSP scheme are subject to the 'last substantial working or 
processing' rule. That is to say, origin is where a product has been wholly obtained or has 
undergone its 'last substantial working or processing'. In the case of products covered by 
trading or association agreements or the GSP scheme, the criterion is one of 'sufficient 
transformation'. Products are deemed to be sufficiently transformed if the four-digit tariff 
heading of the final product differs from that of the inputs. With effect from 1 January 1996, 
however, imports from Turkey do not require a certificate of origin under the customs union 
agreement reached with that country. 
Finally, in addition to quotas, certain categories of imports may be subject to surveillance, 
which means that importers have to obtain export licences in their applications for import 
licences so that imports into the EC can be monitored. The aim of surveillance is to provide 
the EC with immediate information regarding any sudden surge of imports and to check for 
fraudulent imports, as when the declaration of origin is falsified to get round quota restrictions 
on imports from the true country of origin. Import surveillance has often been used with regard 
to imports of clothing products from 'preferential' suppliers such as Morocco and Tunisia. In 
1991-92, the EC applied Community surveillance measures on textile and clothing products 
from the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). In theory, surveillance does not imply 
any restriction of imports. However, in practice, if surveillance is seen to herald a threat of 
actual quantitative restrictions, exporters may feel constrained. 
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A.2. The import regime for footwear 
Footwear imports have been subject to the same kind of restraints as clothing products. Firstly, 
the pre-Uruguay Round rate of the Common External Tariff on imports of footwear varied 
between 4.6 and 20.2% with a simple m.f.n. average of 11.7% and a weighted average of 
13.5%. Developing countries eligible for preferential treatment under the GSP face a zero 
tariff on quotas within the prescribed quota limits. Countries having trade or association 
agreements with the EC (EFTA states, ACP countries, the East European EA countries and the 
Mediterranean countries including Turkey) also face zero tariffs. 
Quantitative restrictions on imported footwear were rife in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
However, by the mid-1980s, many had disappeared. In the past, most were operated at a 
Member State level, but there have been cases of Community-wide QRs. In August 1977, the 
United Kingdom unilaterally imposed quotas on imports of non-leather footwear from Taiwan 
under Article XIX of the GATT following a request from UK manufacturers. The quotas were 
temporary (for two years) until the end of 1979 and were sanctioned by the EC. One year later, 
in November 1978, the UK signed an industry-to-industry voluntary export restraint with 
South Korea covering all footwear. The arrangement was renegotiated in late 1979 and every 
year thereafter until it expired in December 1987. In 1980, UK manufacturers, with the 
encouragement of the UK government, began negotiations with their Taiwanese counterparts 
for a similar arrangement covering imports of leather and non-leather footwear from Taiwan. 
Temporarily, quotas were re-imposed on non-leather footwear from Taiwan. However, in 
1981, agreement was finally reached and a VER came into being covering both products. This 
last VER arrangement with Taiwan expired in 1984. The effectiveness of both arrangements is 
in doubt because Taiwanese and Korean exporters appear to have succeeded in redirecting 
products through Hong Kong. Both received informal backing from the European 
Commission. Since the mid-1970s, the UK operated industry-to-industry restraints on 
footwear from the Czech and Slovak Republic and Romania, and with Poland before it was 
suspended in 1990. 
In April 1981, France entered into an industry-to-industry VER with Taiwan limiting exports 
to France of both leather and rubber footwear. From 1982 onwards, the arrangement had the 
official sanction of the Commission. However, as imports never exceeded the quota limits 
agreed, it was not binding. In December 1985, manufacturers in the two countries signed a 
new VER arrangement covering the period 1986-88. It remained, however, ineffective and 
was eventually abandoned by the French industry. At the same time, in April 1981, French and 
Korean manufacturers agreed a VER which lasted until December 1984. France also applied a 
VER on Chinese exports of slippers and sandals. In addition, in March 1992, France informed 
the Commission of its decision under the EC safeguard rules to impose quotas on shoe imports 
from China for one year. 
Italy operated a VER applied to non-rubber footwear from South Korea over the period 1979— 
85, although Korean records show the restriction operating only from 1 June 1981. In June 
1981, Italy signed a co-operation agreement with Taiwan but imposed no quota limits. Also, 
since 1982, national quotas on imports of some types of footwear from Japan have been 
applied. A long-standing VER on imports of rubber footwear from Poland also operated over 
the period 1979-85. The Benelux countries applied national quotas on imports of some rubber 
and leather footwear from Japan commencing in 1982. Denmark applied national import 
quotas on imports of some types of leather footwear imported from Taiwan from 1982 
onwards. Greece had a quota on imports of athletic footwear from Taiwan from January 1983 
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to January 1984. Ireland applied import quotas on leather and rubber footwear from Taiwan 
from 1977 which were sanctioned by the Community in 1981. Also, on 1 January 1979, 
Ireland entered into a VER with South Korea covering both leather and non-leather footwear. 
This lasted for six years until 1 January 1985. West Germany appears to have been the only 
Member State during the 1980s not to have used some kind of QR on footwear imports. Since 
joining the EC, both Spain and Portugal applied global quotas on imports of rubber and plastic 
footwear. 
QRs applied at the EC level have taken the form of both negotiated VERs and unilaterally 
imposed import quotas. In 1988, the EC negotiated bilateral VERs on imports from South 
Korea and Taiwan with respect to the French and Italian markets (Council Regulations (EEC) 
Nos 3283/88 and 1733/88). In July 1990, this arrangement was followed by an EC-wide 
arrangement accompanied by prior import surveillance (see below). Under this new 
arrangement, the quotas were applied at an EC level by all the Member States. The 
arrangement covered footwear excluding slippers and remained in place until the end of 1992 
whereupon it was allowed to expire. After 1990, many of the import quotas applied by 
individual Member States on imports from East and Central European suppliers were 
liberalized. Quotas on imports from the Soviet Union were removed in August 1991 and the 
treatment was extended to all former Soviet Union states. Imports from Bulgaria, the Czech 
and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland and Romania were liberalized in 1990 and 1991. 
From 1 January 1992, selective restrictions on shoe exports from Albania and the Baltic states 
were lifted and some suspended. In February 1994, all national quota restrictions were 
abolished except for those applying to imports from China which became subject to a new 
Community-wide quota (Council Regulation (EEC) No 519/94). The current position is that 
imports from China are the only imports subject to quantitative restraint. These quotas were 
expanded in March 1995 to take account of the accession of three new Member States 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 538/95). Imports of certain types of sports shoes were 
liberalized at the same time and the scope for quota exemption was extended for special 
technology footwear. 
Surveillance measures have been widely used with regard to footwear imports. As noted 
above, surveillance requires the importer to obtain an import licence before the goods can be 
put into free circulation. Although surveillance does not restrict imports in a formal sense, it is 
often preceded by measures which do and therefore creates expectations of further protection. 
Between 1975-78, the EC operated a system of 'retrospective control of imports' which 
covered leather imports. Briefly, for a period of six months in 1978, this was replaced with a 
system of'prior import surveillance' applied only to imports from principal suppliers (namely, 
Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Romania). Thereafter, a system of 'retrospective control of imports' - so-called 'a 
posteriori import surveillance' - was operated, covering all types of footwear. In July 1990, 
the bilateral VER on exports of footwear from South Korea and Taiwan was accompanied by 
'prior import surveillance'. Footwear imports from all other sources remained subject to 
'retrospective surveillance' (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 74/90). In August 1992, the 
EC made imports of slippers and other indoors footwear from China subject to prior 
Community surveillance (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2327/92). 
As with clothing imports, imports of footwear do not appear to have been the subject of any 
anti-dumping actions during this period. However, in 1981, a voluntary export price restraint 
was agreed between the EC and Brazil following a complaint by manufacturers that exports 
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had been subject to an export subsidy of 15%. With regard to rules of origins, the same rules 
apply as for clothing. 
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APPENDIX Β 
Relevant trade policy literature 
Conceptually, there are two different effects on third-country suppliers arising from the SMP 
and the completion of the common commercial policy. Firstly, the elimination of national or 
Community quotas amounts to a relatively straightforward exercise in trade liberalization. 
Secondly, the replacement of national quotas with Community-wide quotas is more 
problematic as this will affect individual Member States differently. The simplest case is 
where a Community-wide quota is introduced which is exactly equivalent to the sum total of 
the national quotas previously applying. In this appendix, we discuss the various attempts 
made in previous empirical work to examine and evaluate these different effects. 
Substantial amounts of literature now exist on the effects of quantitative restraints (import 
quotas, voluntary export restraints and other grey-area measures) on trade including empirical 
work on the effects of such QRs on exporting and importing countries alike. Simple partial-
equilibrium models quantify the effects of QRs by converting QRs into import tariff 
equivalents (MTEs) and then estimating the effects of changes in MTEs on consumption, 
production and imports in the same manner as is used in studies of the costs of tariffs. In the 
case of unilaterally imposed import quotas, quota rents accrue entirely to the importing 
country; in the case of voluntary export restraints, the rent is appropriated by the exporting 
country. Since the size of quota rents is unknown, MTEs cannot be derived directly. Instead, 
quota rents must be guessed. 
In the case of clothing products, Hamilton (1984b) used the prices of export licences traded in 
Hong Kong expressed as a percentage of the unit value of imports to calculate the MTE on 
European clothing imports. Since these licences are often destination-specific, it proved 
possible to calculate these individually for different EC and EFTA Member States. He found 
that, because unit import values fluctuate only modestly over time, measured fluctuations in 
MTEs were largely due to fluctuations in quota prices. However, because quota prices 
fluctuate quite a lot over time, a long time period is to be preferred over which the average 
quota price could be measured. Silberston (1984) has argued that the use of quota prices gives 
a misleading impression because only a small proportion of quotas are actually traded during a 
given period. On the other hand, as Greenaway (1985) has argued, the same is true of the use 
of the housing market to estimate the current price of housing. All trading in any market 
occurs 'at the margin'. Clearly, however, there are problems with the use of quota prices as a 
proxy for quota rents. For one, imports and domestically-produced goods may not be perfect 
substitutes. Furthermore, quota prices are likely to fluctuate a great deal during the course of 
any particular year depending on their relative scarcity at different times of the year. They may 
also vary over the course of the business cycle as Hamilton (1984b) himself observes. 
Hamilton (1990b) re-estimated the MTE of EC QRs on clothing imports from Hong Kong for 
the period 1980-89. Table B.l shows the results. 
An alternative approach is to use differences in the costs of imports as expressed by the unit 
value of imports to estimate the MTE. This is possible if there exists at least one equivalent 
market where imports are not subject to quantitative restraint. The unit value of imports in the 
restricted market can then be compared with the same for the unrestricted market to find the 
MTE indirectly. For this to be at all accurate, the exercise should be performed for individual 
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supplier countries and account taken of any differences in both transport costs and the 
composition of imports. A major problem with unit values is that they may reflect quality 
differences so that comparisons are best made at a disaggregated level and for countries whose 
import composition is broadly alike. Also, to the extent that QRs encourage exporters to up-
grade their product, there will be a tendency for the unit value of imports to restricted markets 
to increase faster than that of imports to unrestricted ones. With regard to imports of UK 
footwear from Taiwan, Greenaway (1986) compared the unit value of imports to the UK with 
the same for imports to Taiwan, an unconstrained country, with an adjustment for transport 
costs. However, this treats footwear as a single homogeneous good and allows for no 
differences between types of footwear. The more direct approach preferred by Winters (1991) 
in his study of UK imports of footwear was to estimate using time-series regressions what he 
called the 'policy price wedge', i.e. the extent to which exporters actually raised their prices 
following the introduction of QRs. These were obtained individually for different supplier 
countries and distinguished between different kinds of footwear (leather, textile, rubber and 
plastic). Winters (1991) estimated the extent of the policy price wedge at 19% for imports of 
leather footwear (from Poland), 16% and 27% respectively for imports of textile footwear 
from Taiwan and Korea and 12% and 285 respectively for imports of rubber and plastic 
footwear from Taiwan and Korea. (The period covered ranged from 1977 to 1986.) 
Table B.l. Import tariff equivalents of the EC's quantitative restrictions on clothing 
imports from Hong Kong, 1980-89 
West Germany 
France 
UK 
Denmark 
All above, 
imp.value weighted 
Standard deviation 
Combined trade 
barrier1 
Italy 
Rents to Hong 
Kong 
1989 price 
$ million 
1980 
20 
n/a 
28 
32 
24 
45 
n/a 
n/a 
1 The import tariff equivalent 
Source: Hamilton, 1990b. 
1981 
18 
18 
17 
13 
17 
2.06 
37 
n/a 
213 
1982 
4 
12 
10 
8 
7 
2.96 
25 
n/a 
82 
1983 
9 
7 
7 
11 
8 
1.66 
26 
n/a 
91 
multiplied by the EC ad \i 
1984 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
0.87 
32 
n/a 
136 
1985 
8 
13 
17 
11 
12 
3.27 
31 
12 
108 
tlorem tariff of 17%. 
1986 
20 
27 
22 
33 
21 
5.02 
42 
16 
237 
1987 
16 
14 
15 
17 
16 
1.12 
36 
19 
231 
1988 
13 
12 
14 
8 
14 
2.28 
33 
55 
220 
1989 
10 
15 
11 
9 
11 
2.28 
30 
36 
166 
1980-89 
average 
14 
13 
15 
15 
14 
33 
165 
An interesting finding of Brenton and Winters (1991) was that a large element of product 
rationing was apparent in the case of UK footwear imports such that actual prices failed to 
reflect the true scarcity value of footwear which could exceed actual prices by as much as 
three times. 
A further difficulty with measuring the effects of QRs is the possibility that quotas may not be 
binding. To determine whether or not a particular quota is binding, it is necessary to calculate 
quota utilization percentages, defined as the ratio of actual imports to quota-restrained 
imports. Erzan, Goto and Holmes (1989) of the World Bank conducted such an exercise for 
textiles and clothing imports to the EC, the US, Canada and Sweden covered by the Multifibre 
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Arrangement. They defined a binding quota as one where imports amounted to more than 90% 
of the quota limit. They found that the percentage of total imports subject to quotas was fairly 
stable within the narrow range of 46-50% which, given that new suppliers were drawn into the 
MFA and additional products were put under quotas, implied a disproportionate expansion of 
non-restricted imports. In other words, imports subject to quotas experienced a relative 
slowdown in their volume growth. The percentage of imports subject to binding quotas 
increased from 28 to 35% over the period covered. The percentage of restricted imports 
subject to binding quotas increased from 61 to 71%. Finally, quota utilization ratios increased 
in all four markets from an average of 69% to 82%, providing some evidence that the MFA 
was becoming more restrictive over the period in question. These figures were combined with 
measures of the percentage of trade covered by quotas in two-dimensional scatter diagrams to 
determine the trend in the degree of restrictiveness of the MFA. Quota utilization rates, 
however, can only provide partial evidence that a particular quota has been binding or not. The 
various flexibility provisions under the MFA allow countries to exceed quotas. In the case of 
the EC, as we have seen, quotas are subject to regional allocation. A supplier country may 
have underused its Community-wide quota, yet used up its quota in a particular Member State 
and be unable to shift supplies from other Member States to meet the higher demand in the 
market where the quota has become binding. Even where quotas have become fully used, 
exporters may be able to circumvent the quota by redirecting supplies through some third 
country with unused quotas or no restrictions and falsifying the declarations of origin. If the 
latter is not possible, production may, given time, be shifted to unrestricted countries (so-
called 'quota hopping') (see Trela and Whalley (1989) for a discussion of these issues in 
relation to the MFA). 
One aspect of the analysis of reducing or removing QRs as distinct from tariffs is that QRs are 
generally source-specific in their application. This means that QRs cause an element of trade 
diversion away from restricted to unrestricted supplier countries. Any attempt to quantify the 
effects of such QRs must of necessity take into account this aspect of welfare loss for the 
importing country. Figure B.l illustrates the effects of a VER in a situation where imports 
from certain 'preferred' suppliers are not restrained. 
DDDD is the domestic demand curve for the product and SDSD is the domestic supply curve. 
SwSvv is the supply curve for constrained suppliers (which is assumed to be perfectly elastic) 
and SDNSDN is the combined supply curve for domestic and unconstrained (i.e. preferred) 
suppliers. (The situation is analogous to the formation of a customs union where tariffs are 
eliminated on trade between the home and partner countries but not on trade with the rest of 
the world.) Under free trade and in the absence of transport costs, the domestic price is equal 
to the world price, i.e. OPn. Demand equals OQ4, domestic production OQi and imports Q1Q4. 
If a VER is negotiated with certain suppliers which is designed to increase domestic 
production to OQ2, imports fall to BE = Q2Q4, the domestic price will rise to OP] and 
consumption fall to OQ3. However, imports from unconstrained suppliers increase from AF to 
BD, while imports from constrained suppliers fall from FG to DE. Thus, trade has been 
diverted from constrained to unconstrained suppliers. By shifting SDSD parallel to the right so 
that it crosses point E, the extent of trade diverted, namely CD, can be measured. The static 
welfare loss to the importing country from the VER is measured in the conventional way as 
the loss of consumer surplus (equal to area P0P|EG) less the gain in producers' surplus (equal 
toareaPoPiBA). 
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Figure B.l. The effects of a voluntary export restraint on the pattern of trade 
Prie 
Pi 
Po 
O Quantity 
Source: Hamilton, 1984c. 
However, to this must be added the additional cost from trade diversion. The units of the 
goods now obtained from unconstrained suppliers are obtained at an increased cost of PoPi 
amounting to an additional welfare loss of FDI. Constrained suppliers gain increased rent 
income equal to the area DFIH, while preferred suppliers enjoy increased producers' surplus 
equal to ABDF. 
The greatest difficulty facing economists in measuring the effects of QRs concerns how to 
treat the products in question. Theoretical models which assume a homogeneous product are 
relatively straightforward to handle, but are oversimplistic. Assumptions of product 
homogeneity have been made in the study of trade liberalization in both of the sectors covered 
by this study. For example, Hamilton (1981) studied the effects of Sweden relaxing its VER 
on foreign country exports of textile and clothing products subject to the MFA assuming 
perfect substitutability as between foreign and domestic supplies. Hamilton estimated the 
effects on foreign and domestic prices of a 50% relaxation of the Swedish VER, distinguishing 
between constrained and unconstrained third countries and using 26 five-digit product groups. 
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Estimates of the elasticity of the rest-of-the-world price with respect to changes in Sweden's 
VER were obtained mathematically from available information regarding the export supply 
elasticity of the rest of the world and world import demand elasticity. Assuming perfect 
substitution between domestic and foreign supplies but imperfect substitution between export 
markets, the results showed that a 50% relaxation of the Swedish VER would reduce Swedish 
clothing prices by a modest 6.8% on average. The effects on consumer welfare were found to 
be a gain of roughly $102 million matched by a loss of employment equivalent to 2,938 man-
years or about 8% of total employment in the sector. Both the price and welfare effects were 
therefore quite small. 
Greenaway and Hindley (1985) sought to estimate the effects of UK VERs as applied to both 
clothing and footwear, treating the two products as separate homogeneous goods. Estimating 
the MTE for clothing using the prices of clothing quotas traded in Hong Kong, Greenaway 
(1985) estimated the combined effect of tariffs and QRs as sufficient to raise UK prices by 
34% giving a total cost to the UK economy of £68.4 million a year. For imports of non-leather 
footwear, the cost was some £43.4 million, or between £7,500 and £15,000 per job saved. 
Where, however, products are assumed to be heterogeneous, it becomes necessary to include 
parameters representing the elasticities of substitution. Such an approach has been adopted by 
Winters ( 1992) in relation to footwear. Estimates of the coefficients of variation of the unit 
values of imports into six EC markets from 17 sources implied something less than perfect 
substitutability both between suppliers and markets. The results suggested that products may 
be heterogeneous and/or that markets are segmented within the EC (see below for a discussion 
of the results of this empirical study). Empirical work in the clothing sector has more 
frequently assumed product homogeneity. Erzan, Goto and Holmes (1989), however, 
constructed a relatively simple partial equilibrium model covering six broad categories of 
clothing imports. Distinguishing between constrained and unconstrained foreign suppliers, 
they found that unconstrained developing country suppliers enjoyed a small gain from the 
existence of the MFA of $194.9 million or 14.1% of the 1986 shipments but that the main 
beneficiaries were domestic producers in the United States whose output was higher to the 
tune of $1.6 million or roughly 10%. A quantity effect was estimated using changes in the 
value of shipments of the six items under MFA quotas valued at the non-quota price. This 
revealed that the volume of imports from constrained developing country suppliers fell by 
19% due to the MFA. However, this decline was largely offset by higher prices due to the 
quotas, such that the revenue losses amounted to only 4%. The assumption of product 
homogeneity more obviously breaks down in other sectors of manufacturing. Thus, studies of 
the impact of VERs applied to exports of Japanese cars (e.g. de Melo and Messerlin, 1988) 
have used more complex models which incorporate producer differentiation. 
The transformation of national into Community-wide quotas (quota unification) involves a 
rather different set of considerations. Winters (1988) demonstrated that the replacement of 
individual Member State quotas with a Community-wide quota on imports which is exactly 
equal to the sum of the members' individual quotas will raise total union welfare. However, it 
would affect consumers differently in the various Member State markets. Clearly, consumers 
would gain in Member States where the restrictions bit deepest, which would be those where 
Article 115 restrictions had been most vigorously used, as prices would fall following quota 
unification. Prices, however, would rise in other Member States reducing their welfare. 
However, total union welfare would still increase because the same quantity of imports would 
be allocated more efficiently. Every unit shifted from less restricted to more restricted Member 
States would generate a net increase in welfare because consumers in the more restricted 
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Member States value an additional unit more than consumers in less restricted Member States. 
As an illustration, Winters simulated the effects of quota unification for imports of jeans from 
Hong Kong on the assumption that, in the absence of Article 115, quota rents are equalized 
and that each Member State faced linear demand curves having equal elasticities. Consumer 
prices rose by 3% and 12% in France and Germany respectively but fell by 19% in the UK. 
entailing a net welfare gain of between ECU 3 and 8 million overall. 
An important aspect of the process of adjustment following quota unification is that, where 
quotas are bilateral, the price of imports rises after unification because foreign exporters are 
able to act in concert to appropriate higher scarcity rents for themselves. This effect was 
demonstrated by Gros (1992) and the model applied to the European automobile industry. The 
logic underlying the argument is that the opening up of previously restricted Member State 
markets (e.g. Germany in the case of cars) increases the size of the market in which foreign 
exporters (e.g. Japan) can now sell. Since the amount which foreign suppliers can sell is the 
same where Community and national quotas are assumed to be equally restrictive, it follows 
that the average price of imports must increase. In the case of automobiles, a differentiated 
goods model predicted that Japanese producers' prices would rise by between 8 and 18% on 
average. This implied a total transfer to Japanese producers of between ECU 0.5 and 1.3 
billion per year. As in Winters' model, consumers in less restricted markets (e.g. Germany) 
lose, while those in more restricted markets (e.g. France) gain. The net aggregate effect on 
consumer welfare depends on the elasticities of demand. However, Gros found that, even on 
favourable assumptions, the gain to consumers amounted to only between one-third and one-
tenth of the transfer to foreign producers. 
Global economic welfare, however, is higher because imports are redistributed from markets 
where consumers' marginal utility is relatively low to those where it is relatively high. (This is 
reflected in the fact that foreign producers could potentially compensate consumers in the 
Community and still be better off.) From this, it follows that the replacement of national 
quotas with an exactly equivalent Community-wide quota will lower Community welfare even 
though consumers are likely to gain in aggregate. For the Community to gain, the degree of 
restriction should either be lowered following unification or the VER abolished altogether. 
Hamilton (1990b) expected abolition of Article 115 to have little effect on price levels for 
clothing within the EC because of the existence of market segmentation. Where intra-EC trade 
is restricted by 'third-country non-tariff barriers' such as Article 115, import tariff equivalents 
should be lower in the more restrictive Member States (e.g. France) than the less restrictive 
ones (e.g. Germany). This is easily demonstrated. Since the EC applies a common external 
tariff and costs of transport are identical for imports of clothing from, say, Hong Kong and 
since clothing may be regarded as approximating a homogeneous product, the price levels for 
clothing in France and Germany, Pd and Pf, may be expressed as follows: 
Pd = P x ( l + U x d ) ( l + S x d ) 
P f=P x ( l+U x f ) ( l+S x f ) 
where Px is the Hong Kong supply price, Ux the ad valorem MTE of the VER and Sx the MTE 
of the third-country NTB imposed by each country. (Third-country NTBs are assumed to be 
binding.) If France applies Article 115 but Germany does not, Sxd = 0 < Sxf. Since in a customs 
union Pd=Pf, a binding French third-country NTB must be reflected in Uxf < Uxd. Using 
" 
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estimates of MTEs based on quota prices in Hong Kong, Hamilton found no evidence for 
significant differences in MTEs between individual EC Member States. It follows that the 
application of Article 115 by France must have failed in the attempt to restrict imports. One 
way of seeing this is that producers in the less restrictive Member States (Germany) increased 
their supplies to the more restrictive Member States (France) while third countries supplied 
more to Germany and less to France. The free circulation of intra-union-produced perfect 
substitutes thus offset any restrictive tendency of Article 115. If, however, market 
segmentation exists, Pxd does not equal Pxf. The effectiveness, then, of third-country NTBs 
will depend on the existence of'partner non-tariff barriers' giving rise to market segmentation. 
It follows that the abolition of these impediments to internal trade will be more important than 
abolition of Article 115 in equalizing prices in different Member States. 
Relatively little empirical work has been carried out of the effects of the SMP on external 
trade. Winters (1988) carried out a policy simulation for footwear imports using a partial 
equilibrium model which allowed for product heterogeneity and imperfect substitution 
between markets. Using a model calibrated for 1987 which identified four different markets, 
six different groups of suppliers and six different types of footwear, he simulated the effects of 
translating the national VERs applied to imports from Taiwan and South Korea into 
Community-wide quotas. Since the national VERs applied only to imports into France and 
Italy, quota unification had strong distributional effects. French and Italian consumers gained 
at the expense of consumers in the rest of the Community. Aggregate consumer welfare, 
however, fell. Domestic producers in France and Italy lose, but this is more than offset by the 
gain to producers in the rest of the Community. Total welfare costs were found to rise from 
ECU 38 to 46 million. Korean and Taiwanese exporters also benefited from higher quota rents 
(although these fall in per unit terms, they applied to a wider range of trade). 
Winters also estimated for the effects of Spanish and Portuguese accession to the EC and for 
the effects of tariffs and QRs being abolished on imports from Eastern Europe. With regard to 
the former, Spain and Portugal were found to have both benefited substantially but, as a result 
of trade diversion, the rest of the EC were marginal losers. Quota rents for non-EC suppliers 
also fell. The effects of abolishing tariffs and QRs on imports from Eastern Europe as under 
the Europe Agreements was found to have a potentially significant welfare-enhancing effect, 
although at the expense of EC footwear producers in Italy and Spain. 
An alternative to simulating the effects of quota unification using a theoretical model 
calibrated for an earlier year is to examine actual trends in extra-area trade resulting from the 
process of bringing about a single market. This is problematic since internal borders were only 
abolished on 1 January 1993, leaving only a short time period over which to analyse any 
effects on trade patterns. On the other hand, the SMP involved a progressive reduction in the 
use of Article 115 in the years leading up to 1993. Sapir (1989) examined the external impact 
of completing the European Internal Market using three measures - the share of apparent 
consumption accounted for by both intra- and extra-EC imports as opposed to domestic 
production, the ratio of intra-EC to total imports and an index of revealed comparative 
advantage (defined as net trade divided by total trade). Using the work of Buigues and 
Ilzkovitz (1988), he identified three-digit manufacturing sectors most affected by NTBs and 
assessed the relative competitiveness of EC producers in each. Industries were then grouped as 
either ones where domestic suppliers were practically unrivalled, those where domestic 
producers were principal suppliers of local markets but faced strong competition from EC or 
third-country firms, and those where domestic suppliers accounted for no more than 40% of 
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domestic sales and the main source of supply was foreign. He found that, for goods in the first 
and third categories, the completion of the single market would have relatively little external 
impact because EC suppliers had either a very strong or a very weak position. Most of the 
impact would be in the second category. High technology sectors with scale economies might 
be revitalized by integration at the expense of foreign producers. In those sectors with low to 
medium R&D intensity where EC comparative advantage was declining, foreign producers 
would generally benefit from the single market; however, in some of those sectors, EC 
producers had succeeded in obtaining various forms of protection. Sapir (1995) updated and 
extended his analysis of the external impact of the SMP. 
Different aspects of the SMP are likely to have different effects on extra-area trade. Where 
NTBs may prevent the exploitation of economies of scale (e.g. discriminatory public 
procurement), the completion of the SM could be expected to boost the intra-area share and 
lower the extra-area share. However, for certain other types of NTBs such as national quotas 
imposed on extra-imports, the extra-area share should increase relative to the intra-area and 
domestic production share. For a third group of NTBs, the effect of their removal would be to 
raise both the intra- and extra-area share at the expense of domestic production. At the 
aggregate level, Sapir found evidence for both internal and external trade creation as reflected 
by a steady decline in the share of domestic production in apparent consumption and a 
constant ratio of imports to consumption. Using an earlier classification of manufacturing 
sectors by NTB intensity (Buigues and Uzkovitz, 1988), Sapir found that both internal and 
external trade creation occurred in all three sectors. Internal trade creation was least in sectors 
with low NTB intensity and greatest in sectors with medium NTB intensity (including 
footwear and clothing). External trade creation was greatest in sectors with medium NTB 
intensity and weakest in those with high NTB intensity. (Clothing and footwear both show 
only external trade creation.) 
Empirical studies of the effects of protectionism on particular sectors have generally used a 
partial equilibrium framework which seeks to compare the equilibrium situations of the 
market first with and then without protection. The effects on domestic production, 
consumption and the volume of imports can be determined if either the elasticities of demand 
and supply are known or (more likely) can be assumed. Costs to consumers, producers and the 
economy as a whole can then be readily measured. In the case of quantitative restrictions such 
as import quotas or VERs, the procedure discussed above and illustrated by Figure B.l must 
be employed. This treats the imported product as a homogeneous good for which perfect 
substitution between domestic and foreign supplies is assumed. Thus, there is one single price 
for the product regardless of whether it is foreign or domestically produced. The QR is then 
assumed to raise the market price by the import tariff equivalent (MTE) in a manner similar to 
that of a tariff. The effects on producers, consumers and imports can then be estimated in the 
same way as with a tariff if reasonable assumptions can be made about the value of elasticities. 
However, since QRs are generally source-specific, it is necessary to distinguish between 
constrained and unconstrained suppliers. Trade diversion caused by discrimination must then 
be treated as an additional source of welfare loss over and above the dead-weight loss from the 
fall in the volume of imports. Moreover, in the case of a VER, the welfare loss exceeds that of 
a tariff because the revenue which accrues to the importing authorities in the case of a tariff 
instead is appropriated as a quota rent in the case of a VER. 
The effects of the SMP on third-country suppliers are more complex than the simple case of 
quota liberalization. In particular, there is a need to distinguish between the different Member 
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State markets as, prior to the abolition of Article 115, each applied separate national quotas. 
The equilibrium in each of these markets is therefore likely to differ. Quota unification, 
however, will enable foreign suppliers to move products between different markets within the 
EC and indeed they can be expected to do so until quota rents per unit are equal across 
Member States. There is therefore a need to have separate supply and demand equations for 
each Member State. The equilibrium after quota unification must then be compared with that 
before in order to measure the effects on production, consumption and imports in each case. 
Having done so, the effects on consumers, producers, foreign suppliers and total welfare can 
be measured in the usual manner. As in the simpler case of trade liberalization, assumptions 
must of necessity be made regarding elasticity values. There is also the need to measure the 
size of the quota premium for each Member State market in order to measure the import tariff 
equivalent. 
Table B.2. Empirical studies of the effects of quantitative restrictions on imports of 
clothing and footwear and the external impact of the EC's SMP 
Study Subject matter Methodology Results 
Footwear 
Greenaway ( 1986) 
Hamilton (1988a) 
Winters (1991) 
Winters (1992) 
Effects of tariffs and VERs 
on footwear. 
Effects of the New 
Protectionism on footwear 
trade. 
Effect of VERs on the prices 
of UK footwear imports. 
Effects of EC SMP on 
European footwear trade. 
Simulations of. 
1. Effects of Spanish and 
Portuguese accession to the 
EC, 
2. Effects of abolishing 
Article 115. 
3. Effects of abolishing 
barriers on imports from 
Eastern Europe. 
Estimated MTE of VER using 
difference in unit values of imports 
from constrained v. unconstrained 
suppliers. Elasticity values taken 
from Deaton (1975). 
Estimated shares of imports in 
apparent consumption to analyse 
trends in comparative advantage in 
non-rubber footwear. 
Use of time-series regressions to 
estimate policy price wedges for 
UK imports from Eastern Europe 
and welfare costs of VERs. 
Complex model distinguishing 
between 4 markets, 6 groups of 
suppliers and 6 product groups. 
Calibrated for 1987. Used to run 
various policy simulations. 
Net welfare loss to UK of 
£43.4 million per annum. 
No quantitative estimates. 
Extent of price wedge: 
leather (from Poland) 19% 
textile (Taiwan) 16% 
(Korea) 27% 
rubber & plastic 
(Taiwan) 12% 
(Korea) 28% 
Total loss to the UK: 
leather £7.5 million 
textile £13.7 million 
rubber & plastic £3.3 million 
Effect of 1992: 
Consumer welfare costs rise 
by ECU 8.8 million per 
annum. 
Total welfare costs rise by 
ECU 7.3 million. 
Strong distributional effects. 
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Table B.2. (continued) 
Clothing 
Hamilton (1981) 
Hamilton (1983) 
Hamilton (1984b) 
Greenaway (1985) 
Trela & Whalley 
(1989) 
Erzan, Goto & 
Holmes (1989) 
Effects of a 50% relaxation 
of the Swedish VER on 
foreign country exports and 
domestic employment. 
Measured the trade-diverting 
effects of source-specific 
QRs for clothing, textiles and 
footwear. 
Measurement of MTEs of 
VERs. 
Effects of MFA quotas on 
UK clothing imports. 
Measurement of the degree 
of restrictiveness of the 
MFA. 
Measured the effects of the 
MFA over the period 1981-
87 for the US, the EC, 
Canada and Sweden. 
Model assumed both perfect 
substitution between foreign and 
domestic supplies but allowed for 
imperfect substitution between 
export markets. Distinguished 26 
5-digit product groups. 
Estimated changes in the shares of 
apparent consumption between 
1970-79 for different groups of 
suppliers. Normalized changes 
using 'other manufacturers" as a 
control group. 
Used prices of quotas traded in 
Hong Kong to estimate MTEs. 
Used quota premia from prices of 
traded quotas to determine the MTE 
of quotas. Used Deaton (1975) for 
demand elasticities. 
Used quota utilization ratios for US 
and EC, distinguishing between 
supplier countries. 
Measured the proportion of imports 
covered by binding quotas, and the 
QU ratios. Constructed a relatively 
simple six-product model calibrated 
for 1986 and simulated the effects 
of removing quotas. 
Average price fall 6.8%. 
Consumer gain: $ 102.341 m. 
Jobs lost: 2.938 man-years. 
Evidence for strong trade 
diversion towards other 
developed countries. 
Total loss to UK = £68.4 
million per annum, or £8.500 
per job saved. 
Evidence that MFA slowed 
growth of imports over time 
but many quotas may not be 
binding. 
Results confirm tendency for 
MFA to become more 
restrictive. Also evidence of 
trade diversion in favour of 
unconstrained countries. 
Main beneficiaries of the 
MFA are US producers. The 
volume loss of constrained 
countries is offset by price 
gains. 
Other 
Winters (1988) 
Gros (1992) 
Analysis of the likely effects 
of a completed SM on EC 
external trade. 
Analysis of effects of 
replacing national with EC-
wide VERs. 
Measurement of the welfare effects 
of abolishing Article 115 on 
imports of jeans from Hong Kong, 
using Hamilton's estimates of quota 
rents. 
Measurements of effect for 
Japanese automobiles using a 
differentiated goods model. 
Overall welfare gain of 
ECU 3-8 million, but some 
countries gain (e.g. UK) 
while others lose (e.g. France 
and Germany). 
Gain to EC consumers of 
between ECU 50-430 million. 
but more than offset by gain 
to Japanese producers of 
between ECU 500-1,300 
million. 
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Table B.2. (continued) 
Sapir (1989) 
Sapir (1995) 
Analysis of likely effect of 
completing the SM. 
Ex-post analysis of the 
effects of the SM on external 
trade. 
Used Buigues-IIzkovitz sectoral 
classification of NTB intensity and 
various measures of 
competitiveness of different sectors: 
share of imports in apparent 
consumption, ratio of intra-area to 
extra-area imports and revealed 
comparative advantage. 
Used changes in shares of intra- and 
extra-area imports and domestic 
production in apparent 
consumption and ratio of intra- to 
extra-area trade. 
Found that external impact 
greatest in sectors where 
domestic suppliers face strong 
competition. 
Found evidence for both 
internal and external trade 
creation with sectoral 
differences determined. 
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APPENDIX C 
Quota utilization rates 
Table C.l. Quota utilization rates for China, 1989-94 
Year MFA category 
1989 12 13 16 18 21 24 26 27 29 31 68 73 76 78 83 10 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1990 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1991 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
1 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1.69 
0.78 
0.56 
8.39 
1 16 
0.00 
0.26 
1.29 
0.00 
1.71 
0.99 
4 
091 
1.00 
0.93 
2.69 
1.72 
0.00 
0.72 
0.49 
1.68 
111 
1.01 
4 
0.65 
0.88 
0.93 
3.13 
1.14 
1.60 
0.47 
0.51 
6.23 
0.95 
0.79 
0.86 
1.22 
0.86 
0.97 
0.82 
0.24 
0.40 
1.14 
0.00 
2.28 
1.17 
5 
1.00 
1.08 
0.77 
1.48 
0.83 
0.10 
0.69 
0.53 
0.04 
1.16 
0.96 
5 
1.23 
0.86 
1.14 
0.93 
083 
0.34 
0.70 
0.56 
0.54 
1.12 
0.91 
0.46 
0.90 
0.75 
0.72 
0.56 
0.00 
0.41 
0.84 
0.00 
0.88 
0.69 
6 
0.94 
0.85 
0.45 
0.74 
1.04 
0.08 
049 
0.75 
0.00 
0.63 
0.79 
6 
0.70 
0.72 
0.91 
0.94 
1.04 
0.11 
0.72 
0.92 
0.13 
0.53 
0.75 
2.12 
1.09 
0.62 
1.06 
0.66 
0.00 
0.21 
0.33 
0.00 
1.30 
0.87 
7 
0.29 
0.90 
1.18 
1.49 
0.49 
0.00 
0.30 
0.48 
0.00 
0.47 
0.52 
7 
0.56 
1.67 
0.66 
1.95 
0.96 
0.21 
0.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.85 
0.68 
0.75 
1.11 
0.49 
0.45 
0.42 
0.58 
0.84 
0.00 
1.60 
0.82 
8 
099 
0.86 
1.47 
0.90 
0.76 
0.29 
0.64 
080 
0.00 
1.17 
0.89 
8 
081 
0.80 
0.85 
0.67 
0.79 
0.10 
0.60 
0.53 
0.00 
1.18 
0.81 
1.57 
0.85 
2.24 
0.62 
0.77 
1.16 
0.44 
0.69 
0.00 
0.55 
0.83 
12 
2.63 
1.23 
1.73 
0.50 
1.11 
0.62 
0.23 
0.32 
0.00 
0.91 
1.15 
12 
2.04 
0.97 
2.33 
0.91 
1.39 
0.00 
0.79 
0.00 
0.00 
1 96 
1.37 
0.25 
0.61 
0.50 
0.56 
0.55 
13 
0.64 
1.03 
0.84 
0.17 
0.50 
13 
0.60 
1.09 
0.59 
0.32 
0.64 
0.01 
0,02 
0.15 
16 
0.02 
0.05 
0.05 
16 
0.03 
0.03 
0.12 
0.72 
0.62 
0.55 
1.66 
0.53 
2.00 
1.08 
0.60 
0.00 
0.89 
0.76 
18 
0.77 
0.65 
0.50 
1.33 
0.79 
0.45 
1,02 
0.67 
0.00 
096 
0.83 
18 
1.08 
0.98 
1.09 
1.70 
0.87 
0.93 
0.91 
0.00 
0.00 
1.12 
1.00 
0.73 
1.77 
1.61 
0.93 
0.88 
0.10 
0.50 
0.43 
0.00 
1.01 
1.17 
21 
1.66 
1.24 
1.12 
1.61 
1.11 
0.28 
0.60 
0.83 
0.00 
1.24 
1.17 
21 
1.46 
1.27 
1.16 
2.11 
1.04 
0.24 
0.90 
0.49 
0.30 
0.96 
1.17 
0.98 
1.40 
0.77 
0.46 
0.91 
24 
2.22 
1.83 
1.06 
0.86 
1.04 
24 
2.28 
1.84 
1.24 
0.72 
0.43 
0.57 
0.97 
0.48 
0.07 
0.56 
0.00 
0.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.41 
0.63 
26 
0.66 
0.72 
0.56 
0.06 
0.46 
0.00 
0.56 
000 
0.00 
0.68 
0.59 
26 
1.00 
1.06 
0.82 
0.25 
0.62 
0.00 
0.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.75 
0.79 
27 
0.57 
27 
0.40 
0.01 
0.17 
29 
0.06 
0.00 
29 
0.05 
0.01 
0.64 
0.64 
1.01 
31 
0.95 
0.65 
0.88 
31 
0.93 
0.91 
1.02 
0.94 
I K 
68 
1.13 
0.91 
68 
1.12 
1.17 
1.25 
1.29 
1.37 
0.09 
0.89 
0.00 
0.08 
0.52 
0.00 
0.75 
0.89 
73 
0.57 
1.23 
1.20 
0.35 
0.62 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.47 
0.73 
73 
1.21 
1.99 
1.38 
0.38 
0.96 
0.05 
0.09 
1.23 
0.00 
0.73 
1.19 
0.53 
1.09 
0.41 
0.42 
0.79 
0.17 
0.50 
1.25 
0.00 
0.72 
0.84 
76 
0.79 
1.13 
0.65 
0.94 
0.74 
0.10 
0.73 
1.14 
0.00 
0.47 
0.87 
76 
0.76 
1.39 
0.67 
0.75 
0.71 
0.20 
0.78 
0.60 
0.00 
0.72 
1.06 
0.32 
0.38 
78 
0.62 
0.54 
78 
1.01 
0.80 
0.4·/ 
0.13 
83 
0.83 
0.14 
83 
1.38 
0.41 
0.84 
0.54 
0.40 
0.72 
0.54 
2.48 
0.93 
1.07 
1.28 
0.88 
0.75 
10 
0.49 
0.43 
0.40 
0.44 
0.54 
1.65 
0.69 
0.55 
0.00 
0.87 
0.53 
10 
0.40 
0.74 
0.34 
0.89 
0.91 
1.73 
0.59 
0.31 
4.17 
0.81 
0.60 
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Table C.l. (continued) 
Year 
1992 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1993 
1994 
MFA category 
4 
0.80 
1.37 
1.26 
10.20 
1.03 
0.22 
0.83 
0.45 
0.53 
1.09 
1.07 
4 
1.05 
0.94 
5 
1.24 
1.03 
0.80 
2.02 
0.69 
0.43 
0.86 
0.66 
0.38 
1.06 
0.95 
5 
1.10 
1.00 
6 
0.53 
0.8! 
0.64 
1.98 
0.47 
0.13 
0.56 
0.79 
0.43 
0.62 
0.68 
6 
1.08 
1.16 
7 
0.50 
1.14 
0.26 
4.18 
0.56 
0.10 
0.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.68 
0.70 
7 
1.14 
1.17 
8 
0.53 
0.79 
0.88 
2.18 
061 
0.08 
0.50 
1.11 
0.23 
1.68 
0.87 
8 
1.08 
0.92 
12 
1.73 
1.28 
1.95 
0.68 
0.89 
0.61 
0.43 
0.00 
0.33 
1.78 
1.17 
12 
1.18 
1.18 
13 
0.42 
1.01 
0.73 
0.09 
0.47 
13 
0.53 
0.61 
16 
0.38 
0.25 
0.12 
16 
0.23 
0.23 
18 
0.77 
1.13 
0.72 
2.50 
0.87 
0.81 
0.87 
0.67 
2.94 
1.14 
1.02 
18 
1.10 
1.04 
21 
0.78 
1.33 
1.35 
2.28 
0.86 
0.52 
1.23 
0.98 
0.47 
1.01 
1.17 
21 
1.17 
1.17 
24 
1.70 
1.71 
1.05 
1.53 
0.68 
24 
1.15 
0.99 
26 
0.51 
1.43 
069 
0.38 
0.76 
0.00 
0.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.46 
0.80 
26 
0.68 
0.83 
27 
0.22 
27 
29 
0.33 
0.76 
29 
31 
0.79 
0.68 
0.94 
31 
0.92 
0.90 
68 
0.62 
0.74 
68 
73 
1.03 
1.62 
0.97 
1.01 
1.05 
0.88 
0.26 
0.32 
0.00 
0.88 
1.07 
73 
1 01 
1.44 
76 
0.60 
1.34 
0.75 
2.66 
0.69 
0.19 
0.46 
0.71 
0.00 
0.51 
0.93 
76 
0.74 
0.82 
78 
0.50 
0.71 
78 
0.81 
0.90 
83 
1.01 
0.57 
83 
0.56 
0.51 
10 
0.89 
0.52 
0.57 
10 
0.72 
Table C.2. Quota utilization rates for Hong Kong, 1989-94 
Year 
1989 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1990 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
MFA category 
4 5 6 7 8 12 13 16 18 21 24 26 27 28 
0.85 1.01 0.88 1.03 1.07 1.57 0.73 0.02 0.47 0.93 0.88 0.46 0.50 
0.97 1.03 0.76 0.96 0.95 0.71 0.98 0.08 0.22 0.93 1.31 0.44 0.45 
0.72 0.82 0.73 1.30 0.94 0.65 0.64 0.06 0.30 0.46 0.91 0.24 0.53 
4.75 1.10 1.82 2.06 1.19 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.47 1.23 0.77 0.52 0.39 
1.62 1.05 0.68 0.86 1.04 0.20 1.38 0.01 0.46 1.22 1.03 0.67 0.55 
0.58 0.92 0.33 1.22 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.20 0.24 0.41 
0.69 0.76 0.24 0.21 0.60 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.39 0.97 0.55 0,09 0.08 
0.61 0.97 0.71 1.04 1.01 0.00 2.06 0.00 1.00 1.19 0.62 0.00 0.41 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.31 0.93 1.11 1.18 1.02 7.56 0.96 0.10 0,83 1.05 
1.12 0.97 0.90 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.86 0.07 0.44 0.96 
4 5 6 7 8 12 13 16 18 21 
0.92 1.16 0.97 0.91 1.16 2.16 0.75 0.03 0.46 
1.02 1.17 0.78 1.07 1.15 0.52 0.89 0.04 0.19 ** 
0.63 0.90 0.90 1.15 1.04 0.49 0.56 0.05 0.29 
12.6 1.91 6.74 2.65 5.13 0.45 0.25 0.04 0.38 
1.45 0.96 0.64 0.97 1.04 0.06 1.47 0.01 0.44 
0.69 0.92 0.25 1.84 0.48 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.03 
0.60 0.66 0.16 0.13 0.76 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.26 
0.58 0.71 0.40 1.45 0.91 0.00 1.84 0.00 0.94 
0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.26 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.78 2.39 0.95 0.05 0.71 
1.12 1.05 0.84 1.01 0.98 0.49 0.83 0.04 0.39 
29 31 68 73 77 78 83 10 72 74 86 
0.06 0.71 0.90 0.96 0.22 0.43 0.55 0.60 0.86 0.49 
0.08 0.77 0.77 1.04 0.38 0.33 0.67 0.42 0.75 0.29 
0.00 0.68 0.84 1.97 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.78 0.83 0.39 
0,11 0.58 0.07 0.92 2.33 0.49 0.00 0.87 0.12 0.23 
0.03 0.60 0.91 0.59 0.23 0.56 0.58 1.14 0.49 0.33 
0.00 0.41 0.04 1.19 0.00 0.00 0.34 1.43 0.00 0.19 
0.00 0.75 0.35 1.37 0.18 0.09 3.17 0.51 0.05 0.32 
0.00 0.33 0.90 0.97 1.00 0.34 1.36 1.26 0.54 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.03 0.97 1.04 0.67 0.17 0.84 1.25 1.04 0.20 0.65 0.69 0.96 0.76 0.68 0.46 
1.02 0.60 0.59 
24 26 27 28 
0.77 0.42 0.55 
1.22 0.47 0.52 
1.00 0.16 0.37 
2.00 0.46 0.34 
1.08 0.84 0.54 
0.09 0.33 0.33 
0.40 0.08 0.04 
0.58 0.10 0.59 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.09 0.74 0.91 1.04 0.29 0.43 0.79 0.79 0.68 0.45 
29 31 68 73 77 78 83 10 72 74 86 
0.02 0.75 0.82 0.22 0.12 0.38 1.50 0.43 0.90 0.30 
0.06 0.68 0.84 0.93 0.32 0.34 0.72 0.47 0.80 0.26 
0.00 0.31 0.92 0.80 0.07 0.21 5.68 0.74 0.90 0.37 
0.32 0.60 0.12 0.63 0.75 0.80 0.74 0.30 0.51 0.27 
0.02 0.67 1.03 0.73 0.21 0.81 0.84 0.95 0.60 0.35 
0.00 0.19 0.03 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.09 
0.12 0.47 0.16 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.51 0.01 0.14 
0.34 0.61 0.56 1.11 0.33 0.33 0.00 1.31 0.59 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.47 0.00 0.00 
0.96 0.67 0.79 0.99 0.08 1.22 1.11 0.79 0.13 0.74 0.76 0.84 0.73 0.27 0.29 
0.96 0.52 0.55 0.06 0.76 0.87 0.75 0.21 0.47 0.86 0.71 0.71 0.26 
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Table C.2. (continued) 
Year MFA category 
1991 8 12 13 16 18 21 24 26 27 28 29 31 68 73 78 83 10 72 74 86 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1992 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1993 
1994 
1.13 1.22 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.59 0.84 0.02 0.36 
0.84 1.15 0.77 I 04 1.24 0.58 1.12 0.02 0.23 
0.81 1.26 0.93 1.29 1.05 0.75 0.85 0.00 0.28 
11.2 2.81 6.20 2.04 4.29 0.05 1.10 0.07 0.61 
1.46 1.03 0.56 0.69 1.24 0.08 1.89 0.00 0.25 
0.77 0.93 0.14 1.40 0.50 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.10 
0.79 0.63 0.19 0.29 1.12 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.25 
0.26 0.80 0.65 0.64 0.87 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.49 
0.90 0.40 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.08 
1.40 0.90 0.86 0.98 0.76 0.19 1.19 0 22 0.81 
1.12 1.04 0.82 0.99 1.01 0.42 1.03 0.06 0.40 
4 5 6 7 8 12 13 16 18 
1.27 1.47 1.47 1.11 0.90 0.62 0.64 0.37 0.25 
0.70 0.58 0.60 
** 1.36 0.97 0.55 
1.00 0.64 0.60 
0.41 0.48 0.56 
1.01 0.76 0.46 
0.09 0.21 0.41 
0.33 0.11 0.04 
0.40 0.10 0.19 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.03 0.72 0.56 0.33 0.06 0.36 1.21 0.31 0.88 0.50 
0.05 0.72 0.87 1.04 0.29 0.33 1.16 0.40 0.95 0.43 
0.00 0.41 0.72 1.28 0.14 0.19 1.51 0.71 0.85 0.54 
0.12 0.54 0.31 1.98 1.20 1.61 0.50 0.59 0.46 0.18 
0.07 0.62 0.90 0.44 0.43 0.83 0.78 0.81 0.55 0.20 
0.00 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.08 0.38 0.87 0.00 0.36 
0.06 0.48 0.12 0.48 0.38 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.03 0.03 
0.00 0.55 0.66 1.25 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.11 0.92 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 3.79 0.00 0.00 
0.82 0.77 0.78 0.65 0.11 0.77 1.13 0.59 0.16 0.59 0.73 0.83 0.64 0.34 
0.92 0.79 0.57 
21 24 26 27 28 
1.42 0.51 0.88 0.61 
0.94 1.16 0.78 0.76 1.13 0.44 1.02 0.05 0.22 0.89 0.98 0.99 0.43 
1.04 1.10 0.81 1.25 0.83 0.55 0.67 0.40 0.29 0.43 0.99 0.82 0.46 
6.02 3.54 7.57 3.60 4.14 0.05 0.96 0.70 1.90 3.06 0.43 1.10 0.35 
1.08 1.12 0.44 0.75 0.87 0.12 2.03 0.17 0.24 1.36 0.73 0.86 0.29 
0.71 0.79 0.14 0.79 0.24 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.83 0.08 0.29 0.14 
0.70 0.70 0.23 0.32 0.75 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.95 0.45 0.14 0.07 
0.50 0.95 0.46 0.48 0.91 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.81 0.61 0.63 0.10 0.06 
0.28 0.77 0.42 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.07 0.68 0.83 0.77 0.25 0.43 0.84 0.65 0.73 0.35 
29 31 68 73 78 83 10 72 74 86 
0.84 0.84 0.50 0.43 0.03 0.34 1.30 0.30 0.73 1.97 
0.12 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.38 0.18 0.77 0.56 0.81 0.24 
0.86 0.23 0.55 0.55 0.75 0.12 1.01 0.64 0.47 0.66 
0.69 0.87 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.64 1.06 0.68 0.92 0.41 
0.42 0.69 0.70 0.54 0 69 0.51 0.69 0.95 0.36 0.00 
0.00 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.08 0.00 0.43 
0.43 0.39 0.20 0.58 0.40 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.03 0.01 
0.00 1.01 0.30 1.54 0.00 0.22 0.67 1.72 0.51 0.00 
0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.13 0.00 0.00 
1.24 0.80 0.92 1.05 0.80 0.81 1.40 0.16 0.85 0.86 0.52 0.76 0.66 0.70 0.27 1.00 1.01 0.56 0.13 0.42 0.73 0.79 0.65 0.26 
1.12 1.02 0.88 0.87 0.95 0.41 0.97 0.14 0.41 
4 5 6 7 8 12 13 16 18 
0.95 0.67 0.85 0.47 
21 24 26 27 28 
0.90 1.05 1.12 1.01 1.06 0.40 1.05 0.14 0.34 0.99 0.84 0.66 0.40 
0.84 1.05 1.02 1.01 1.12 0.25 0.81 0.08 0.25 1.01 0.53 0.64 0.37 
0.29 0.68 0.65 0.55 0.32 0.29 0.76 0.67 0.62 0.41 
29 31 68 73 78 83 10 72 74 86 
0.20 0.47 0.49 0.18 0.17 0.47 0.93 0.54 0.19 0.07 
0.27 0.83 0.55 0.55 0.16 0.42 0.88 0.58 0.53 0.19 
** denotes data deficiency 
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Table C.3. Quota utilization rates for India, 1989-94 
Year 
1989 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1990 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
1 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1991 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1992 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1993 
1994 
MFA Category 
4 
0.90 
1.10 
0.83 
1.13 
0.89 
0.16 
0.38 
0.57 
0.00 
1.13 
0.86 
4 
0.95 
1.02 
0.90 
1.58 
0.86 
0.00 
0.44 
0.66 
0.45 
1.05 
0.85 
4 
1.12 
1.30 
1.06 
2.29 
1.17 
0.04 
0.43 
0.95 
1.12 
1.08 
1.00 
4 
1.35 
1.41 
1.02 
1.85 
0.81 
0.46 
0.39 
0.87 
0.59 
1.16 
1.00 
4 
1.01 
0.99 
5 
0.98 
0.85 
0.53 
0.22 
0.74 
0.16 
0.37 
0.19 
0.00 
0.53 
0.67 
5 
0.53 
0.62 
0.34 
0.38 
0.37 
0.06 
0.20 
0.00 
0.19 
0.52 
0.49 
5 
1.05 
1.24 
0.68 
0.76 
0.75 
0.12 
0.40 
0.00 
0.37 
1.03 
0.99 
5 
0.89 
1.28 
0.99 
0.59 
0.78 
0.00 
0.35 
1.03 
0.08 
1.16 
0.97 
5 
1.01 
0.79 
6 
0.19 
0.19 
0.12 
0.31 
0.10 
0.05 
0.11 
0.04 
0.00 
0.13 
0.15 
6 
0.23 
0.17 
0.05 
0.54 
0.12 
0.12 
0.12 
0.07 
0.00 
0.09 
0.15 
6 
0.21 
0.15 
0.05 
0.33 
0.10 
0.14 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.13 
6 
0.76 
0.40 
0.29 
0.42 
0.31 
0.02 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.57 
0.42 
6 
0.41 
0.53 
7 
0.84 
0.97 
0.99 
1.27 
0.82 
0.37 
0.34 
0.67 
0.25 
0.80 
0.84 
7 
1.08 
1.35 
1.25 
2.97 
1.01 
0.43 
0.42 
0.98 
0.43 
0.93 
1.09 
7 
1.02 
1.24 
1.16 
3.12 
0.84 
0.56 
0.49 
0.91 
0.78 
0.81 
0,99 
7 
1.59 
1.23 
1.29 
3.56 
0.92 
0.32 
0.62 
0.65 
0.58 
1.05 
1.15 
7 
1.17 
1.17 
8 
1.11 
1.19 
0.91 
0.99 
0.91 
0.13 
0.25 
0.96 
0.00 
1.13 
1.00 
8 
0.90 
1.26 
0.95 
2.34 
0.88 
0.27 
0.36 
0.71 
0.26 
0.88 
0.94 
8 
0.86 
1.38 
1.00 
2.99 
0.97 
0.17 
0.60 
0.82 
0.04 
0.67 
0.97 
8 
1.17 
1.26 
0.80 
2.46 
0.97 
0.28 
0.66 
0.66 
0.15 
0.70 
0.97 
8 
0.69 
0.55 
15 
0.12 
0.21 
0.23 
0.15 
0.16 
0.07 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.13 
15 
0.09 
0.15 
0.11 
0.21 
0.22 
0.09 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.05 
0,11 
15 
0.10 
0.17 
0.21 
0.18 
0.15 
0.08 
0.02 
Oi l 
0.03 
0.06 
0.12 
15 
0.15 
0.15 
0.14 
0.14 
0.11 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.11 
15 
0.10 
0.14 
26 
0.47 
0.26 
0.31 
0.55 
080 
0.13 
0.33 
0.37 
0.00 
0.80 
0.53 
26 
0.57 
0.37 
0.41 
0.98 
0.85 
0.08 
0.18 
0.73 
0.00 
0.92 
0.60 
26 
0.65 
0.55 
0.70 
1.05 
0.93 
0.34 
0.23 
0.83 
0.70 
1.02 
0.71 
26 
1.41 
0.77 
0.61 
1.34 
0.99 
0.15 
0.38 
0.53 
0.33 
1.18 
0.92 
26 
1.01 
1.01 
27 
0.40 
0.57 
0.67 
0.57 
0.48 
0.07 
0.16 
0.32 
0.03 
0.74 
0.52 
27 
0.51 
0.56 
0.50 
0.77 
0.65 
0.12 
0.16 
0.39 
0.03 
0.81 
0.57 
27 
0.48 
0.43 
0.71 
0.93 
0.74 
0.33 
0.14 
0.36 
0.10 
0.93 
0.57 
27 
0.48 
0.26 
0.29 
0.73 
0.56 
0.12 
0.08 
0.16 
0.00 
0.82 
0.45 
27 
0.60 
1.03 
29 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.10 
0.04 
29 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.06 
0.03 
29 
001 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.04 
0.01 
29 
0.22 
0.15 
0.21 
0.42 
0.25 
0.04 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
0.35 
0.21 
29 
0.21 
0.27 
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Table C.4. Quota utilization rates for Indonesia, 1989-94 
Year 
1989 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1990 
MFA category 
4 
0.59 
0.72 
0.70 
0.59 
1.12 
0.24 
0.35 
0.00 
0.00 
1.03 
0.75 
4 
5 6 
1.15 
1.03 
1.25 
0.11 
0.93 
0.00 
0.06 
0.08 
0.00 
0.89 
0.85 
5 6 
7 
0.99 
1.19 
0.67 
0.49 
0.45 
0.00 
0.19 
0.25 
0.00 
0.97 
0.82 
7 
8 
1.30 
0.87 
1.20 
1.40 
1.07 
0.00 
0.18 
1.31 
0.00 
0.96 
0.87 
8 
21 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1991 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1992 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1993 
1994 
0.49 
0.66 
0.31 
1.41 
0.56 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
1.07 
0.65 
4 
0.88 
0.99 
0.45 
0.98 
0.71 
0.08 
0.46 
0.78 
0.00 
1.52 
0.93 
4 
1.05 
0.97 
0.75 
0.67 
0.65 
0.26 
0.20 
0.84 
0.00 
1.29 
0.87 
4 
0.98 
1.04 
5 
5 
1.03 
1.03 
1.14 
0.38 
1.20 
0.05 
0.36 
0.43 
0.00 
1.12 
1.03 
5 
1.12 
1.06 
1.14 
1.00 
1.17 
0.38 
0.98 
0.00 
0.08 
0.52 
0.00 
0.85 
0.84 
6 
1.08 
0.69 
0.68 
0.49 
0.76 
0.25 
0.22 
0.21 
0.00 
0.77 
0.69 
6 
1.05 
0.74 
0.69 
0.45 
0.71 
0.03 
0.41 
0.60 
0.00 
0.65 
0.70 
6 
0.74 
0.82 
1.09 
1.25 
0.48 
1.32 
0.57 
0.00 
0.36 
0.12 
0.00 
1.09 
0.91 
7 
1.14 
1.37 
0.57 
1.30 
0.56 
0.00 
0.82 
1.33 
0.00 
0.78 
0.96 
7 
0.91 
1.42 
0.20 
1.04 
0.55 
0.16 
0.43 
0.21 
0.00 
0.80 
0.85 
7 
1.01 
1.10 
1.31 
1.08 
0.87 
1.01 
0.95 
0.10 
0.52 
0.22 
0.00 
1.02 
0.96 
8 
1.09 
1.22 
1.00 
0.84 
1.30 
0.09 
0.43 
1.53 
0.00 
0.97 
1.02 
8 
1.42 
1.16 
1.41 
0.87 
1.27 
0.08 
0.36 
0.97 
0.00 
1.20 
1.06 
8 
1.17 
1.17 
21 
21 
0.93 
0.85 
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Table C.5. Quota utilization rates for Poland, 1989-94 
Year 
1989 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1990 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1991 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1992 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1993 
1994 
MFA category 
4 
0.43 
0.43 
0.55 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.30 
4 
0.58 
0.52 
1.51 
0.00 
0.17 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.29 
0.37 
4 
0.50 
0.84 
1.29 
0.05 
0.07 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.45 
4 
0.40 
0.59 
3.77 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.35 
4 
0.51 
0.51 
5 
0.94 
1.26 
1.06 
0.00 
0.81 
0.00 
0.00 
0.17 
0.00 
0.17 
0.68 
5 
0.90 
1.26 
3.78 
0.03 
0.40 
0.00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.71 
5 
0.96 
1.52 
2.80 
0.02 
0.66 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.82 
5 
1.01 
1.35 
3.64 
0.01 
0.42 
0.00 
0.38 
0.00 
0.35 
0.12 
0.71 
5 
0.63 
0.61 
6 7 
0.67 
2,42 
4.24 
0.00 
0.58 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 0.23 
0.00 
0.24 
1.17 
6 7 
0.61 
1.55 
2.91 
0.01 
0.32 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.82 
6 7 
0.66 
1.32 
1.86 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.72 
6 7 
0.66 
1.34 
3.78 
0.01 
0.13 
0.00 
0.07 
0.08 
0.00 
0.09 
0.55 
6 7 
0.51 
0.56 
8 
1.78 
0.78 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.50 
8 
0.42 
0.85 
0.06 
0.02 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.43 
8 
0.29 
0.53 
0.14 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.28 
8 
0.26 
0.57 
0.20 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.25 
8 
0.24 
0.18 
12 
0.00 
1.09 
0.70 
0.00 
1.10 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.45 
0.79 
12 
1.02 
1.86 
0.67 
0.00 
1.48 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
1.12 
12 
1.90 
2.07 
0.65 
0.00 
0.92 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.27 
1.17 
12 
1.13 
0.87 
0.39 
0.00 
0.24 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.49 
12 
0.51 
0.50 
13 
0.13 
0.88 
2.40 
0.00 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.21 
0.67 
13 
0.37 
1.03 
3.87 
0.00 
0.24 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.11 
0.78 
13 
0.79 
1.39 
3.10 
0.00 
1.48 
0.00 
0.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
1.17 
13 
13 
14 
0.36 
1.24 
0.34 
0.05 
0.31 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
1.58 
0.79 
14 
0.71 
1.16 
0.53 
0.10 
0.23 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.92 
0.72 
14 
0.90 
1.73 
0.43 
0.12 
0.41 
0.00 
0.33 
0.24 
0.00 
0.85 
1.01 
14 
0.55 
1.57 
0.36 
0.06 
0.31 
0.00 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.52 
0.83 
14 
0.76 
0.89 
15 
0.37 
0.46 
0.27 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0.05 
0.23 
15 
0.47 
0.53 
0.48 
0.01 
0.12 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.28 
15 
0.82 
1.04 
0.79 
0.03 
0.29 
0.00 
0.07 
0.16 
0.00 
0.11 
0.56 
15 
0.81 
0.49 
0.81 
0.02 
0.17 
0.00 
0.05 
0.08 
0.00 
0.04 
0.35 
15 
0.31 
0.44 
16 
2.64 
1.07 
0.55 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.99 
1.60 
0.00 
1.16 
0.94 
16 
1.56 
0.76 
0.40 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.63 
1.07 
0.00 
0.55 
0.60 
16 
1.25 
0.76 
1.68 
000 
0.57 
0.00 
0.54 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.66 
16 
0.83 
0.38 
0.91 
0.00 
0.25 
0.00 
0.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.36 
16 
0.30 
0.36 
17 
0.31 
0.97 
17 
0.11 
0.80 
17 
0.14 
0.50 
17 
17 
18 
0.27 
0.67 
0.74 
0.00 
0.49 
0.00 
0.33 
1.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.46 
18 
0.00 
0.53 
0.65 
0.11 
0.20 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.28 
18 
0.05 
0.39 
0.24 
0.06 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.18 
18 
18 
24 
0.73 
1.31 
0.10 
0.00 
0.77 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.86 
0.79 
24 
0.42 
0.72 
0.02 
0.00 
0.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
0.65 
0.56 
24 
0.13 
0.60 
0.07 
0.00 
0.54 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.22 
0.36 
24 
0.06 
0.19 
0.10 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.16 
24 
0.20 
0.14 
26 
0.18 
0.77 
0.69 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.41 
26 
0.17 
0.85 
1.21 
0.00 
0,09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.44 
26 
0.39 
1.23 
2.88 
0.03 
0,13 
0,00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.13 
0.64 
26 
0.71 
1.05 
1.76 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.50 
26 
0.62 
0.73 
28 
0.14 
28 
0.18 
28 
0.14 
28 
28 
73 
0.00 
0.35 
0.19 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.37 
0.19 
73 
0.08 
0.14 
1.38 
0.05 
0.06 
0.00 
0.92 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.19 
73 
0.02 
0.10 
3.06 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
3.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
73 
73 
83 
0.05 
0.06 
83 
0.03 
0.18 
83 
0.08 
0.16 
83 
83 
69 
0.91 
69 
0.69 
69 
0.29 
69 
69 
> 
■o ■o 
Table C.6. Quota utilization rates for South Korea, 1989-94 
Year 
1989 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1990 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
MFA category 
5 8 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 21 24 26 27 28 29 31 68 
0.85 
0.66 
0.52 
7.56 
0.88 
0.00 
1.02 
0.82 
0.00 
1.04 
0.88 
0.66 
0.66 
0.68 
2.31 
0.85 
0.00 
0.13 
0.98 
0.00 
0.88 
0.75 
0.27 
0.35 
0.22 
1.31 
0.52 
0.00 
0.06 
1.37 
0.00 
0.60 
0.40 
0.65 
1.04 
0.53 
2.90 
1.03 
0.00 
0.26 
0.56 
0.00 
0.76 
0.81 
0.80 
0.92 
0.88 
1.47 
1.22 
0,10 
0,66 
1.12 
0.00 
1.12 
0.91 
0.83 
0.82 
0.63 
0.80 
1.05 
0.00 
0.16 
0.80 
0.00 
1.05 
0.78 
1.09 
0.70 
0.11 
0.09 
0.78 
0.00 
0.00 
0.46 
0.00 
0.14 
0.52 
0.16 
0.20 
0.11 
0.82 
0.38 
0.23 
0.17 
0.41 
0.00 
0.43 
0.25 
0.40 
0.53 
0.15 
0.20 
0.41 
0.23 
0.03 
0.12 
0.00 
0.58 
0.45 
0.04 
0.18 
0.09 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.12 
0.11 
0.37 
0.30 
0.29 
0.72 
0.50 
0.00 
0.22 
0.08 
0.00 
0.21 
0.27 
0.10 
0.08 
0.08 
0.10 
0.81 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.15 
0.73 
0.81 
0.40 
1.04 
0.66 
0.71 
0.81 
0.74 
0.05 
0.88 
0.78 
0.75 
0.55 
0.14 
0.00 
0.83 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.51 
0.20 
0.35 
0.10 
0.10 
0.58 
0.00 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.38 
0.65 
0.67 
0.29 
0.09 
0.39 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.75 
0.56 
0,34 
0.38 
0.13 
0.44 
0.58 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.77 
0.48 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.45 
0.29 
0.25 
0.26 
0.57 
0,22 
0.57 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.45 
0.34 
0.67 
0.82 
0.63 
0.20 
0.56 
0.00 
0.11 
0.14 
0.00 
0.83 
0.65 
0.95 
0.67 
0.90 
1.43 
1.12 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
1.40 
0.88 
0.17 
0.34 
0.24 
0.50 
0.41 
0.00 
0.89 
0.00 
0.00 
0.44 
0.36 
0.61 
0.28 
0.44 
0.44 
0.66 
0.70 
0.13 
0.26 
0.00 
0.61 
0.51 
73 77 78 83 
0.60 
0.14 
0.00 
0.40 
0.75 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.38 
0.31 
10 69 70 
0.20 
0.10 
0.21 
0.29 
0.17 
0.35 
0.63 
0.15 
0.61 
0.61 
0.28 
0.56 
0.27 
0.25 
0.40 
8 
86 
0.44 
045 
0.26 
0.40 
0.17 
0.09 0.08 
0,24 
0.32 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 21 24 26 27 28 29 31 68 73 77 78 83 10 69 70 86 
0.71 
0.79 
0.36 
6.71 
1.03 
0.00 
0.39 
1.02 
0.00 
1.19 
0.92 
0.65 
1.11 
0.93 
1.85 
1.26 
0.37 
0.10 
0.87 
0.00 
0.69 
0.78 
0.32 
0.26 
0.22 
0.85 
0.52 
0.00 
0.07 
1.18 
0.00 
0.50 
0.35 
0.42 
0.97 
0.33 
2.06 
1.24 
0.00 
0.24 
0.53 
0.00 
0.49 
0.65 
0.84 0. 
0.87 0. 
0.37 0. 
1.13 0. 
1.06 0. 
0.00 0. 
0.75 0. 
1.02 0. 
0.00 0. 
0.92 0. 
0.86 0. 
84 
84 
61 
89 
99 
00 
20 
70 
00 
77 
76 
0.98 
0.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.91 
0.00 
0.03 
0.46 
0.00 
0.16 
0.50 
0.07 0 
0.09 0 
0.00 0 
1.63 0 
0.31 0 
0.14 0 
0.12 0 
0.46 0 
0.00 0 
0.30 0 
0.16 0. 
.07 
.35 
.08 
21 
.32 
.15 
.03 
00 
00 
,22 
23 
0.01 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.06 
0.23 
0.11 
0.16 
0.91 
0.30 
0.00 
0.12 
0.04 
0.00 
0.16 
0.16 
10 
13 
04 
04 
57 
00 
19 
00 
00 
05 
16 
0.58 
0.85 
0.25 
1.97 
0.94 
0.72 
1.03 
0.78 
0.05 
0.80 
0.80 
0.28 
0.58 
0.00 
0.07 
0.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.37 
0.21 
0.19 
0.02 
0.18 
0.28 
0.00 
0.09 
0.16 
0.00 
0.18 
0.19 
0.33 
0.72 
0.32 
0.26 
0.80 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.49 
0.82 
0.58 
0.50 
0.67 
0.85 
0.00 
0.14 
0.40 
0.00 
0.77 
0.65 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.05 
0.19 
0.12 
0.00 
0.20 
0.68 
0.00 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.25 
0.28 
0.48 
0.77 
0.44 
0.21 
0.65 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.50 
0.52 
0.60 
1.31 
1.06 
0.45 
0.21 
1.24 
0.00 
0.00 
1.32 
0.82 
0.18 
0.10 
0.17 
0.56 
0.20 
0.00 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.15 
0.29 
0.20 
0.15 
1.00 
0.19 
0.25 
0.14 
0.05 
0.11 
0.18 
0.21 
1.67 
0.15 
0.00 
0.45 
0.78 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.23 
0.11 
0.11 
0.20 
0.30 
0.15 
0.16 
0.41 
0.23 
0.18 
0.45 
0.21 
0.25 
0.29 0.34 
0.05 0.23 
0.23 
0.24 
0.15 
0.17 
0.22 
r. 
c 
c 
o 
Table C.6. (continued) 
—α 
Os 
Year 
1991 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1992 
BNL 
D 
DK 
E 
F 
GR 
I 
IRL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
1993 
1994 
M F A category 
4 
0.66 
0.71 
0.33 
5.02 
0.95 
0.00 
0.35 
0.93 
0.00 
1.09 
0.84 
4 
0.53 
0.53 
0.42 
2.43 
0.55 
0.00 
0.38 
1.05 
1.50 
0.83 
0.59 
4 
0.54 
0.53 
5 
0.79 
1.33 
1.12 
1.79 
1.49 
0.42 
0.12 
1.05 
0.00 
0.84 
0.94 
5 
1.07 
1.20 
0.76 
4.73 
0.92 
0.23 
0.15 
0.43 
0.09 
0.66 
0.87 
5 
0.80 
0.62 
6 
0.58 
0.59 
0.33 
0.62 
0.50 
0.17 
0.20 
0.11 
0.00 
0.38 
0.47 
6 
0.27 
0.35 
0.06 
0.60 
0.28 
0.00 
0.03 
0.11 
0.00 
0.30 
0.27 
6 
0.27 
0.12 
7 
0.35 
1.09 
0.43 
2.69 
1.10 
0.00 
0.66 
0.76 
0.00 
0.59 
0.73 
7 
0.21 
0.74 
0.19 
3.96 
0.55 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.28 
0.43 
7 
0.48 
0.35 
8 
0.94 
0.96 
0.13 
1.52 
1.09 
0.00 
0.91 
0.98 
0.00 
1.01 
0.96 
8 
0.79 
0.59 
0.18 
1.78 
0.68 
0.00 
0.67 
1.00 
0.00 
0.37 
0.63 
8 
0.62 
0.41 
12 
0.84 
0.84 
0.58 
0.72 
0.94 
0.00 
0.19 
0.65 
0.00 
0.73 
0.74 
12 
0.82 
1.06 
1.11 
0.76 
0.88 
0.00 
0.25 
0.22 
0.12 
1.07 
0.89 
12 
0.81 
0.78 
13 
0.97 
0.56 
0.00 
0.00 
0.89 
0.00 
0.03 
0.46 
0.00 
0.16 
0.48 
13 
0.18 
1.56 
0.00 
0.00 
1.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
13.8 
0.38 
0.47 
0.36 
14 
0.15 
0.08 
0.03 
1.37 
0.34 
0.06 
0.19 
0.45 
0.00 
0.26 
0.17 
14 
0.15 
0.05 
0.01 
1.10 
0.18 
0.09 
0.08 
0.12 
0.00 
0.19 
0.12 
14 
0.11 
0.04 
15 
0.08 
0.22 
0.06 
0.24 
0.29 
0.12 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.19 
15 
0.03 
0.10 
0.00 
0.43 
0.17 
0.12 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.09 
15 
0.08 
0.02 
16 
0.01 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
16 
0.00 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
16 
0.06 
0.02 
17 
0.20 
0.13 
0.02 
2.37 
0.22 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.10 
17 
0.10 
0.09 
0.00 
0.51 
0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.04 
1.43 
0.00 
0.05 
17 
0.04 
0.01 
18 
0.09 
0.18 
0.00 
0.08 
0.35 
0.54 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.16 
18 
0.06 
0.11 
0.00 
0.18 
0.27 
0.71 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.10 
18 
0.10 
0.04 
21 
0.89 
0.81 
0.26 
3.00 
1.16 
0.53 
1.20 
0.93 
0.13 
0.93 
0.92 
21 
0.60 
0.49 
0.06 
2.86 
0.60 
0.39 
0.73 
0.26 
0.13 
0.45 
0.54 
21 
0.37 
0.31 
24 
0.27 
0.51 
0.00 
0.06 
0.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.35 
24 
0.15 
0.23 
0.12 
0.00 
0.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.15 
24 
0.18 
0.18 
26 
0.34 
0.11 
0.02 
0.95 
0.22 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.13 
0.16 
26 
0.06 
0.20 
0.00 
0.65 
0.19 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.24 
0.17 
26 
0.13 
0.08 
27 
0.38 
0.57 
0.38 
0.33 
0.87 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.56 
0.48 
27 
0.39 
0.41 
0.25 
0.54 
0.77 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.38 
27 
0.42 
0.26 
28 
0.82 
0.53 
0.46 
0.62 
0.79 
0.00 
0.13 
0.40 
0.00 
0.75 
0.61 
28 
0.67 
0.49 
0.11 
0.69 
0.33 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.77 
0.50 
28 
0.51 
0.42 
29 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.06 
29 
0.14 
0.35 
0.17 
0.59 
0.23 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.19 
29 
0.19 
0.16 
31 
0.22 
0.18 
0.25 
0.00 
0.45 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.21 
31 
0.21 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.08 
31 
0.08 
0.01 
68 
0.46 
0.72 
0.45 
0.09 
0.49 
0.00 
0.05 
0.14 
0.00 
0.30 
0.44 
68 
0.48 
0.79 
1.00 
0.12 
0.37 
0.25 
0.05 
0.00 
0.43 
0.30 
0.45 
68 
0.41 
0.35 
73 
0.50 
0.53 
1.22 
1.02 
0.43 
0.21 
1.20 
0.00 
0.00 
1.29 
0.77 
73 
0.16 
0.66 
0.00 
1.67 
0.16 
0.00 
0.77 
0.00 
0.00 
0.11 
0.45 
73 
0.49 
0.06 
77 
0.18 
0.07 
0.07 
0.17 
0.14 
0.00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.10 
77 
0.11 
0.07 
0.00 
0.27 
0.12 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.07 
77 
0.07 
0.01 
78 
0.29 
0.19 
0.07 
1.22 
0.15 
0.23 
0.23 
0.22 
0.08 
0.35 
0.27 
78 
0.15 
0.21 
0.03 
0.70 
0.11 
0.17 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.16 
78 
0.15 
0.10 
83 
1.43 
0.12 
0.00 
0.42 
0.70 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.22 
83 
0.38 
1.12 
1.00 
0.23 
0.45 
0.20 
0.31 
0.00 
0.20 
0.48 
83 
0.26 
0.48 
10 
0.11 
0.09 
0.19 
0.27 
0.15 
0.14 
0.38 
0.22 
0.17 
0.42 
0.19 
10 
0.11 
0.14 
0.06 
0.18 
0.33 
0.38 
0.52 
0.00 
0.15 
0.66 
0.29 
10 
0.27 
0.22 
69 70 86 
0.26 0.44 
0.04 0.24 
0.21 
0.13 
0.24 0.36 
0.24 
0.04 
0.24 
69 70 86 
2.20 
0.30 
0.00 
0.05 
0.83 
0.00 
0.69 
0.00 
0.00 
0.13 
0.46 
69 70 86 
0.13 
0.02 
o 
m 
o •α 
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APPENDIX D 
Detailed model calibration 
Table D.I. Clothing 1988 - Model calibration 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Price equation 
Unit value 
(unresfd) 
(Pif) 
17.249 
17.367 
18.658 
23,403 
23,399 
23,057 
21.905 
19,710 
22.912 
24,533 
28.246 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
s 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
19,492 
19.625 
21.083 
26,446 
26,441 
26,055 
24,753 
22,273 
25,891 
27,723 
31,918 
Quota 
premium 
1.12 
1.09 
1.09 
1.13 
1.13 
1.15 
1.09 
1.08 
1.14 
1.10 
1.14 
Jnit value 
restricted) 
(Pie) 
15,401 
15.933 
17.117 
20,711 
20.707 
20,050 
20,096 
18,250 
20,098 
22,303 
24,778 
Supply equations 
I. Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
II. Unconstrained suppl 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
iers 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price Volume of 
(Pie) 
15,401 
15,933 
17,117 
20,711 
20,707 
20,050 
20,096 
18,250 
20,098 
22,303 
24.778 
imports 
(Sie) 
54,717 
10,459 
49,067 
194,051 
35,967 
129,993 
2.370 
20,763 
436 
181 
3.275 
Price Volume of 
(Pif) 
17,249 
17,367 
18.658 
23.403 
23,399 
23,057 
21,905 
19.710 
22,912 
24,533 
28,246 
imports 
(SiO 
69,922 
15,155 
24,165 
143.431 
13,051 
39,669 
927 
6.998 
375 
555 
1,538 
Slope 
(Bie) 
7.11 
1.31 
5.73 
18.74 
3.47 
12.97 
0.24 
2.28 
0.04 
0.02 
0.26 
Slope 
(Bit) 
8.11 
1.75 
2.59 
12.26 
1.12 
3.44 
0.08 
0.71 
0.03 
0.05 
0.11 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-54,717 
-10,459 
-49,067 
-194,051 
-35,967 
-129,993 
-2,370 
-20,763 
-436 
-181 
-3,275 
Intercept 
(Aif) 
-69,922 
-15.155 
-24.165 
-143,431 
-13,051 
-39,669 
-927 
-6.998 
-375 
-555 
-1.538 
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Table D.I. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,492 
19,625 
21,083 
26,446 
26,441 
26,055 
24.753 
22,273 
25,891 
27,723 
31,918 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
487,504 
101,745 
50,296 
407,056 
238,988 
274,713 
16,899 
13,203 
4.090 
2,355 
105,315 
Slope 
(Bir) 
37.52 
7.78 
3.58 
23.09 
13.56 
15.82 
1.02 
0.89 
0.24 
0.13 
4.95 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-243.752 
-50,873 
-25.148 
-203.528 
-119.494 
-137,356 
-8.449 
-6.601 
-2.045 
-1.178 
-52,657 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
54,717 
10,459 
49,067 
194,051 
35,967 
129,993 
2,370 
20,763 
436 
181 
3,275 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(Sif) 
69,922 
15,155 
24,165 
143,431 
13,051 
39,669 
927 
6,998 
375 
555 
1,538 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
487,504 
101,745 
50,296 
407,056 
238,988 
274,713 
16,899 
13,203 
4.090 
2,355 
105,315 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
612,143 
127,359 
123.528 
744,538 
288,006 
444,375 
20,196 
40,964 
4,901 
3,091 
110,128 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
Price 
(Pir) 
19.492 
19.625 
21,083 
26.446 
26.441 
26,055 
24,753 
22.273 
25,891 
27,723 
31,918 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
612,143 
127.359 
123,528 
744,538 
288.006 
444,375 
20,196 
40,964 
4,901 
3,091 
110,128 
Slope 
(dir) 
-34. Il 
-7.05 
-6.36 
-30.57 
-11.83 
-18.52 
-0.89 
-2.00 
-0.21 
-0.12 
-3.75 
Intercept 
(cir) 
1,276,931 
265,672 
257,680 
1,553.106 
600,781 
926,966 
42.128 
85.450 
10,224 
6,448 
229,726 
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Table D.2. Clothing 1988 - Counterfactual I: Replacement of national quotas with 
Community-wide restrictions 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
17.256 
17,402 
18,829 
23,392 
23,393 
22,959 
21,969 
20,000 
22,895 
24,559 
28,239 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
19.500 
19,664 
21,277 
26,434 
26,434 
25,944 
24,825 
22,600 
25,871 
27,752 
31,910 
Quota 
premium 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
15,310 
15,439 
16.705 
20,754 
20,754 
20,369 
19,491 
17,744 
20,312 
21,789 
25,054 
Supply equations 
I. Constrained supplier 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
II. Unconstrained supp 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
iers 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price Volume of 
(Pie) 
15,310 
15,439 
16,705 
20.754 
20.754 
20,369 
19,491 
17,744 
20,312 
21,789 
25.054 
imports 
(Sie) 
54,069 
9,810 
46.703 
194,851 
36,132 
134,136 
2,227 
19,611 
445 
173 
3,348 
Price Volume of 
(Pii) 
17,256 
17,402 
18,829 
23,392 
23,393 
22,959 
21,969 
20,000 
22,895 
24,559 
28,239 
imports 
(Sif) 
69,981 
15,216 
24,608 
143,297 
13,045 
39,332 
932 
7,204 
374 
556 
1,537 
Slope 
(Bie) 
7.11 
1.31 
5.73 
18.74 
3.47 
12.97 
0.24 
2.28 
0.04 
0.02 
0.26 
Slope 
(Bit) 
8.11 
1.75 
2.59 
12.26 
1.12 
3.44 
0.08 
0.71 
0.03 
0.05 
0.11 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-54,717 
-10,459 
-49,067 
-194,051 
-35,967 
-129,993 
-2,370 
-20,763 
-436 
-181 
-3,275 
Intercept 
(Aif) 
-69,922 
-15,155 
-24,165 
-143,431 
-13,051 
-39,669 
-927 
-6,998 
-375 
-555 
-1,538 
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Table D.2. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
19.500 
19,664 
21,277 
26,434 
26,434 
25,944 
24,825 
22,600 
25,871 
27,752 
31,910 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
487,813 
102,054 
50,988 
406,770 
238,903 
272,960 
16,972 
13,494 
4,085 
2,359 
105,274 
Slope 
(Bir) 
37.52 
7.78 
3.58 
23.09 
13.56 
15.82 
1.02 
0.89 
0.24 
0.13 
4.95 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-243,752 
-50,873 
-25,148 
-203,528 
-119,494 
-137,356 
-8,449 
-6,601 
-2,045 
-1,178 
-52,657 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
54,069 
9,810 
46,703 
194,851 
36,132 
134,136 
2,227 
19,611 
445 
173 
3,348 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(Sif) 
69,981 
15,216 
24,608 
143,297 
13,045 
39,332 
932 
7,204 
374 
556 
1,537 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
487,813 
102,054 
50,988 
406,770 
238,903 
272,960 
16,972 
13,494 
4,085 
2,359 
105,274 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
611,863 
127,080 
122,298 
744,917 
288,080 
446,427 
20,132 
40,309 
4,905 
3,088 
110,159 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,500 
19,664 
21,277 
26,434 
26,434 
25,944 
24,825 
22.600 
25.871 
27,752 
31,910 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
611,863 
127,080 
122,298 
744,917 
288,080 
446,427 
20,132 
40.309 
4,905 
3,088 
110,159 
Slope 
(dir) 
-34.11 
-7.05 
-6.36 
-30.57 
-11.83 
-18.52 
-0.89 
-2.00 
-0.21 
-0.12 
-3.75 
Intercept 
(cir) 
1,276,931 
265,672 
257,680 
1,553,106 
600.781 
926.966 
42,128 
85.450 
10.224 
6,448 
229,726 
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Table D.3. Clothing 1988 - Counterfactual II: Removal of all restrictions to trade 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
17.113 
17.272 
18.206 
22,853 
23,118 
22,351 
21,733 
19,179 
22,700 
24,428 
28.157 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
19,337 
19,517 
20.573 
25,824 
26.123 
25,257 
24,558 
21,672 
25,651 
27,603 
31,817 
Quota 
premium 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
17,113 
17,272 
18.206 
22,853 
23,118 
22.351 
21,733 
19,179 
22,700 
24,428 
28,157 
Supply equations 
Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price Volume of 
(Pie) 
17,113 
17.272 
18,206 
22,853 
23,118 
22,351 
21.733 
19.179 
22,700 
24.428 
28,157 
imports 
(Sie) 
66,879 
12,217 
55,310 
234.187 
44,342 
159,832 
2.756 
22.875 
549 
215 
4,168 
Slope 
(Bie) 
7.11 
1.31 
5.73 
18.74 
3.47 
12.97 
0.24 
2.28 
0.04 
0.02 
0.26 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-54,717 
-10,459 
-49,067 
-194,051 
-35,967 
-129,993 
-2,370 
-20,763 
-436 
-181 
-3,275 
II. Unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price Volume of 
(Pif) 
17,113 
17.272 
18.206 
22.853 
23.118 
22,351 
21,733 
19,179 
22,700 
24,428 
28,157 
imports 
(Sif) 
68,815 
14,989 
22.995 
136.682 
12,738 
37,238 
912 
6,620 
368 
550 
1,528 
Slope 
(BiO 
8.11 
1.75 
2.59 
12.26 
1.12 
3.44 
0.08 
0.71 
0.03 
0.05 
0.11 
Intercept 
(Aif) 
-69,922 
-15,155 
-24,165 
-143,431 
-13,051 
-39,669 
-927 
-6,998 
-375 
-555 
-1,538 
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Table D.3. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price Volume of 
(Pir) production 
19,337 
19,517 
20,573 
25,824 
26,123 
25,257 
24,558 
21,672 
25,651 
27,603 
31,817 
(Sir) 
481.714 
100,910 
48,470 
392,691 
234,683 
262,089 
16,700 
12,668 
4,033 
2,340 
104,812 
Slope 
(Bir) 
37.52 
7.78 
3.58 
23.09 
13.56 
15.82 
1.02 
0.89 
0.24 
0.13 
4.95 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-243.752 
-50,873 
-25,148 
-203,528 
-119,494 
-137,356 
-8,449 
-6,601 
-2,045 
-1,178 
-52,657 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
66,879 
12,217 
55,310 
234,187 
44,342 
159,832 
2,756 
22.875 
549 
215 
4,168 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(SiO 
68,815 
14,989 
22,995 
136,682 
12,738 
37,238 
912 
6,620 
368 
550 
1,528 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
481,714 
100,910 
48,470 
392,691 
234,683 
262,089 
16,700 
12,668 
4.033 
2,340 
104.812 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
617,407 
128,116 
126,775 
763,560 
291,762 
459,159 
20,368 
42,164 
4,950 
3,106 
110,508 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,337 
19,517 
20,573 
25,824 
26,123 
25,257 
24,558 
21,672 
25,651 
27,603 
31,817 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
617,407 
128,116 
126,775 
763,560 
291,762 
459,159 
20,368 
42,164 
4,950 
3,106 
110,508 
Slope 
(dir) 
-34.11 
-7.05 
-6.36 
-30.57 
-11.83 
-18.52 
-0.89 
-2.00 
-0.21 
-0.12 
-3.75 
Intercept 
(cir) 
1,276,931 
265,672 
257,680 
1,553,106 
600,781 
926,966 
42,128 
85.450 
10.224 
6,448 
229,726 
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Table D.4. Clothing 1994 - Model calibration 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
17,382 
13.922 
18,337 
23.056 
18,960 
16,420 
19,328 
23,673 
16,456 
18,731 
13,006 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
19,642 
15,732 
20.721 
26,053 
21,425 
18,555 
21,840 
26.751 
18,595 
21,166 
14,697 
Quota 
premium 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
15,383 
12,320 
16,227 
20,404 
16,779 
14,531 
17,104 
20,950 
14,563 
16,576 
11,510 
Supply equations 
I. Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
II. Unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pie) 
15.383 
12.320 
16.227 
20.404 
16,779 
14,531 
17,104 
20,950 
14,563 
16,576 
11,510 
Price 
(Pif) 
17,382 
13,922 
18,337 
23,056 
18,960 
16,420 
19,328 
23,673 
16,456 
18,731 
13,006 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sie) 
119.654 
40,730 
109.183 
391,041 
88,622 
229,728 
3,943 
44,081 
3.864 
1,491 
24,675 
Volume of 
imports 
(SiO 
130,183 
35,936 
43,203 
201,745 
40,058 
69,582 
1,563 
7,245 
1,456 
1,593 
13,800 
Slope 
(Bie) 
15.56 
6.61 
13.46 
38.33 
10.56 
31.62 
0.46 
4.21 
0.53 
0.18 
4.29 
Slope 
(BiO 
14.98 
5.16 
4.71 
17.50 
4.23 
8.48 
0.16 
0.61 
0.18 
0.17 
2.12 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-119,654 
-40,730 
-109,183 
-391.041 
-88,622 
-229,728 
-3,943 
-44,081 
-3,864 
-1,491 
-24,675 
Intercept 
(AiO 
-130,183 
-35,936 
-43,203 
-201,745 
-40,058 
-69,582 
-1,563 
-7,245 
-1,456 
-1,593 
-13,800 
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Table D.4. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,642 
15,732 
20,721 
26,053 
21,425 
18,555 
21,840 
26,751 
18,595 
21,166 
14,697 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
464,105 
174,240 
3,250 
421,729 
269,307 
322,061 
15,891 
4,617 
17,851 
70,600 
317,159 
Slope 
(Bir) 
35.44 
16.61 
0.24 
24.28 
18.85 
26.04 
1.09 
0.26 
1.44 
5.00 
32.37 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-232,053 
-87,120 
-1,625 
-210,865 
-134.654 
-161,030 
-7,946 
-2,308 
-8,925 
-35,300 
-158,580 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
119,654 
40,730 
109,183 
391,041 
88,622 
229,728 
3,943 
44,081 
3,864 
1,491 
24,675 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(SiO 
130,183 
35,936 
43,203 
201,745 
40,058 
69,582 
1,563 
7,245 
1,456 
1,593 
13,800 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
464,105 
174,240 
3,250 
421,729 
269,307 
322,061 
15,891 
4,617 
17,851 
70,600 
317,159 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
713,942 
250,906 
155,636 
1,014,515 
397,987 
621,371 
21,397 
55,943 
23,171 
73,684 
355,634 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,642 
15,732 
20,721 
26.053 
21,425 
18,555 
21,840 
26,751 
18,595 
21,166 
14,697 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
713,942 
250.906 
155.636 
1,014,515 
397,987 
621,371 
21,397 
55,943 
23,171 
73,684 
355,634 
Slope 
(dir) 
Intercept 
(cir) 
-39.47 1,489,284 
-17.32 
-8.16 
523,390 
324,656 
-42.29 2,116,279 
-20.17 830,202 
-36.37 1.296,180 
-1.06 
-2.27 
-1.35 
-3.78 
-26.28 
44634 
116,697 
48,334 
153,705 
741,853 
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Table D.5. Clothing 1994 - Counterfactual I: Replacement of Community-wide 
restrictions with national quotas 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
17,364 
13,862 
18,035 
23,056 
18,960 
16,495 
19,232 
23,119 
16,474 
18,723 
13,012 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
19.621 
15,664 
20,379 
26,053 
21,425 
18,640 
21,732 
26,124 
18,615 
21,157 
14,704 
Quota 
premium 
1.12 
1.09 
1.09 
1.13 
1.13 
1.15 
1.09 
1.08 
1.14 
1.10 
1.14 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
15,503 
12,717 
16,546 
20,404 
16,779 
14,344 
17,644 
21,407 
14,451 
17,021 
11,414 
Supply equations 
I. Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
II. Unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pie) 
15,503 
12,717 
16,546 
20,404 
16,779 
14,344 
17,644 
21,407 
14,451 
17,021 
11,414 
Price 
(Pif) 
17,364 
13,862 
18,035 
23,056 
18,960 
16,495 
19,232 
23,119 
16,474 
18,723 
13,012 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sie) 
121,529 
43,354 
113,469 
391,041 
88,622 
223,801 
4.192 
46,004 
3,805 
1,571 
24,265 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sio 
129,901 
35,625 
41,780 
201,745 
40,058 
70,218 
1.548 
6,906 
1,459 
1592 
13,813 
Slope 
(Bie) 
15.56 
6.61 
13.46 
38.33 
10.56 
31.62 
0.46 
4.21 
0.53 
0.18 
4.29 
Slope 
(BiO 
14.98 
5.16 
4.71 
17.50 
4.23 
8.48 
0.16 
0.61 
0.18 
0.17 
2.12 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-119,654 
-40,730 
-109,183 
-391.041 
-88,622 
-229,728 
-3,943 
-44,081 
-3,864 
-1.491 
-24,675 
Intercept 
(AiO 
-130,183 
-35,936 
-43,203 
-201,745 
-40,058 
-69,582 
-1,563 
-7,245 
-1,456 
-1,593 
-13,800 
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Table D.5. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
19.621 
15,664 
20,379 
26,053 
21.425 
18,640 
21.732 
26,124 
18.615 
21,157 
14,704 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
463,352 
173,108 
3,169 
421,729 
269,307 
324,269 
15,773 
4,455 
17,880 
70,555 
317,379 
Slope 
(Bir) 
35.44 
16.61 
0.24 
24.28 
18.85 
26.04 
1.09 
0.26 
1.44 
5.00 
32.37 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-232.053 
-871.20 
-1,625 
-210.865 
-134.654 
-161.030 
-7,946 
-2,308 
-8,925 
-35,300 
-158,580 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
121,529 
43,354 
113,469 
391,041 
88,622 
223,801 
4,192 
46,004 
3,805 
1,571 
24,265 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(SiO 
129,901 
35,625 
41,780 
201,745 
40,058 
70,218 
1,548 
6,906 
1,459 
1,592 
13,813 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
463,352 
173,108 
3,169 
421,729 
269,307 
324,269 
15,773 
4,455 
17,880 
70,555 
317,379 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
714,782 
252,086 
158,419 
1,014,515 
397,987 
618,287 
21,512 
573,64 
23,143 
73,718 
355,456 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,621 
15,664 
20,379 
26,053 
21.425 
18,640 
21,732 
26,124 
18,615 
21,157 
14,704 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
714,782 
252,086 
158,419 
1,014,515 
397,987 
618,287 
21,512 
57,364 
23,143 
73,718 
355,456 
Slope 
(dir) 
-39.47 
-17.32 
-8.16 
-42.29 
-20.17 
-36.37 
-1.06 
-2.27 
-1.35 
-3.78 
-26.28 
Intercept 
(cir) 
1,489,284 
523,390 
324,656 
2,116,279 
830,202 
1,296,180 
44,634 
116,697 
48,334 
153,705 
741,853 
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Table D.6. Clothing 1994 - Counterfactual II: Removal of all restrictions to trade 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italv 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
17,112 
13.711 
17,310 
22,280 
18,569 
15,880 
18,992 
22,181 
16,196 
18,693 
12,918 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
19,337 
15,493 
19,561 
25,177 
20,983 
17,945 
21,461 
25,064 
18,302 
21,123 
14,597 
Quota 
premium 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
17,112 
13,711 
17,310 
22,280 
18,569 
15,880 
18.992 
22,181 
16,196 
18,693 
12,918 
Supply equations 
. Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
II. Unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pie) 
17,112 
13,711 
17,310 
22,280 
18.569 
15,880 
18,992 
22.181 
16,196 
18,693 
12,918 
Price 
(Pif) 
17,112 
13,711 
17,310 
22.280 
18,569 
15,880 
18,992 
22.181 
16,196 
18,693 
12,918 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sie) 
146,562 
49,923 
123,756 
462,975 
107,531 
272,383 
4,814 
49,261 
4,731 
1,872 
30,712 
Volume of 
imports 
(SiO 
126,138 
34,845 
38.366 
188,168 
38.405 
65,005 
1,509 
6,331 
1,410 
1,587 
13,613 
Slope 
(Bie) 
15.56 
6.61 
13.46 
38.33 
10.56 
31.62 
0.46 
4.21 
0.53 
0.18 
4.29 
Slope 
(BiO 
14.98 
5.16 
4.71 
17.50 
4.23 
8.48 
0.16 
0.61 
0.18 
0.17 
2.12 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-119,654 
-40,730 
-109,183 
-391,041 
-88,622 
-229,728 
-3,943 
-44,081 
-3,864 
-1,491 
-24,675 
Intercept 
(AiO 
-130,183 
-35,936 
-43,203 
-201,745 
-40,058 
-69,582 
-1563 
-7,245 
-1,456 
-1,593 
-13,800 
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Table D.6. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,337 
15.493 
19,561 
25,177 
20,983 
17,945 
21,461 
25.064 
18.302 
21,123 
14,597 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
453.289 
170.273 
2.977 
400.444 
260,971 
306.174 
15,478 
4.180 
17,427 
70,387 
313,931 
Slope 
(Bir) 
35.44 
16.61 
0.24 
24.28 
18.85 
26.04 
1.09 
0.26 
1.44 
5.00 
32.37 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-232,053 
-87.120 
-1.625 
-210.865 
-134.654 
-161,030 
-7,946 
-2,308 
-8,925 
-35,300 
-158,580 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
146,562 
49,923 
123,756 
462,975 
107,531 
272,383 
4,814 
49,261 
4,731 
1,872 
30,712 
Volume of 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(SiO 
126,138 
34,845 
38,366 
188.168 
38,405 
65,005 
1,509 
6,331 
1,410 
1,587 
13,613 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
453,289 
170,273 
2,977 
400,444 
260,971 
306,174 
15,478 
4,180 
17,427 
70.387 
313,931 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
725,989 
255,041 
165,098 
1,051,588 
406,907 
643,563 
21,800 
59,773 
23,568 
73.845 
358,255 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
-1.086 
Price 
(Pir) 
19,337 
15.493 
19,561 
25,177 
20,983 
17,945 
21,461 
25,064 
18,302 
21.123 
14.597 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
725.989 
255.041 
165,098 
1,051,588 
406,907 
643.563 
21.800 
59.773 
23.568 
73.845 
358,255 
Slope 
(dir) 
-39.47 
-17.32 
-8.16 
-42.29 
-20.17 
-36.37 
-1.06 
-2.27 
-1.35 
-3.78 
-26.28 
Intercept 
(cir) 
1,489.284 
523,390 
324,656 
2,116.279 
830.202 
1,296,180 
44,634 
116,697 
48,334 
153,705 
741,853 
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Table D.7. Footwear 1988 - Model calibration 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(PiD 
14,254 
12,214 
11,763 
19.424 
10.887 
9,359 
7927 
15.222 
11,483 
14,313 
11,065 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
16,107 
13,802 
13,292 
21,949 
12,302 
10,576 
8.958 
17,200 
12,975 
16,174 
12.504 
Quota 
premium 
1.15 
1.17 
1.15 
1.16 
1.13 
1.15 
1.16 
1.16 
1.14 
1.15 
1.17 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
12,420 
10,451 
10,257 
16,722 
9611 
8,139 
6,824 
13,164 
10,080 
12,495 
9,470 
Supply equations 
I. Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pie) 
12,420 
10,451 
10,257 
16,722 
9,611 
8,139 
6,824 
13.164 
10,080 
12,495 
9,470 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sie) 
35.242 
6,646 
13,180 
39,721 
26,074 
30,853 
768 
4.246 
2,713 
121 
4,285 
Slope 
(Bie) 
5.68 
1.27 
2.57 
4.75 
5.43 
7.58 
0.23 
0.65 
0.54 
0.02 
0.90 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-35.242 
-6.646 
-13,180 
-39,721 
-26,074 
-30,853 
-768 
-4,246 
-2,713 
-121 
-4,285 
II. Unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pif) 
14,254 
12,214 
11,763 
19,424 
10,887 
9,359 
7,927 
15,222 
11,483 
14,313 
11,065 
Volume of 
imports 
(SiO 
14.535 
2,916 
6,897 
30,810 
11,639 
27,078 
1,032 
3,484 
458 
147 
796 
Slope 
(BiO 
2.04 
0.48 
1.17 
3.17 
2.14 
5.79 
0.26 
0.46 
0.08 
0.02 
0.14 
Intercept 
(A¡0 
-14.535 
-2,916 
-6,897 
-30,810 
-11,639 
-27,078 
-1,032 
-3,484 
-458 
-147 
-796 
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Table D.7. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
16,107 
13,802 
13,292 
21,949 
12,302 
10.576 
8,958 
17,200 
12,975 
16,174 
12,504 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
141,208 
26.490 
38,052 
187,222 
57,226 
185,501 
14,566 
12,210 
16,788 
1,521 
56,325 
Slope 
(Bir) 
13.15 
2.88 
4.29 
12.79 
6.98 
26.31 
2.44 
1.06 
1.94 
0.14 
6.76 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-70,604 
-13,245 
-19,026 
-93,611 
-28.613 
-92,750 
-7.283 
-6,105 
-8,394 
-760 
-28,163 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
35,242 
6,646 
13,180 
39,721 
26,074 
30,853 
768 
4,246 
2,713 
121 
4,285 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(SiO 
14,535 
2,916 
6,897 
30,810 
11,639 
27,078 
1,032 
3,484 
458 
147 
796 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
141,208 
26,490 
38,052 
187,222 
57,226 
185,501 
14,566 
12,210 
16,788 
1.521 
56,325 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
190,985 
36,052 
58,129 
257,753 
94,939 
243,432 
16,366 
19,940 
19,959 
1,789 
61.406 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
Price 
(Pir) 
16.107 
13,802 
13,292 
21,949 
12.302 
10,576 
8,958 
17,200 
12,975 
16,174 
12,504 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
190,985 
36,052 
58,129 
257,753 
94,939 
243,432 
16,366 
19,940 
19,959 
1,789 
61,406 
Slope 
(dir) 
-8.89 
-1.96 
-3.28 
-8.81 
-5.79 
-17.26 
-1.37 
-0.87 
-1.15 
-0.08 
-3.68 
Intercept 
(cir) 
334,223 
63,091 
101,726 
451,068 
166,144 
426,005 
28,641 
34,894 
34,929 
3,130 
107,461 
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Table D.8. Footwear 1988 - Counterfactual: Removal of all restrictions to trade 
Price equation: 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
13.935 
11.904 
11.448 
19.027 
10,572 
9.212 
7.875 
14.818 
11.299 
14.193 
10.953 
s 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
15.746 
13.451 
12.937 
21.500 
11.947 
10.409 
8.899 
16,744 
12,768 
16,038 
12,377 
Quota 
premium 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
13.935 
11.904 
11,448 
19.027 
10.572 
9,212 
7.875 
14.818 
11,299 
14,193 
10.953 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply equations 
I. Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pie) 
13.935 
11.904 
11.448 
19,027 
10,572 
9.212 
7,875 
14,818 
11.299 
14,193 
10.953 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sie) 
43.841 
8.493 
16.241 
50,673 
31,287 
38,988 
1,005 
5,313 
3,369 
154 
5,627 
Slope 
(Bie) 
5.68 
1.27 
2.57 
4.75 
5.43 
7.58 
0.23 
0.65 
0.54 
0.02 
0.90 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-35.242 
-6,646 
-13,180 
-39.721 
-26,074 
-30,853 
-768 
-4.246 
-2.713 
-121 
-4,285 
II. Unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(PiO 
13,935 
11,904 
11.448 
19,027 
10,572 
9.212 
7.875 
14.818 
11,299 
14.193 
10,953 
Volume of 
imports 
(SiO 
13,884 
2.768 
6.528 
29,550 
10,966 
26.223 
1,018 
3.299 
443 
145 
780 
Slope 
(BiO 
2.04 
0.48 
1.17 
3.17 
2.14 
5.79 
0.26 
0.46 
0.08 
0.02 
0.14 
Intercept 
(AiO 
-14,535 
-2,916 
-6,897 
-30,810 
-11,639 
-27.078 
-1,032 
-3,484 
-458 
-147 
-796 
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Table D.8. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
15,746 
13,451 
12,937 
21,500 
11,947 
10,409 
8.899 
16,744 
12,768 
16,038 
12,377 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
136,465.60 
25.479.02 
36.525.99 
181.481.40 
54.744.88 
181.105.20 
14.423.14 
11.723.95 
16,386.03 
1,501.65 
55.467.55 
Slope 
(Bir) 
13.15 
2.88 
4.29 
12.79 
6.98 
26.31 
2.44 
1.06 
1.94 
0.14 
6.76 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-70.604 
-13.245 
-19.026 
-93.611 
-28,613 
-92,750 
-7.283 
-6,105 
-8.394 
-760 
-28,163 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
'olume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
43,841 
8,493 
16,241 
50,673 
31,287 
38,988 
1.005 
5,313 
3,369 
154 
5,627 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(SiO 
13,884 
2,768 
6,528 
29,550 
10,966 
26,223 
1.018 
3,299 
443 
145 
780 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
136.466 
25,479 
36,526 
181.481 
54,745 
181,105 
14,423 
11,724 
16,386 
1,502 
55,468 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
194,191 
36,740 
59,295 
261,704 
96,998 
246,316 
16,446 
20,336 
20,198 
1,800 
61,874 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
Price 
(Pir) 
15,746 
13,451 
12,937 
21,500 
11,947 
10,409 
8,899 
16,744 
12,768 
16.038 
12,377 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
194,191 
36.740 
59,295 
261,704 
96,998 
246,316 
16.446 
20.336 
20,198 
1.800 
61,874 
Slope 
(dir) 
-8.89 
-1.96 
-3.28 
-8.81 
-5.79 
-17.26 
-1.37 
-0.87 
-1.15 
-0.08 
-3.68 
Intercept 
(cir) 
334,223 
63,091 
101,726 
451,068 
166.144 
426.005 
28,641 
34,894 
34,929 
3,130 
107,461 
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Table D.9. Footwear 1994 - Model calibration 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy-
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
12,254 
11,709 
9,800 
16,047 
11,558 
10,679 
9,645 
14,613 
11,096 
26,342 
12.924 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
13,847 
13,232 
11.074 
18,133 
13,061 
12,068 
10,899 
16,513 
12,539 
29,767 
14,604 
Quota 
premium 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
1.15 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
10.655 
10.182 
8.522 
13.954 
10.051 
9.286 
8.387 
12.707 
9,649 
22,906 
11,238 
Supply equations 
I. Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pie) 
10,655 
10.182 
8,522 
13,954 
10,051 
9,286 
8.387 
12,707 
9.649 
22,906 
11,238 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sie) 
25,434 
14,344 
21,366 
44,389 
10.057 
9,016 
7,251 
2,613 
2,964 
889 
5,056 
Slope 
(Bie) 
4.77 
2.82 
5.01 
6.36 
2.00 
1.94 
1.73 
0.41 
0.61 
0.08 
0.90 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-25,434 
-14.344 
-21.366 
-44.389 
-10,057 
-9.016 
-7,251 
-2,613 
-2.964 
-889 
-5,056 
II. Unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pif) 
12,254 
11.709 
9.800 
16,047 
11.558 
10.679 
9.645 
14.613 
11.096 
26,342 
12.924 
Volume of 
imports 
(SiO 
44.560 
7,734 
39,557 
93.644 
76.521 
68,821 
3.771 
6,087 
3.594 
1,796 
9.121 
Slope 
(BiO 
7.27 
1.32 
8.07 
11.67 
13.24 
12.89 
0.78 
0.83 
0.65 
0.14 
1.41 
Intercept 
(AiO 
-44.560 
-7,734 
-39.557 
-93,644 
-76.521 
-68.821 
-3,771 
-6,087 
-3,594 
-1,796 
-9.121 
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Table D.9. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
13,847 
13,232 
11.074 
18.133 
13.061 
12.068 
10.899 
16.513 
12.539 
29,767 
14,604 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
149.981 
21.666 
28.614 
226.486 
82.090 
120,195 
6.829 
17,034 
25,870 
9.156 
25,065 
Slope 
(Bir) 
16.25 
2.46 
3.88 
18.74 
9.43 
14.94 
0.94 
1.55 
3.09 
0.46 
2.57 
Intercept 
(Air; 
-74.991 
-10.833 
-14.307 
-113243 
-41.045 
-60.098 
-3.414 
-8,517 
-12.935 
-4.578 
-12,532 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
25,434 
14,344 
21,366 
44,389 
10,057 
9,016 
7.251 
2,613 
2,964 
889 
5.056 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(SiO 
44,560 
7.734 
39,557 
93.644 
76.521 
68,821 
3,771 
6,087 
3.594 
1,796 
9,121 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
149.981 
21,666 
28,614 
226.486 
82.090 
120.195 
6.829 
17.034 
25,870 
9.156 
25.065 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
219.975 
43,744 
89,537 
364,519 
168.668 
198.032 
17,851 
25.734 
32.428 
11.841 
39,242 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
Price 
(Pir) 
13,847 
13,232 
11,074 
18,133 
13,061 
12,068 
10,899 
16.513 
12.539 
29,767 
14,604 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
219,975 
43,744 
89,537 
364,519 
168.668 
198.032 
17,851 
25,734 
32.428 
11.841 
39,242 
Slope 
(dir) 
-11.91 
-2.48 
-6.06 
-15.08 
-9.69 
-12.31 
-1.23 
-1.17 
-1.94 
-0.30 
-2.02 
Intercept 
(cir) 
384,957 
76,551 
156,689 
637,908 
295,169 
346,557 
31,239 
45,035 
56.750 
20,722 
68,673 
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Table D.10. Footwear 1994 - Counterfactual: Reintroduction of national quotas on 
imports from countries previously restricted 
Price equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Unit value 
(unrestr'd) 
(Pif) 
12.340 
11.830 
9.971 
16.278 
11.807 
10.772 
9.776 
14,730 
11,119 
26,397 
13,059 
CET 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
1.13 
Domestic 
price 
(Pir) 
13.944 
13.368 
11.267 
18.394 
13.341 
12.172 
11.047 
16,645 
12,564 
29.828 
14,757 
Quota 
premium 
1.15 
1.17 
1.15 
1.16 
1.13 
1.15 
1.16 
1.16 
1.14 
1.15 
1.17 
Unit value 
(restricted) 
(Pie) 
10,752 
10,122 
8,695 
14,013 
10,423 
9,367 
8,415 
12,739 
9,761 
23,044 
11,177 
Supply equations 
Constrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
II. Previously unconstrained suppliers 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Supply 
elasticity 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Price 
(Pie) 
10,752 
10,122 
8,695 
14,013 
10,423 
9,367 
8,415 
12,739 
9.761 
23,044 
11,177 
Price 
(Pif) 
12,340 
11,830 
9,971 
16,278 
11,807 
10,772 
9.776 
14.730 
11,119 
26,397 
13,059 
Volume of 
imports 
(Sie) 
25,893 
14,176 
22,233 
44.769 
10,803 
9,173 
7.300 
2,626 
3,033 
900 
5,001 
Volume of 
imports 
(SiO 
41,371 
7,229 
36,769 
84,431 
70,408 
65,809 
3,401 
5,713 
3,396 
1,739 
8,475 
Slope 
(Bie) 
4.77 
2.82 
5.01 
6.36 
2.00 
1.94 
1.73 
0.41 
0.61 
0.08 
0.90 
Slope 
(BiO 
7.27 
1.32 
8.07 
11.67 
13.24 
12.89 
0.78 
0.83 
0.65 
0.14 
1.41 
Intercept 
(Aie) 
-25,434 
-14,344 
-21,366 
-44,389 
-10.057 
-9,016 
-7,251 
-2.613 
-2.964 
-889 
-5,056 
Intercept 
(A¡0 
-44,560 
-7.734 
-39,557 
-93,644 
-76,521 
-68.821 
-3,771 
-6,087 
-3,594 
-1,796 
-9,121 
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Table D.10. (continued) 
III. Domestic supply 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Supply 
elasticity 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
Price 
(Pir) 
13.944 
13,368 
11.267 
18.394 
13.341 
12.172 
11.047 
16.645 
12.564 
29.828 
14,757 
Volume of 
production 
(Sir) 
151.556 
22.000.47 
29.362.65 
231.380.60 
84.736.91 
121.761 
6.967.992 
17.239.58 
25.949.42 
9,184.425 
25,458.06 
Slope 
(Bir) 
16.25 
2.46 
3.88 
18.74 
9.43 
14.94 
0.94 
1.55 
3.09 
0.46 
2.57 
Intercept 
(Air) 
-74.991 
-10,833 
-14.307 
-113.243 
-41.045 
-60.098 
-3.414 
-8,517 
-12,935 
-4.578 
-12,532 
Equilibrium conditions 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Volume of Volume of 
restricted 
imports 
(Sie) 
25.893 
14,176 
22.233 
44,769 
10,803 
9,173 
7,300 
2,626 
3,033 
900 
5.001 
unrestr'd 
imports 
(S¡0 
41,371 
7,229 
36,769 
84,431 
70,408 
65,809 
3,401 
5,713 
3,396 
1,739 
8,475 
Volume of Volume of 
domestic 
production 
(Sir) 
151,556 
22,000 
29.363 
231,381 
84,737 
121,761 
6,968 
17,240 
25,949 
9,184 
25.458 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
218,820 
43,406 
88,364 
360,580 
165,948 
196,743 
17,669 
25.579 
32,379 
11.823 
38.934 
Demand equations 
France 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Demand 
elasticity 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
-0.75 
Price 
(Pir) 
13.944 
13.368 
11.267 
18.394 
13.341 
12,172 
11,047 
16,645 
12.564 
29,828 
14,757 
Volume of 
domestic 
demand 
(Dir) 
218.820 
43.406 
88.364 
360.580 
165,948 
196,743 
17.669 
25,579 
32.379 
11.823 
38,934 
Slope 
(dir) 
-11.91 
-2.48 
-6.06 
-15.08 
-9.69 
-12.31 
-1.23 
-1.17 
-1.94 
-0.30 
-2.02 
Intercept 
(cir) 
384.957 
76.551 
156.689 
637,908 
295.169 
346.557 
31,239 
45.035 
56,750 
20,722 
68,673 
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